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PREFACE

The idea for this thesis came from James J.
Dougherty's The Politics of Wartime Aid: American Economic
Assistance to France and French West Africa 1940-1946. In
Dougherty's book the chapter on "Arab Nationalism
and the United States" struck me because of the problems the
North African invasion caused American policy makers by
raising the hopes of the North Africans for independence. I
looked up some of Dougherty's references in the National
Archives in Washington only to discover that a story
unfolded in the despatches from Hooker Doolittle, Paul
O'Neill, and Marcel Malige.
Not only was the story interesting, but the strong
differences of opinion about the United States policy toward
the Tunisian nationalists were similar to those over policy
toward Vietnam and Nicaragua. In all three cases there was
a reluctance by the policy makers in Washington to heed the
advice of the diplomats most knowledgeable about those areas
and to ignore the basic concerns of the people living there.
Instead local concerns have been subordinated to global
ones.
I would especially like to thank my adviser, Dr.
Bernard Burke, for his help and encouragement. He went
beyond the call of duty in reading and re-reading many rough
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drafts of the thesis. Dr. Jon Mandaville let me sit in on
his class on Islamic Civilization and gave me some valuable
insight into the North African world. I am grateful to the
other members of my committee, Dr. Charles Le Guin and Dr.
Michael Reardon, for their suggestions about the thesis.
In talking with Paul O'Neill, I learned of things such
as the outpouring of emotion in Tunisia at the time of
Roosevelt's death, that were not to be found in the
Archives. Marcel Malige was kind enough to write
answering my questions and describing his impressions of
Bourguiba.
Doolittle's daughter, Katya Coon (Mrs. Maurice Coon),
spent a day with me at her home in Marshfield,
Massachusetts and gave me material that was otherwise
unavailable. Her sister, Natasha Van Deusen (Mrs. E.R. Van
Deusen), filled me in on her recollections of Doolittle's
meetings with Bourguiba in Alexandria. Katya Coon's
daughter, Elena Prentice, who lives in Paris, contacted
people for me to meet or talk with who had been in Tunisia
during the war.
Sabine Vauclain arranged for my husband and me to
exchange our house for Yves and

Andr~e

Haas' apartment in

Paris making it possible for me to do research at the
Biblioth\que Nationale and at the Minist\re des Affaires
'trang\res. AndrJe Haas, whose first husband was killed at
Toulon fighting with the Free French, introduced me to
Suzanne Broche, whose husband had also been with the Free
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French and had been killed in the fighting at Bir Hakeim.
Madame Broche, who had grown up in Tunisia, shared with me
her memories of the war years in Tunisia, especailly those
under German occupation. Yves Haas, another former Free
French fighter, explained how there were very few Frenchmen
joining the de Gaulle forces at the beginning. Tamara
Kinski, whose family had immigrated to France from Tiflis,
Georgia at the time of the October Revolution, remembered
seeing Hooker Doolittle in Egypt with his wife, who had also
come from Tiflis. Tamara's father, a member of the French
Foreign Legion, was killed fighting with the Free French at
El Alamein. Tamara helped me to understand differences in
French politics and offered to introduce me to Madame Mast,
who was unfortunately away from Paris.
Estelle de Montgoflier of Avignon, France, whose
parents were French doctors in Tunisia, described many
aspects of Tunisian culture. Woods Vest helped find the
addresses of Katya Coon and Marcel Malige.
Stuart Gates of Portland, who knew Doolittle in
Tangiers, found two pictures of himself and Doolittle when
they were both living in Tangiers which he had reproduced
for me, one of which is included.
My brother, Allen Staley, and his wife, Etheleen, let
me stay in their house while I worked at the Hyde Park
library and my brother had many useful suggestions about
writing the thesis. My daughter and her husband, Martha and
Carter Wormeley, let me combine visiting with them and doing
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research at the Archives and Library of Congress. Sally
Marks, Kathy Nicastro, and John Taylor were helpful at the
Archives and have subsequently found documents for me. My
husband, John, has helped me with making the thesis more
readable and has let the thesis take precedence over other
activities.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A conflict arose in Tunisia during World War II among
State Department representatives over the United States
response to the Tunisian independence movement. Hooker
Doolittle, the American Consul General in Tunis, was aware
of and sensitive to Tunisian nationalism. He reported it in
numerous letters to the State Department. Robert Murphy,
Civil Affairs Officer on General Dwight Eisenhower's staff,
on the other hand, thought any recognition by the United
States of nationalist desires of the North Africans would
jeopardize relations with the French.
Eisenhower backed Murphy because French cooperation
had been important not only in preparation for the North
African invasion, but afterwards for its administration.
Eisenhower wanted the French to administer the area in order
not to tie up his forces in the responsibilities of an
occupation army. Anticipating the landing of the Allied
Expeditionary Force in France, Eisenhower was well aware
that French cooperation would be equally important there.
For the French, humiliated by their recent defeat, it
was important to hold on to their Empire, for it along with
their navy and the unoccupied portion of the mainland was
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what remained to them to use as bar g ai ni n g chips with the
Germans . Later when German defeat seeme d probable, they
needed the Empire to regain their great power status .
After United States and British troo p s had landed in
North Africa and driven the Germans o ut , the French resorted
to harsh and repressive measures against the North Africans
to regain the u pper hand . In Tunisia they went so far as to
depose the Bey . They claimed he had collaborated with the
Axis , but the real reason was his support of nationalist
goals .
Doolittle, aware of the injustice of this step as
well as the French mistreatment of the Tunisians, urged
the State Depart men t to intervene with the French and
attempt to influence them not to depose the Bey and to
ameliorate their treatment of t h e Tunisians . He realized
that American prestige which had been high with the North
Africans at th e beginning of the war was suffering from
these French actions. The North Africans we re holding the
United States accounta ble as allies of the French . In some
cases the Frenc h were saying that they were carrying out
repressive measures at the requ e st o f the Anglo -American
command . Doolittl e , furthermore, thought the United States
should uphold the pr in ciples of the Atlantic Charter , or as
his daughter said in an intervi e w, he thought America should
stand for something .
Unfortunately for all c once r ned , Mu rphy saw only the
Fre nch position. He ha d wo rk ed in France be f o r e t h e war . In
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preparation for the North African invasion, he had worked
with members of the military and other French in North
Africa. By his own admission, he knew nothing about the
North Africans. He only knew that any suspicion of American
encouragement for North African goals of independence upset
the French.
It was because Doolittle had upset the French by his
Tunisian sympathies that Murphy asked the State Department
for his recall. Doolittle's position was not without
supporters in the State Department. Among these was Edward
Stettinius, who was serving as Acting Secretary of State at
the time. Stettinius and others thought that Doolittle's
point of view was of sufficient importance to the United
States that President Roosevelt should hear it. Thus it was
that Doolittle had an interview with the President. Unlike
Murphy, Roosevelt was sympathetic with the North Africans,
but no policy changes resulted from the interview. If
anybody could have effected a change in United States
policy, it was the President, but he declined to do so.
Undoubtedly he did not intervene because he wanted to back
up Eisenhower. Also, Roosevelt had appointed Murphy as his
personal representative to report directly to him. Having
initially by-passed the State Department and relied on
Murphy for political advice about North Africa, Roosevelt
probably did not want to oppose Murphy's decision in the
Doolittle dispute.
Furthermore, the Doolittle matter came to his
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attention at a time when he was preoccupied with another
controversy - that between General Charles de Gaulle and
Henri Giraud. Roosevelt had been troubled by this dispute
since the landings and at the time of Doolittle's recall it
was at one of its crisis points. With Giraud's eventual
elimination from the political picture, the de Gaulle-Giraud
conflict was settled, but not the conflict between Roosevelt
and de Gaulle. This would last until Roosevelt's death. Its
consequences on French-American relations have probably
lasted until today. Ignoring North African concerns has
produced consequences that are less well known, but have
been important ever since. Americans lost some good will and
were seen as partisans of French colonialism. Could the
United States have done any differently under the
circumstances? To understand how American actions evolved in
Tunisia, it is necessary to look at American relations
toward the French from the beginning of the war.

CHAPTER II

FALL OF FRANCE

The fall of France brought about changes in French
leadership. One of the American responses to this new
leadership was an increased interest in North Africa.
On May 14, 1940 the Germans broke through the French
lines at Sedan. The invasion was not unexpected since both
France and England had declared war on Germany on September
3, 1939 after the latter had attacked Poland. Even with
British help, however, French troops were no match for the
well prepared Germans with their heavy tanks and dive
bombers. French Premier Paul Reynaud and his recently
appointed Under-Secretary of State for War, Charles de
Gaulle, were determined to continue fighting, but there were
others in the military and government that considered the
French position hopeless and thought the French should seek
an armistice. Among these were Marshal Henri Pltain, the new
Minister of War, and General Maxim Weygand, who had been
called from his post in Syria on May 19 to take charge of
the faltering French army. There was little Weygand could do
to reverse the situation. Part of the French and British
forces were trappec at Dunkirk and had to be evacuated
across the chanenl in a dramatic rescue operation. The
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British and French navy as well as numerous small boats
brought two hundred and sixty thousand British and ninety
thousand French to England. With his troops severely
reduced, Weygand was unable to withstand the German advance
toward Paris. To make matters worse, the Italians declared
war on France June 11 crossing the Italo-French frontier in
the south. This "stab in the back" was bitterly resented by
the French and would later cause problems for the Italians
in Tunisia.
Reynaud pleaded with both Winston Churchill and
Franklin Roosevelt for help. The latter could offer only
material and moral support as Congress alone could declare
war, and it was not prepared to do so at that time. As for
Churchill, Reynaud beseeched him to send more planes. On
June 9 Reynaud expressed to United States Ambassador to
France William Bullitt his disappointment with the English:
in spite of eleven telegrams and seven personal
telephone conversations he had been unable to
persuade Churchill to put into the present battle
more than one fourth of the British pursuit
planes. (1)
Churchill, anticipating the need for planes for England's
own defense, felt that he could not send more.
Churchill's refusal to send more planes reinforced the
position of those like Pitain and Weygand who wanted an
armistice. Pltain told Bullitt that he thought England would
allow Germany to defeat France and then make a compromise
peace.

(2) Reynaud, however, had promised Churchill that as

long as he remained premier, "France would fight to the
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bitter end."

(3) He felt honor bound to the pledge both

countries had jointly made in March not to sign a separate
armistice or peace without the prior consent of the
other.

( 4) Nevertheless, on June 13 when Churchi 11 came to

Tours to which the government had retreated when the Germans
reached the outskirts of Paris, Reynaud asked him what the
English reaction would be should France be forced to ask for
peace terms. Churchill replied:
We shall not heap reproaches on an unfortunate ally
and if we are victorious, we assume the unconditional
obligation to raise France from her ruins. (5)
As sympathetic as Churchill's response was, he could not
answer for his government. After his return to England and
consultation with the cabinet, Churchill sent a proposal to
the French, that the two countries form a union. Having had
to move farther south to Bordeaux on June 14, the French
cabinet was in too great a state of confusion to consider
seriously this innovative and generous offer. While it
rejected this proposal, there were those who wanted to hold
out in a "Breton redoubt" while others favored moving the
government to North Africa. The majority, however, wanted an
armistice. Lacking the support of the cabinet in his
determination to fight on, Reynaud stepped down on June 17
in favor of PJtain, who immediately sought peace terms with
the Germans. A ship carrying a group of French deputies,
including Pierre M~ndes-France, actually sailed for Morocco.
Unfortunately by the time they landed, the government in
France had changed and they were put under arrest on their
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arrival.
General August NogJes, Resident General of Morocco and
Commander-in-Chief of the North African troops, wanted to
continue the fight. He sent a message to Weygand urging him
not to stop lest France "lose forever the esteem and
confidence of the indigenous people."

(6) He himself was

ready to continue the fight and was ready to enter into
dissidence if he was authorized. In a cable to Petain he
warned that if France did not defend North Africa, she would
have trouble maintaining her authority "for one doesn't
govern in scorn."

(7) Weygand found the idea of continuing

the fighting "absurd" and "odious".

(8)

In Tunisia, too,

according to Charles Heisler, the American consul there, the
French had wished to continue the struggle. When Marcel
Peyrouton, the Resident General there, accepted the
armistice, it was not popular. Nor were the British popular
as the French in Tunisia thought they had not aided France
sufficiently.

(9)

P'tain at 84 was known as the hero of Verdun. While
there were questions whether this tribute was deserved,
there were even more about his treatment of Reynaud and
other members of the previous administration who were
arrested and imprisoned. The new cabinet needed a scapegoat
for the defeat and what was more natural than to blame the
previous cabinet. In letters to p/tain from prison, copies
of which managed to go to Roosevelt, Reynaud questioned
Pdtain about why he was accusing him, Reynaud, of being
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responsible for losing the war when it was really P/tain who
had vetoed his plan of using tanks. Reynaud reminded P/tain
that he had for years "tried to open the eyes of Parliament
to the deadly peril that threatened our country."

(10)

While Reynaud and others were unjustly accused, there
was a tendency throughout France to blame the Third Republic
with its parliamentary type government and ever changing
premiers for the national disgrace. This climate of opinion
seemed to call for a more authoritarian government. On July
10 the Chamber of Deputies gave full powers to P/tain and

made him the head of the French State. This new
authoritarian government instituted what was called the
"national revolution", with the slogan "work, family and
country". The national revolution was a revolution from the
top with all power coming from the state. Above all it
represented a shift to the right bringing to power an
element in France that was both nationalistic and intolerant
of minorities. Freemasons, Jews, and socialists were looked
upon with suspicion. This aspect of French politics had been
seen before in the persecution of Dreyfus and has been seen
since in the recent gains of the National Front in the 1984
election for the European Parliament.
While Vichy was characterized by internal
authoritarianism, externally it was characterized by its
collaboration with Adolph Hitler. By the armistice terms
Hitler had left France with a semblance of sovereignty.
Though Germany occupied three-fifths of France, the
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southeastern part was left free and established itself at
the spa town of Vichy whose hotels were used for government
offices. Hitler also allowed France to keep her fleet, her
colonies and to maintain an armistice army. A France that
seemed sovereign saved Germany from the job of total
occupation and of keeping order in its rear during the
contemplated assault on England.
While there were those in

P~ain's

government such as

Weygand who were fiercely anti-German, there were others who
thought that France's future lay with the Germans. Among
these were a group of French financiers and industrialists
called the Banque Worms whose business interests would best
be served by a German victory. Organized into a political
pressure group, the Banque Worms took its name from the
parent organization Worms et Cie., a banking house which had
long standing German connections through its heavy industry
interests. This group wanted complete political and economic
collaboration with Germany and to encourage a negotiated
peace between Germany and England should the opportunity
occur. Instead of operating as a party, it insinuated its
members into the most important political positions. Two
members of the group who held posts in the Vichy government
were Paul Baudouin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Pierre
Pucheu, Minister of the Interior.

(11)

Pierre Laval, a former deputy and one time prime
minister, came into the government without portfolio.
According to Weygand, he persuaded Pltain not to make Laval
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foreign minister because of his hatred of the British. Soon,
however, Laval, an astute politician, became the dominant
member of the cabinet with the title of vice-premier and
exerted a strong and, as Weygand called it,
influence on Pitain.

"pernicious"

(12) While Laval was above all for

France, he preferred her destiny to be linked with Germany
rather than with the Anglo-Saxon countries. He expected
Germany to win the war and hoped that France would be a
favored part of the new German order. To insure her post-war
position, she needed to co-operate with Hitler during the
war.

In a talk on July 30, 1940 with Robert Murphy, the

United States chargl d'affaires, Laval said that a German
had quoted the Axis representative at Paris as saying that
the Germans did not expect to crush France, but they planned
a European federation of states in which France
will play an important role compatible with its
dignity and tradition. (13)
And further:
speaking personally and off the record, he [Laval)
said he had announced it before and did not
hesitate again to say 'that he hoped ardently that
the English would be defeated.' (14)
In pursuit of his policy Laval arranged a meeting between
Hitler and PJtain to discuss closer French-German
cooperation against England at Montoire-sur-Loire on October
31 and November 1, 1940. As a result of this meeting, Hitler
left it up to the French to defend themselves against the
English in North Africa. In spite of Laval's success in
arranging this meeting, Pltain was dissatisfied with him and
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dismissed him from his cabinet in December. Laval treated
PJtain with disdain. Pjtain feared that Laval intended to
make him a figurehead and make himself head of state.

(15)

PJtain now showed increasing confidence in Admiral
Francois Darlan, his Minister of Marine, who by February was
appointed vice-premier and "heir apparent" to the
Marshal.

(16) Darlan probably hated the British as much as

Laval if not more. As a navy man Darlan resented the
limitation that had been put on the French navy at the
Washington Naval Conference in 1922 when France had been
allotted the same number of ships as Italy, below that of
England, America, or even Japan. In case he might have
overlooked this slight, he could never forgive the British
for the Mers-el-Kebir incident. A large part of the French
navy in order to escape from the Germans had fled to the
port of Mers-el-Kebir in Algeria. In spite of assurances
from Darlan that the fleet would be scuttled rather than be
allowed to fall into German hands, the British were not
completely convinced. Feeling they could not risk such an
eventuality, the British on July 3, 1940 sent an ultimatum
to the French admiral in charge of the ships at
Mers-el-Kebir demanding that the fleet proceed either to
Britain, the West Indies, or to a United States port to be
interned. When the French admiral refused, the British
opened fire on the ships putting many out of commission and
killing over one thousand Frenchmen.
This incident reinforced the anglophobia of Darlan and
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of the French navy. It did not help any French feeling
toward their former ally, and it particularly embittered the
French in North Africa, some of whom had watched the ships
burning from the nearby city of Oran. The damage done to
French-British relations by Mers-el-Kebir was enormous. The
French cabinet was so angry that Foreign Minister Baudouin
even wanted France to join Germany in the war against
England.

{17) While Pitain restrained the cabinet from

taking this step, it did break diplomatic relations with
Britain two days later. Pdtain attributed Mers-el-Kebir "to
the snap judgment of 'Winston Churchill who is capable of
almost any rash act when drunk as he frequently is.'"

{18)

Hating the British need not, however, have meant
actively pursuing the policy of collaboration which Darlan
embarked upon. Like Laval, Darlan was confident that the
Germans would "win the war and establish a new order in
Europe."

{19) Darlan envisioned a new continental system in

which France would be a naval and imperial power. He thought
a German victory which would weaken England would help bring
this about.

{20) Darlan's policy of collaboration culminated

in May 1941 with the signing of what were called the Paris
Protocols, which gave the Germans the use of Syrian
airfields, the use of Bizerte in Tunis for General Erwin
Rommel's Afrika Corps and a future submarine base at
Dakar.

{21)

Unlike Laval, who never wavered from his

pro-German stance, Darlan, considered an opportunist, would
later switch his allegiance. He preferred to be on the
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winning side. When Germany invaded Russia in June 1941, he
probably realized that a German victory was less certain.
At the time of the armistice there was one member of
Reynaud's cabinet whose allegiance was beyond question.
Charles de Gaulle, who had just been promoted to General,
was bitterly opposed to the armistice. Later he managed to
escape to England and there he appealed to other Frenchmen
to join him to continue the fight against the Germans. At
that time de Gaulle was relatively unknown, though during
the 1930's he had written a book advocating the use of tanks
as an important element in French military strategy. While
Premier Reynaud had favored the idea, he had not been able
to bring the rest of the government to implement the
proposal. It was said that Hitler made use of de Gaulle's
ideas in modernizing the German army. During the Nazi
invasion de Gaulle had fought well in the north of France
and had been commended by Weygand for his efforts there. On
meeting him Bullitt wrote Roosevelt that this general, who
had two weeks before been a colonel in the tank corps, had
"showed great initiative and courage in stemming the German
advance on Paris."

(22) He found that he was a young man who

appeared "vigorous and intelligent."

(23) He was thus known

as a sound military thinker and a good soldier, but he did
not have the prestige of heroes of the first World War such
as Pdtain and Weygand. The PJtain government, considering
him a traitor for breaking with them and leaving for
England, condemned him to death in absentia by a military
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tribunal August 2, 1940.
While Churchill decided to support de Gaulle, who was
the only Frenchman rallying others to the side of Britain,
very few French leaders who had left France joined de Gaulle
at this time. Some of the soldiers who had been evacuated at
Dunkirk stayed on and became part of the Free French
Divisions while gradually others came from France and the
colonies. Eventually the Free French had two divisions, one
of which fought alongside the British in Libya against
Rommel while the other went to Syria before going to North
Africa.
With the British radio at his disposal, de Gaulle was
able to encourage the mainland French and gained stature
with them. Slowly a resistance developed in France with many
members who looked toward de Gaulle as their leader. He also
won the adherence of several of the colonies including Chad
and the Cameroons.
In North Africa, however, de Gaulle was looked on with
distrust. He was seen as too closely connected with the
British, the perpetrators of Mers-el-Kebir. His movement was
even thought to serve as a screen for British imperial
ambitions. This suspicion was strengthened when de Gaulle
and the British joined forces in September 1940 in an
attempt to take over Dakar. The British wanted Dakar in
order to protect British shipping. Although de Gaulle
thought the Dakar garrison would rally to him, instead they
put up a stiff resistance resulting in French killing
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French. The attackers were turned back. Not only was the
invasion a failure, it increased anti-British hatred among
the French. It also increased their distrust of de Gaulle
and the Free French. One of the causes of the defeat seemed
to have been that the Free French had talked about it in
London too openly. From that time on, Churchill considered
them "leaky" and was hesitant to inform them of any plans in
advance. This was true of both the North African invasion as
well as that of the European continent.
A similar situation occurred ten months later in June
1941 when the Free French and British attacked Syria to
prevent Darlan from turning over Syrian airfields to the
Germans. Again there were French fighting French, which did
not endear de Gaulle to the French in North Africa.
Weygand used these attacks by de Gaulle to extract
more troops from Hitler in order to build up the armistice
army. The French military officers in North Africa were
determined to keep both the British and Germans out of this
area. To allow either to enter would bring reprisals from
the other. It was because Hitler had been so impressed by
the French defense at Dakar that he had agreed to the
meeting at Montoire.
For his part it was because of Montoire that de Gaulle
in October made a declaration at Brazzaville that Vichy was
no longer legitimate. De Gaulle thought that the
collaboration of Vichy with the enemy had been officially
proclaimed at that meeting.

(24) He took upon himself the
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responsibility of looking after the interests of France. He
promised to give an accounting "to the sovereign
people . . . when liberty was regained."

(25) Having started

as a purely military movement, de Gaulle's Free French had
become a political one as well.
While relations between de Gaulle and Churchill were
often difficult, they endured for the length of the war.
Churchill not only wanted these Frenchmen fighting alongside
the British, he wanted the strong post-war France that de
Gaulle envisioned. A strong France, of course, meant to both
men a France with her empire intact.
President Franklin Roosevelt and Secretary of State
Cordell Hull had quite different ideas about de Gaulle and
the ultimate disposition of the French Empire. As for de
Gaulle, the United States could not recognize his movement
so long as it continued to maintain relations with Vichy.
Besides, in the summer of 1940 de Gaulle was still an
unknown quantity. De Gaulle made sure that he did not remain
unknown, but his ways of asserting himself and his movement
often resulted in his alienating not just Roosevelt and
Hull, but even Churchill.
Underlying personality clashes and difficulties over
recognition were fundamental differences between Roosevelt
and Hull on the one hand and Churchill and de Gaulle on the
other over the question of colonialism. While more has been
written about Roosevelt's differences with Churchill on this
question, de Gaulle shared the latter's belief in Empire and

18
was considered by Roosevelt and Hull to be an ally of
Churchill on this point. A major goal of the foreign policy
of de Gaulle as well as of the Vichy French after the defeat
of 1940 was to maintain the French Empire. Roosevelt could
not forgive the French for failing to resist the Germans in
Europe and the Japanese in Indochina. He felt France did not
deserve to have colonies such as Indochina returned or to
play a great power role in the post war world.
While Roosevelt had not always been anti-imperialist,
by 1928 he had come to the conclusion that a new world based
on self-determination was needed. In Foreign Affairs he
wrote:
The time has come when we must accept not only
certain facts but many new principles of a higher
law, a new and better standard in international
relations. We are exceedingly jealous of our own
sovereignty and it is only right that we should
respect a similar feeling among other nations. (26)
By the time he became president in 1933, his
anti-colonialism was well established and never altered
until his death.
There were political as well as humanitarian reasons
for his stand. With the outbreak of the war and American aid
to Great Britain, Roosevelt realized the American public
needed to be reassured that aid to the British was not for
the purpose of perpetuating the British Empire. Roosevelt
arranged to meet with Churchill to discuss aid and at the
same time clarify for American public opinion the principles
at stake in the war. Out of their meeting at Argentia,
Newfoundland in August 1941 came the Atlantic Charter, which
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stressed the humanitarian goals of the war. Article III
pledged respect for the right of all people to choose their
form of government. While Churchill gave his assent
grudgingly, differences in interpretation of the Atlantic
Charter between the two heads of state surf aced shortly
after the meeting. Roosevelt was never successful in
changing Churchill's views about Empire. This was apparent
in the latter's remark in 1945, "I did not become Prime
Minister to preside at the liquidation of the British
Empire."

(27)

Cordell Hull's anti-imperialism also went back a long
way. As a Congressman from Tennessee, he had become a
student of tariffs and his ideas on tariffs had led him from
the national to the international sphere. He became an
exponent of free trade and as early as 1914 was opposed to
the idea of preferential trade or the empire system. In his
Memoirs he wrote: "Back in my Congressional years I had
stood against imperialism and colonial expansion."

(28) Even

before the United States entered the war, Hull, as Secretary
of State, felt the United States would be confronted with
the need to establish a stable world order. In those days
of non-belligerence he appointed a committee in the State
Department to analyze the post-war consequences of the
policies of the warring nations. After the United States
entered the war, the committee turned to planning for a
post-war organization that would maintain peace by
collective security rather than the balance of power.
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Although Roosevelt and Hull were at least as distant
from Vichy as from de Gaulle in terms of their views on
imperialism and a world order, they devoted much more effort
to getting along with the former than they did with the
latter. The American president and his secretary of state
had some specific objectives they thought could be achieved
by this policy. Above all they wanted to keep the French
fleet and Empire from falling into German hands. As a
former Under-Secretary of the Navy during World War I,
Roosevelt was particularly sensitive to naval problems. As
early as May 26, 1940, he had instructed Ambassador Bullitt
to tell Reynaud that the United States
considered retention of the French fleet
vital to the reconstitution of France and
her colonies and to control of the oceans
and to getting less harsh peace terms. (29)
Churchill was given the same message about the English
fleet. Both Churchill and Reynaud promised that the fleets
would never be surrendered. According to Weygand, there was
never any question on the part of the French of
relinquishing either fleet or colonies to the Germans. The
ministers had agreed that armistice negotiations would be
broken off if the Germans demanded surrender of the fleet or
any part of the overseas territories.

(30)

In spite of these reassurances the United States
remained concerned. With the armistice there was only the
British fleet between America and Germany. It was known
that British land defenses were weak, and there was even a
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question of whether the British fleet could withstand the
Germans. This depended to some extent on the French. If
the Germans were able to use the French fleet, England would
have even less of a chance, thereby affecting United States
security. Bullitt wrote Roosevelt
I believe as strongly as I have ever
believed anything that you will be
unable to protect the United States
from German attack unless you have the
cooperation of the French and British
fleets. (31)
On June 17 Admiral Darlan was told that if the fleet was
surrendered to Germany, "France will permanently lose the
friendship and good will of the government of the United
States."

(32) On June 23, several hours before the signing

of the armistice, Darlan gave orders, which he renewed the
next day, that the fleet would remain French or perish.

(33)

Still Roosevelt continued to worry about the fleet.
P/tain's meeting with Hitler at Montoire raised questions
about how trustworthy the Vichy government was. After that
meeting Roosevelt sent a strong statement to Pitain saying
that he saw no justification for France to help Germany
against Britain, her former ally, and warned P'tain against
permitting Germany to use the fleet. Any such agreement:
would permanently remove any chance that we
would aid the French people in their
distress and in these conditions we would
make no effort to exercise our influence in
insuring France the retention of her
overseas possessions. (34)
Roosevelt, of course, was putting himself in a contradictory
position in promising help in the return of the French
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colonies.
Besides the United States government's desire to keep
the French fleet and colonies out of German hands, it had
other reasons for continuing the Vichy policy. There were
humanitarian reasons. The United States wanted the French
people to know it was still their friend and give them hope
of eventual Nazi defeat. Furthermore, the United States had
an important listening post for obtaining word of what the
Nazis might be doing. As Churchill was to describe it later,
"the position of the Americans at Vichy gave us a window on
that courtyard that otherwise would not have existed."

(35)

Also the United States hoped to influence the Vichy
government not to collaborate with the Germans. To carry
out this task Roosevelt sought an ambassador to France in
the fall of 1940 who could talk to Pdtain since Bullitt had
returned to the United States after the armistice.
Roosevelt's first choice was General John Pershing,
who had fought alongside Pe{ain in World war I. When
Pershing could not accept the appointment because of ill
health, Roosevelt asked Admiral William Leahy, former Chief
of Naval Operations. Roosevelt thought that Leahy as a
former Navy man could gain the respect of P/tain and have
some influence with Admiral Darlan. In a letter to Leahy
outlining American policy toward France, Roosevelt asked the
new ambassador "to cultivate as close relations with Marshal
PJtain as may be possible."

(36) Roosevelt feared that

Pjtain had been unaware of what Laval had been doing as
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vice-premier and that it might be the same with his
replacement. Roosevelt asked Leahy to bring any acts not in
the interest of the United States to PJtain's attention.
(37) At the same time Leahy was to keep Pltain informed of
the support the United States was giving the British. Leahy
was to remind the French naval officers that to allow
Germany the use of the French fleet or naval bases would
forfeit the friendship of the United States.

( 3 8) As

for the children in unoccupied France, the United States
would be favorable to sending medical supplies and milk if
it were assured it would not assist Germany.

(39) Finally,

in view of the French effort to stay in authority in North
Africa, Leahy was to offer assistance to help improve the
economic situation there.
There were several reasons Roosevelt was interested
in North Africa. The port of Dakar was the closest point in
Africa to the western hemisphere and he did not want to see
it in German hands. He had also heard that there was an army
there which might be brought back into the fight against the
Axis. Embassy reports from France about a trip the American
naval attach/ had made to North Africa had come to his
attention. The naval attach/ had found that the French
military establishment in North Africa was far stronger than
had been expected. Furthermore, these military men had not
lost their fighting spirit. While they had accepted the
German armistice and had sworn allegiance to Marshal Pdtain,
they expected to defend the African empire in spite of the
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/

collapse of the mother country. The naval attache told the
American diplomats in France, "If France is going to fight
again anywhere in this war, I believe North Africa will be
the place."

(40)

After reading these reports about North Africa,
Roosevelt summoned Robert Murphy, charg/ d'affaires at
Vichy, to the United States. Murphy had been a career
foreign service officer since 1917 and had been counselor of
the United States Embassy in Paris at the time of the
armistice. In his hour long conversation with Murphy at the
White House, Roosevelt expressed the belief that North
Africa was the most likely place French troops might be
brought back into the war against the Germans. Roosevelt
asked Murphy to return to Vichy and work to obtain
permission to make a thorough inspection tour of North
Africa. According to Murphy,
The French African policy of the United States
Government thus became the President's personal
policy. He initiated it, he kept it going and
he resisted pressures against it, until in the
autumn of 1942 French North Africa became the
first major battle ground where Americans
fought Germans. (41)
One of the reasons Roosevelt thought there might well
be anti-German action in North Africa was because Weygand
had been made Delegate General there by the Vichy
government. As a French World war I hero, Roosevelt could
not believe Weygand would indefinitely tolerate French
subservience to Germany. Roosevelt thought that the fact
that Murphy was a Roman Catholic would help in his dealings
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with Weygand. Roosevelt suggested to Murphy,
go to church with Weygand."

"You might even

(42) As Murphy left the White

House, Roosevelt told him to communicate anything of special
interest about North Africa directly to him and not to
bother with the State Department. Thus, Murphy became one of
Roosevelt's "personal representatives". Roosevelt was known
for establishing personal contacts like this which
short-circuited the bureaucracy.
The United States realized that the best approach to
Weygand would be economic. Upon his return to Vichy, Murphy
obtained permission to tour French Africa in December of
1940. One of the first things he did was pay his respects to
General Weygand at Dakar, where the latter was on an
inspection tour. Murphy found that North Africa was in real
economic distress. Because of the British blockade there was
a shortage of gasoline, cotton fabrics, and food,

including

green tea liked by the North Africans. Weygand believed
consumer goods were urgently needed as an incentive to North
African cooperation in defense of the area and to make them
less susceptible to German propaganda. For their part the
Germans hoped that Morocco would have a nationalist
revolution and that the North Africans would ask for German
protection.

(43)

The United States was receptive to sending supplies,
but it was necessary to obtain permission from the British
to go through the blockade. The British were reluctant to
grant this fearing that supplies to North Africa would only
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help the Nazis. They particularly were concerned that goods
might be transshipped to Germany. Ostensibly to placate the
British, the Americans requested that American observers
inspect all shipments. This was agreed to by the French.
Thus the Murphy-Weygand Accord signed on February 26, 1941
permitted the use of French funds frozen in the United
States to buy nonstrategic goods and ship them to North
Africa. To see that nothing was transshiped to the Germans,
twelve American control officers, serving as vice-consuls,
were to supervise the distribution. While the job of these
men, according to the Accord, was to supervise the
shipments, everyone knew, even Pltain and Weygand, that
these Americans really would be intelligence agents.

(44)

They could observe the activities of the Axis powers, could
note conditions of the North Africans, look at the depth of
port facilities, landing locations and roads, and make
contacts. Weygand made another concession, demonstrating his
confidence in the United States, which was to allow the
vice-consuls to use secret codes and to employ couriers
carrying locked pouches.
The War Department was asked to find twelve officers
who would be reassigned to the State Department. Since army
officers could be convicted, if caught, and tried as spies,
it was decided that they should resign from the army before
assuming their new posts. Mainly from the New York area,
these vice-consuls were chosen on the basis of their
knowledge of France and the French language. They started
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arriving in April 1941 and by December all twelve were at
their posts. Murphy was assigned to North Africa as a sort
of High Commissioner with the job of maintaining contacts,
particularly with Weygand. He was also to supervise the
vice-consuls.
The vice-consuls would soon come under the new
intelligence organization created by William Donovan, known
since childhood as "Wild Bill''. Donovan had impressed upon
Roosevelt the need to consolidate the Military and Naval
Intelligence under a coordinator of Strategic Information
who would be responsible directly to the President. This
service, besides analyzing and interpreting material, was
also to direct psychological warfare.

(45)

In July 1941 the

Office of Coordinator of Information (COI - later changed to
Office of Strategic Services, or OSS) was set up under
Donovan. It was in charge of establishing a secret
intelligence service as well as with the organization of
special operations. One of the first tasks of the new COI
was to station an assistant naval attach~ in North Africa to
unify the actvities of the vice-consuls and stimulate
efforts in selection of "local agents of information."

(46)

The man picked for this job was Marine Colonel William Eddy
and he was assigned as naval attache' to Tangier.
Overall relief to North Africa from the United States
was never enough to help her ailing economy. Economic aid
was an on-and-off affair, subjected to the American carrotand-stick policy toward Vichy. The United States threatened
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to stop aid several times when it suspected collaboration
with Germany and in some cases actually did. In the spring
of 1941 with Hitler marching into Yugoslavia and Greece, on
the offensive in Libya (where the Germans had gone to help
the Italians fight against the English), and threatening
Syria and Lebanon, Darlan was ready to make concessions.
Leahy reported to Washington that the trend of French policy
was toward greater collaboration. Even the people outside of
the ''small but influential collaborationist circle"
anticipated a German victory. Many believed that the French,
by helping the Germans now, could obtain more generous peace
terms later.

(47) As mentioned earlier, Darlan by the Paris

Protocols of May had offered bases in Syria and North
Africa, including facilities in Tunisia, to the Germans.
Petain even announced closer collaboration with Hitler in a
radio broadcast.

(48) Leahy wrote that it was evident that

the Marshal was "going the full distance in collaboration
with Hitler."

(49) Leahy thought that the only way to keep

France from complete control by Germany was a "definite
setback to the German program by application of superior
force to some important point and before it was too
late."

(50) He wrote, "Today the vulnerable spot is North

Africa."

(51)

In response to Darlan's collaborationist policy,
President Roosevelt said in a radio address he could
hardly believe that the present government
of France could be brought to lend itself
to a plan of voluntary alliance implied or
otherwise which would apparently deliver up
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France and its colonial Empire.

(52)

In a letter to Leahy, Roosevelt wrote
the efforts of Admiral Darlan and others of
the Government to increase collaboration
with Germany has [sic] definitely compromised
our program of assistance to France. (53)
He added that flour shipments would stop unless there was
a "positive resistance to German demands."

(54)

Because of Weygand's resistance, the Paris protocols
were not put into effect. Weygand flew to Paris in June for
a meeting in which he took a firm stand against any further
collaboration. He insisted on the maintenance of the status
quo in North Africa, resistance to any foreign penetration
there, and no action against the de Gaulle forces in North
Africa. He was backed in his position by Admiral Esteva, the
Resident General of Tunisia, who had also flown to Paris for
the meeting. Afterwards it was rumored in Tunisia, according
to the American consul there, that Esteva might be replaced
because he had backed Weygand.

(55)

Darlan was now becoming impatient with Weygand. He
felt Weygand was pushing North Africa, with American
encouragement, toward increasing independence from Vichy.
Darlan feared that Weygand's premature dealings with the
United States would result in a German occupation of French
North Africa. By November Darlan succeeded in having Weygand
recalled. German pressure may have played a part. The
Germans were suspicious of Weygand's contacts with the
Americans and they may have known about a remark Weygand had
made while having lunch with Pe1tain and others at Vichy of
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his wish to see the Germans beaten by the Russians.

(56)

Because of Weygand's recall, the United States

seriously considered stopping its aid. Leahy considered the
"jelly fish" reaction of the Pjtain government justification
for stopping all assistance to France as well as his own
recall. Weygand urged that it be continued, however,
telling Murphy that nothing had changed in French policy by
his departure.

(57) Weygand thought the aid program gave

France the opportunity to have an economic and political
relation with the United States, which he believed would be
an arbiter at the end of the war. If Germany could penetrate
French North Africa, it would be able to inflict its will
upon France "without the possibility of a reaction."

(58)

Murphy too thought that cancellation of the accord
would deprive the United States of advantages such as
maintaining representatives in the area. Murphy tried to
persuade the State Department there were many other
Frenchmen in North Africa with whom he could work. P/tain
assured Roosevelt that Weygand's departure had not changed
French policy.
What saved the supply program was the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United States in the
war. When Churchill came to Washington at Christmas to
discuss strategy with Roosevelt, the idea of attacking North
Africa was seriously considered. At that time it was feared
that Hitler might attempt to strike at North Africa through
Spain or attempt to use Tunisia to supply General Erwin
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Rommel's troops, which were then on the defensive in Libya.
An allied invasion would forestall this possibility as well
as relieve the pressure on the British in Egypt. In fact
Roosevelt and Churchill decided to approach Weygand, now in
retirement, to see if he would return to North Africa
secretly to rally the French Army to the side of an AngloAmerican expeditionary force they hoped to send there. Out
of loyalty to P/tain, Weygand refused.
As already pointed out, de Gaulle was not considered
to take the leadership in North Africa against the Germans
because of the anti-de Gaullist sentiment there. But there
were other reasons as well. The Free French movement
appeared to be in a state of confusion. While they had an
informal representation in the United States, they were not
joined by many prominent Frenchmen such as Mencfes-France
living in the United States and some of the French in
America backed Pitain. According to William Donovan, the
whole Free French movement was in a ''deplorable condition"
and he suggested that Roosevelt discuss with Churchill the
idea of getting another leader out of France such as Edouard
Herriot to take it over.

(59)

If on December 23, when

Donovan wrote his memo, he questioned de Gaulle's leadership
ability, events of December 24 would cause Roosevelt and
Hull to distrust it from then on.
While Roosevelt and Churchill were celebratng
Christmas eve, the Free French forces under Admiral /mile
Musilier took over the French islands of St. Pierre and
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Miquelon off Newfoundland. St. Pierre was of concern because
of its wireless transmitting station. Both Canada and the
United States had been discussing what to do to keep it from
enemy hands, when de Gaulle occupied it without consulting
the American government. Muselier, who carried out de
Gaulle's order, told the American consul on St. Pierre that
de Gaulle's order was that of a dictator and he was sure
that he had not even consulted the Free French at London.
While Muselier would see the action through, he planned to
resign on his return to London as a protest against the
unilateral order given by de Gaulle.

(60) From this time on

Roosevelt and Hull worried about de Gaulle's dictatorial
tendencies. At the time Hull feared de Gaulle's actions
would jeopardize the whole Vichy policy "which we have been
nursing for a considerable period."

(61) Leahy cabled that

Darlan was saying that the Germans would use it as an excuse
to move troops into Africa to protect it from similar
invasions.

(62)

While Hull worried about the effects the St. Pierre
and Miquelon incident would have on the Vichy policy, other
Americans now questioned this policy. Hull in his fury
referred to the "so called Free French." The press, of
course, picked up this remark and raised questions about the
Vichy policy. Because of Hull's intense antipathy toward de
Gaulle, he lost support both from the American people and
his own president. The public were now concerned about the
State Department's ready acceptance of Vichy.

(63) Roosevelt
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increasingly became his own secretary of state and
eliminated Hull from important French matters. In North
Africa he relied on Robert Murphy as his personal emissary.
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CHAPTER III

TUNISIAN BACKGROUND

Although plans for a North African invasion had been
set aside in December 1941, the United States still had a
keen interest in North Africa. Two vice-consuls destined for
Tunisia would arrive by the spring of that year. They would
discover a country that in the midst of centuries of foreign
domination had known periods of independence. Though Tunisia
had lost this independence when it became a French
protectorate in 1881, it was not long before a nationalist
movement aroused hopes for renewed autonomy. Since
theoretically a protectorate was an independent regency
under French protection rather than a colony, the
nationalists were complaining that the French had made
Tunisia a colony under the guise of a protectorate. After
the French debacle of 1940, a new Bey, who came to power in
1942 and identified with the nationalists, had dared to ask
the French for Tunisian autonomy as laid out in the original
Treaty of Bardo. While the French were desperately clinging
to what remnants they had left of their own past glory, the
Bey was attempting to capitalize on French weakness to
recapture an independence his country had known in better
times.
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times.
The Tunisian nationalists could look back on a rich
and interesting history. Tunisia, originally inhabited by
Berbers, knew many invaders starting with the Phoenicians,
who settled along the coast and founded the important
trading city of Carthage. The Romans followed the
Phoenicians and made Tunisia a province in 146 B.C. Tunisia,
rich in wheat, olive oil, and minerals, was a prosperous
part of the Empire. Carthage became the second city of the
Latin part of the Empire and with men such as Augustine
played an important part in the history of Latin
Christianity. From Roman times, Tunisia has existed as a
self-conscious cultural unit and has differentiated itself
from the surrounding regions.
With the Arab invasions of the seventh century the
Latin language and Christian faith disappeared. The Berbers
of the mountains, who had never really been Christianized or
Latinized, accepted the Moslems. Following the Moslem
conquest, Tunisia was dominated at different times by
Norman, Moroccan, Spanish, and Turkish rulers. The Turks
arrived in 1525 and ruled in the name of the Ottoman Empire,
but were too weak to maintain real control after 1600. By
1705 Tunisia was virtually independent under hereditary
regents from whom the Beys of the World War II period were
descended.

(1)

Under the early Beys Tunis had a reputation for
turning its head when pirate ships came into the harbor.
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Though the European powers occasionally managed to check
piracy by treaty, piracy continued until the nineteenth
century and provided public revenue for Tunis. During that
century, the Tunisian people won reforms from the Bey and in
1861 he gave them a Constitution, though by 1864 it was
suspended.
In the scramble for colonies by the European powers
in the nineteenth century, both the Italians and French
wanted Tunisia. There were actually more Italian settlers
there than French, but at the Congress of Berlin in 1878
Great Britain and Germany agreed to concede Tunisia to
France. Great Britain had been willing to give France a
"free hand" in Tunisia in exchange for French acquiescence
to British annexation of Cyprus. Germany under Chancellor
Otto von Bismarck saw in France's interest in Tunisia a way
of taking its recently defeated neighbor's mind off revenge.
The British Ambassador in Berlin expressed the Chancellor's
attitude:
He is in great spirits since the French have gone
into the Tunis trap, which he baited for them
during the Congress, and chuckles over the
security Germany will enjoy from a diminished
Army in France with increased occupation in
Africa. ( 2)
Under the pretext of punishing some native tribes in
1881, a French force crossed the Algerian frontier, advanced
toward the capital, Tunis, and forced the Bey to accept the
French protectorate. The Treaty of Bardo was signed May 12
1881. While this treaty maintained the nominal sovereignty

f
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of the Bey, the Treaty of Marsa of 1883 did away with any
real Tunisian independence. French rule steadily encroached
on native power.
The Italians felt Bismarck had slighted them by
awarding Tunisia to the French. Nevertheless, they retained
the special privileges the Bey had granted them in the form
of capitulatory rights in 1868. They could hold Italian
citizenship, maintain their own schools and practice all
professions without the benefit of a French diploma.

(3)

Under the protectorate Tunisia was administered by a
French and a Tunisian section. The French section was
headed by a Resident General who exercised supreme control
over the Protectorate's administrative services. He served
as Foreign Minister and as president of a Council of
Ministers which included three Tunisians. The Resident
General was assisted by a French delegate, a French military
cabinet and a French civil cabinet. For administrative
purposes Tunisia was divided into five regions, each of
which was further subdivided into nineteen controles civils,
each administered by a French controleur.

(4)

The Tunisian section of the government was headed by
the Bey. Assisting him were three native ministers: a Prime
Minister aided by a French Director General of the Interior;
a Minister of Justice aided by a French Director of Tunisian
Justice, and a Minister of the Pen. Administratively Tunisia
was divided into thirty six caidats under native caids who
held administrative, judicial and financial powers. Each
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caidat was subdivided into shaykhates, 604 in all, each
under the authority of a shaikh. The Grand Council which
voted the budget consisted of both a French and Tunisian
section.

( 5)

Authority ultimately lay with the French; the Bey had
become in effect a puppet. All decrees of the Bey had to be
promulgated by the Resident General who also prepared the
Beylical decrees. As French historian Charles-Andr/ Julien
put it:
In Tunisia, however, the higher French
officials have gradually substituted their own
authority for that of the Tunisian ministers
while the controleurs civils have absorbed the
power of the ca1ds and the French gendarmerie
has replaced the native spahis. (6)
In spite of the fact that the Bey had become a French
puppet, Tunisian allegiance was to the Bey.
Until 1912 Tunisia was the quietest country in North
Africa. The Moslem leaders of the religious community, known
as the Old Turbans, followed a policy of cooperation with
the French. This changed in 1912 when Abd el-Aziz Tha'alibi
founded the Young Tunisians. Modeled after the Young Turks
and influenced by western liberalism, they called for an
extension of rights and liberties equal to those of
Europeans. They were opposed by the Old Turbans until 1919
when the French wanted to use some habous

(religious)

for colonization. The Old Turbans opposed this and
reconciled themselves with the Young Tunisians.

(7)

In 1919 a delegation of Young Tunisians and Old
Turbans presented their claims at the Paris Peace

land
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Conference. Their hopes had been raised by Woodrow Wilson's
ideas of self-determination for all peoples. They were
bitterly disappointed when they met an unyielding attitude
on the part of Georges Clemenceau.

( 8)

Under Shaikh Tha'alabi the Destour (meaning
constitution) Party was founded in 1920 calling for a
constitution under which the Bey and his dynasty would
retain leadership of the country. By 1922 tension between
Naceur Bey, who supported the Destour program, and the
French came to a head when the Bey threatened to resign
unless the Destour demands were met by the French. While the
French granted some reforms, the Destour were not satisfied.
With the failure of the French to meet their demands Shaikh
Tha'alibi went into exile. The French then began repressive
measures. The discouraged Destourians calmed down their
activities and waited for a more favorable climate, which
came in the thirties.

( 9)

Led by Habib Bourguiba, a lawyer, and Mahmoud Materi,
a doctor, a group of young nationalists broke away from the
Destour and began a new party, the Neo-Destour, in 1934
which was more militant and had broader appeal. Bourguiba
insisted that only continual pressure would make France give
up Tunisia. Whereas the older Destour was aristocratic and
upper middle class in its outlook, the Neo-Destour was a
liberal constitutionalist group whose leadership thought it
important to integrate the masses into the party. The
Neo-Destour were successful in winning public support. The
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French responded to increased Neo-Destourian activity by
sending Bourguiba and Materi into exile in the Sahara in

1934.

(10)
When the Popular Front came to power in 1936, it was

more tolerant of nationalist aspirations and Bourguiba and
Materi were allowed to return. By 1937 the Neo-Destour had
gained ascendancy over the Destour and Bourguiba took the
opportunity to organize a campaign which sought to obtain
Tunisian independence through negotiation and persuasion
while also maintaining friendly relations with France.
Premier Leon Blum's promise of independence to Syria had
raised the hopes of the Tunisians. When the Popular Front
fell, the French policy stiffened causing Bourguiba to begin
a campaign of civil disobedience. Demonstrations and riots
followed. On April 29, 1938 the French killed 122
demonstrators. Both the Destour and the Neo-Destour were
banned while Bourguiba was arrested and sent to prison in
Marseille.

(11)

Though the Neo-Destour's leader was in prison, it,
along with the Destour, continued to be the focus for
nationalist ambitions. The success of the Neo-Destour in
winning mass support has been attributed in part to the
homogeneity of the Tunisian society. According to Carl Leon
Brown, as far back as pre-Protectorate days
. Tunisia was blessed with a relatively
homogenous population with a long tradition
of living together and of considering itself
a single society. There was one national
language, Arabic (only a few thousand Berber-
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speaking inhabitants remained at this time),
and except for a fairly well integrated Jewish
community, a single national religion, Islam.
Furthermore, Tunisian Moslems . . . were not
split into opposing sects; nearly all Tunisian
Moslems belonged to the orthodox Sunni
community. (12)
At the time of World War II ninety percent of the
population was Moslem out of a total population of just
under 2,500,000. While the Moslems were predominantly Berber
mixed with Arab, only one percent spoke Berber. There were
60,000 Jews, mainly Tunisian, but with a few European
refugees. The Jewish community had long been a part of
Tunisian society. Though religiously separated, they were
quite close to the Moslem majority, playing an important
role in the economic life of the country. Of the Europeans
there were about 108,000 French, roughly the same number of
Italians, and a smattering of Maltese, Greeks, and
Spaniards.

( 13)

The make up of the population played an important
role in political and economic affairs. The economic
structure tended to divide along ethnic lines. Agriculture
was the principal means of subsistence and most of the
Moslems were involved in agriculture either as workers or as
the owners of the largest percentage of the approximately
19,000,000 olive trees in Tunisia. While Moslerns owned some
vineyards, they were primarily in the hands of the French
and Italians. In general the Europeans were the owners of
the large, modernized farms.

In the northern region the

French owned over ninety percent of the European-owned land.
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In contrast to the French immigrants who went to
Algeria and were roughly a cross section of the French
population, those who went to Tunisia were a more favored
group, partly because French immigrants in the nineteenth
century were required to buy some land. Frenchmen were also
merchants and held most of the goverment posts. The
Italians, who came mainly from Sicily and Sardinia, worked
as miners, masons, agricultural workers, and artisans. While
they were also the owners of small vineyards, generally they
were quite poor. Tunisian Jews were primarily in
merchandising and in skilled labor with a small percentage
in the professions.
Except for the mining of phosphates, there was very
little industry. It was said that the French discouraged
native industry to avoid competition with the mother
country. On the whole the economy was developed by and for
the French. Where the traditional peasant agriculture had
been self-sufficient, the colonial economy was oriented
toward producing raw materials for the French and consuming
the products of French industry. The Tunisians played a
subservient role in the development. "Tunisians were like
guests in their own houses."

(14)

Despite the hornogenous population, there were some
underlying tensions between the different groups, which were
exacerbated by the war. The French, as the colonizers, were
disliked by the Tunisians. The Tunisians resented the
Italians too because as manual workers they tended to take
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jobs from them. As for the Jews there was some anti-Jewish
bias which, according to Carl Brown, may have stemmed partly
from the fact that the Jews tended to assimilate the French
language and culture faster than the Tunisians and even
desired to become part of the French community instead of
being under beylical authority.

(15)

With the outbreak of the war, the French were in a
more vulnerable position. The Tunisians, seeing that the
French had been beaten, had hope for their own independence.
But bad as the French were, the Tunisians preferred them to
the Italians, whom they knew had designs on Tunisia. They
also knew that the Italians treated the Libyans poorly. The
kind of racial discrimation against the Jews introduced by
the Vichy government during the war was quite alien to the
Tunisians and was violently objected to by the Bey. In fact
carrying out the policy was a job that even the French
Resident General disliked and one that caused him
difficulties with the Tunisians.
Under the Vichy regime the French administration in
Tunisia became more authoritarian. Masonic lodges were
forbidden while the press, radio, and publc meetings were
prohibited for the Tunisians. Official discrimination
against the Jews in Tunisia started with the Vichy
anti-Jewish statue of November 30, 1940, which excluded them
from the teaching professions, all liberal professions, and
from the publishing and film industries. Sequestration of
Jewish property was authorized and registration of all Jews
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was required. They were forbidden to own any property except
that in which they lived and were prohibited from collecting
debts. Jewish doctors and lawyers were limited in their
practice.

( 16)

The man who was responsible for enforcing these new
laws was Admiral Jean Pierre Esteva, who had been appointed
Resident General because of his naval connections with
Admiral Darlan, and had arrived in Tunis in July 1940. Soon
after his arrival Esteva made a radio address in which he
pointed out his wish for a "rebirth of the concept of
family."

(17) Besides promoting Pe{ain's ideas, he

replaced a great many bureaucrats, but not all because, as
he wrote Darlan, recruiting locally was difficult.

(18)

As for the Jews, Esteva appeared to want to convince
Vichy that he was doing his best to follow its orders
while at the same time going slowly in carrying out those
orders so as not to upset the Tunisian population. Esteva
convoked the Jewish community and informed them that he
wanted to end abuses such as "usury, unwholesome speculation
and hoarding".

(19) Starting in 1940 a certain number of

Jews had their merchandise confiscated and sold for the
profit of the state. Esteva also fined them substantially.
Writing to reassure Darlan, Esteva reported that his
repression against the Jews had not ceased, but that it was
important to recognize that since time immemorial Tunisia
had lived thanks only to the Jews. During World War I
supplies had been assured only because of their
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intervention. Since the non-Jews were not always honest or
capable, Esteva had had to tolerate Jewish trading. Esteva
feared that, if he suppressed all the Jews, other
individuals would replace them who would be without scruples
and "who would skin their contemporaries." Further
we musn't forget that when the Moslems are
on good terms with the Jews which often
happens, the Moslems don't hesitate to tell
the Jews that the persecution comes from us
and from the Germans and that for them
they desire to live in harmony with their
Jewish brothers. (20)
Esteva recommended that the French act with firmness toward
the Jews, but not fall into systematic and blind
persecution.

(21)

It was into this situation of overt harmony and
latent antagonisms that Hooker Doolittle came when he
arrived in Tunis in the spring of 1941 as the American
Consul General. Doolittle, a native of New York state and a
graduate of Cornell University, had gone into the foreign
service after a brief stint in business. His first post was
in Tiflis in Russian Georgia. There he met his wife,
Victoria, the daughter of a Russian army officer.
Before his assignment in Tunisia, Doolittle had served in
Morocco and knew both Arabic and French.
The vice-consuls, John Utter and Harry Woodruff, also
arrived in the spring of 1941. They were responsible for
verifying the employment of the merchandise received from
America, assuring that it was used in the Regency and not
sent to France or Tripolitania. According to Esteva, they
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were often seen at the ports or talking with a certain
number of bureaucrats or circulating in the country. On
their observation trips into the Tunisian countryside, they
found that the natives were desperately poor. There was a
serious shortage of both food and clothing. Doolittle, who
sometimes accompanied the vice-consuls, wrote that "most
Arabs did not ever get a really good meal" and because of
the lack of cloth, they were "miserably clad."

(22)

In the

area that Doolittle visited, the Tunisians had gone to the
office of the caid to obtain releases for purchases of small
consignments of American cotton goods which had just been
received.
Esteva himself was keenly aware of the need for
clothing. Tunisian authorities as well as the colons were
coming to him to tell him that the women and children in the
country lacked clothes and were practically nude. On his own
trips into the countryside, he had seen men and children
dressed in rags while the women hid refusing, out of
modesty, to go out except at night. In writing Darlan, he
said they needed millions of tons of cotton goods and not
the two or three hundred tons that arrived from America or
France.

(23)

Doolittle and the vice-consuls noted the Tunisian
contempt for the Italians. They found that it was due partly
to the fact that Italian workers who migrated to Tunisia
were hard working and desperately poor. While French
immigrants tended to create enterprises which employed
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natives, Italians displaced native labor by doing the same
work and doing it more effectively.
Doolittle and the vice-consuls also noted the
Tunisian dislike of the French. As Woodruff wrote, "They are
the conquerors and as such have incurred a constant
underlying hostility."

(24) Doolittle found that

"the mainspring of Arab psychology is their anti-French
feeling."

(25) Throughout the Protectorate the Tunisians

stressed to the consul and vice-consuls the need for
independence or greater self-government. The Tunisians
resented not being able to develop their own industries
because of pressure from French manufactures. They also
resented not having positions in the administration as well
as the fact that the French bureaucrats were "mostly
mediocre'' and often "enriched themselves while in
service."

(26) While the French were aware of the discontent

and had attempted to placate the Tunisians in minor ways,
Doolittle found
they fail to get to the crux of the matter
which is the complete subservience of the Arab
population to their French masters and the
resolute exclusion of all Arabs from any
economic and political life of the country. (27)
Further
The so-called Tunisian or Beylical Government
with its 'Possessor of the Kingdom', Ministers,
Caids, and Cadis [Islamic Judge], each of
which has a French controller at his side to
divide the profits derived from spoliation of
the 'fellah' is a complete mockery and is only
permitted to exist as window-dressing and such
weight it may have in deluding the masses of the
people. That this delusion fails to delude is
apparent from the contemptuous manner in which
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nearly all Arabs, high and low, refer to their
'Sovereign Prince' and his satellites. (28)
Considering the Tunisian discontent with the French,
it was not surprising that German war propaganda was having
its effect on them. Because the Germans had conquered the
French, the Tunisians were receptive to what they said.
Radio Ankara also influenced the Tunisians. When Radio
Ankara was pro-German, the Tunisians felt that way and when
Ankara swung toward Britain they followed. Doolittle thought
the British radio might counteract this German propaganda by
letting it be known that Britain intended, if such
intentions existed, to help the Tunisian people obtain their
independence. Doolittle realized this might be political
dynamite but believed it was a question which needed to be
confronted some time or other. Of course, the British had
no such intention. Not only would the British evade this
question, but, as it would turn out, so would Doolittle's
own government.
At that time Doolittle and the consuls found American
prestige high among the French and Tunisians. Both groups
wanted more information about American aid. Because of Axis
jamming of foreign radio stations, they were not getting the
facts about aid. Vice-Consul Utter thought that the Tunisian
population should know what the United States was doing and
that it was solicitous of their welfare. The consul and
vice-consuls emphasized the value of American
representation. Of all the powers the United States enjoyed
the greatest prestige in the Near East because the Tunisians
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believed the United States had no political aspirations and
was the only disinterested power to which they could turn.
Doolittle thought the implications of this position were so
great that serious consideration should be given to
developing American connections in the Middle East.

(29)

In an effort to develop connections with the French
army officers, Doolittle and the vice-consuls had invited
many of them and their families to consular functions.
Disturbed by this, Esteva wrote to both Weygand and Darlan
asking that officers be forbidden from accepting these
invitations. Esteva thought this was necessary "to remedy
the inconveniences which could result from French officers
having contact with members of the American consular
corps."

(30) Since the United States had not entered the war

at this point, Esteva must have feared that the Americans
might undermine Vichy authority.
Though Doolittle was not especially impressed with the
nationalists when he first arrived, he gradually came to
have many contacts with them. As time went by he became an
advocate of their cause. His despatches tended to refer
often to the Tunisians and nationalists and less frequently
to the French. When he did mention the latter, it was often
disparagingly.
If Esteva and the French administration did not want
French officers to have contacts with Americans, they wanted
even less for Tunisians to have contacts with them. For
this reason Doolittle did as thorough an investisation of
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the strength of the Neo-Destour as possible "without
arousing too much interest in French administrative
circles."

(31) He found that there was little cohesion among

party members except for the general anti-French resentment.
Because Bourguiba and the principal leaders of the party
were still in prison in Marseille, the head of this movement
was "apparently effectively lopped off.''

(32) Bourguiba's

lieutenants who were still free were finding it hard to
agree among themselves. Nevertheless, the party still had
many adherents organized into what the French settlers
referred to as "cells". The Neo-Destour put pressure on the
Tunisians to join the party. Various methods were used such
as refusing to marry or bury them until the proposed member
signed on the dotted line.

(33)

Doolittle learned that the Neo-Destour had split from
the Destour because of the latter's growing conservatism.
The Neo-Destour was composed primarily of younger men
without much previous standing or wealth. They "wish to
sweep away all the old fogies now blocking their route to
power and glory."

(34) Doolittle thought "they would

cooperate gladly with any power other than the Italians who
wanted to take a crack at their French masters."

(35) Some

of the party members had expressed the wish for American
assistance and guidance, but judging by the past history of
the country, Doolittle thought the Tunisians would tire "of
even the most disinterested assistance which tried to
instill a really efficient and honest administration."

(36)
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Doolittle's assessment of the Neo-Destour was that they
"represented no political value," were "a source of
trouble," and had little future as a ''democratic
parliamentarian movement." (37) Doolittle's assessment would
prove to be quite wrong for the Neo-Destour would be the
party that in the future led the country to independence.
The old Tunisian families, who tended to belong to
the Destour, feared the loss of their privileges with the
rise of the Neo-Destour. For these families, who before the
French protectorate were similar to a feudal aristocracy,
furnished the protectorate with most of the high Tunisian
dignitaries, including caids and shaiks, allowed to exercise
administrative functions.
The leader of the Destour, Shaikh Tha'alibi, requested
an interview with Doolittle in October 1941. Doolittle, who
went to his home, described Tha'albi as a "magnificent ruin
of a man about sixty years of age."

(38) The Shaikh told

Doolittle that the Tunisians were now convinced that a
British victory was inevitable in the war. They had
concluded this because of the German invasion of Russia
among other things. Originally they had believed that
Germany would definitely win, but the Russian campaign which
seemed to be going nowhere fast, as well as the visibly
growing strength of the British as relayed by Tunisian
sources in the Near East, had caused a great change in
thinking. Doolittle found it significant that this was an
"apparent change of heart away from the pro-German attitude
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reported by all observers in May and June to the pro-British
sympathy now manifested."

(39)

The Shaikh's purpose in wanting to see Doolittle was
to put before the governments of the United States and
Britain the plight of the Tunisians and learn how they could
help in hastening the British victory as well as to find out
what support the Tunisians could expect at the peace
settlement in their goal of independence or at least more
autonomy in administering their own country.

(40)

The Shaikh said they had been approached by the de
Gaulle forces, but had refused to see them as this would
mean exchanging one group of Frenchmen for another. The
Destour would prefer first an American protectorate and
secondly a British and finally continuation of French rule
if it could be drastically modified in its purpose and
manner. Since this resembled too closely a conspiracy,
Doolittle indicated this was out of the question. Besides,
the United States had no political ambitions in foreign
countries. Nor would he or the American government consider
steps against the French. Doolittle suggested that the
Tunisians settle their differences with the French and at
the same time educate their young men to take their place in
a modern world they hoped to occupy. The Shaikh said they
had tried to come to an agreement with the French for a
greater share of the administration of the country and in
return the leaders had been exiled. Furthermore, there was
no chance of their young men being given facilities for
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obtaining an education.

(41)

World War II set in motion with renewed vigor the
longings for independence in Tunisia as well as many other
countries under colonial domination. It was a force that the
French tried desperately to stem. The predicament for the
Americans was how to keep the friendship of the French
without turning their backs on legitimate Tunisian
aspirations. The predicament soon caused serious differences
among the American diplomats.
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CHAPTER lV

PALACE REVOLUTION

With the United States officially in the war,
Doolittle took a more active role in assisting the war
effort and counteracting the Germans. Whereas he had been
primarily an observer of the Tunisian nationalists in 1941,
he now saw them as potentially useful allies and was more
receptive to their proposals. His ideas of working with the
Tunisians were forwarded from the State Department to
Donovan, who looked upon them favorably, but they brought
Doolittle into head-on conflict with Robert Murphy.
Differences about working with the Tunisians existed not
only between Murphy and Doolittle, but between the State
Department and the Coordinator of Information (later OSS).
The COI was interested in working with the North Africans
while the State Department was afraid of upsetting the
French.
In the winter of 1942 Darlan's policy of
collaboration was particularly noticeable in Tunisia. In
December 1941 Darlan had concluded an agreement with the
Axis powers at Turin to ship five hundred tons a day of Axis
material on French ships from Marseille to Tunis and across
Tunisia to General Erwin Rommel's forces in Libya. In
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exchange the Italians had promised to urge the Germans to
release French prisoners and to move the line separating
occupied and unoccupied France northward.

(1) Leahy, who had

learned about this from an informer, questioned Darlan about
the shipments. Darlan admitted that he had agreed to permit
two hundred tons of supplies each week and a total of five
hundred Italian motor trucks to be shipped in French vessels
to Tunis in order to keep the Germans from seizing
Bizerte.

(2) Vice-Consuls Utter and Woodruff on trips out of

Tunis reported that used Italian trucks were going from
Tunis to Gabes to be forwarded to Libya. Gasoline from
Algeria was also being sent to Libya where it was
transferred to German and Italian tank trucks.

(3) Moreover,

the Resident General was requisitioning supplies from the
local Tunisians to be sent to Libya.
While the Americans were upset about these supplies
to Libya, Esteva in his despatches showed his disquiet at
the Americans' knowledge of them. He wrote Darlan that
everyone had seen trucks of a "particular color" carrying
gasoline from Algeria and Northwest Tunisia toward Gabes.
There were numerous trucks and a great deal of unaccustomed
movement. The witnesses of these transports were making
comments which were being spread around and which nobody had
the power to stop.

(4) Furthermore, Esteva told Darlan that

sending supplies to Libya was causing serious discontent
among the Tunisians.

( 5)

In Washington Assistant Secretary of State, Sumner
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Welles, protested to the French Ambassador that this was the
most serious situation which had arisen between the two
governments and if not checked, a friendly United States
policy toward Vichy would not continue.

(6)

Roosevelt

threatened to recall Leahy for counsel unless assurances
were given that no military aid would go to the Axis and
that French ships would not be sent to aid in Axis acts of
aggression. When the assurances requested were not
forthcoming, Leahy thought he should be called home and he
was instructed to that effect, but then Roosevelt decided
that he should stay writing:
Not only is our presence in France and
North Africa the last bridgehead to Europe
but it likewise helps to hold the Iberian
Peninsula in 1 ine. ( 7)
The United States, however, stopped aid to French North
Africa until March when Darlan finally assured Roosevelt
that he had stopped shipments with the exception of food
supplies and trucks which would shortly be delivered. For
his part, Esteva, calling on Robert Murphy on his way to
Vichy, reassured him that the supplies going to Libya via
Tunisia were not important and urged friendly cooperation
between France and the United States.

( 8)

By this time Colonel William Eddy, the recently
appointed representative of the Coordinator of Information
(C.O.I.), was in Tangier under the cover of naval

attach~

Born in Syria of missionary parents, he had served as head
of the English Department of Cairo University and spoke
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Arabic fluently. Eddy worked with the C.O.I. recruits as
well as with Murphy, Doolittle, and the vice-consuls, some
of whom were also C.O.I. staff members.
In French North Africa Eddy was to make French and
North African contacts who could gather intelligence if
United States representatives should have to leave the area.
He was also to supply resistance groups which would operate
by sabotage as well as by organized armed resistance. Eddy
found that there was already a well organized resistance
group in Algeria, a smaller one in Morocco, and various
sabotage and guerrilla groups in Tunisia, though no
organized military resistance.

(9)

In talking with the Tunisian leaders, Doolittle
was pursuing the kind of activity that was being done in
Morocco by the C.O.I. representatives, Gordon Browne and
Carleton Coon. These two had spent time among the Riffians,
Berbers living in the Rif mountains of northern Morocco.
When Coon, an anthropology professor at Harvard, was
recruited by the C.O.I. in November 1941, his interviewers
told him that the Germans planned to drive through Spain
from Vichy France and then to conquer Morocco, reinforcing
Rommel and taking over the whole Middle East. A "rejuvenated
Riffian army", recovering from the humiliation of their lost
independence in 1926, might check this advance. Coon's
diplomatic cover was as assistant to the American consul in
Tangier, J. Rives Childs. He and Browne, another C.O.I. man,
who had been appointed vice-consul, worked with the Riffian
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leaders to set up a resistance. C.O.I. agents worked in
North Africa independently of the State Department even
though they often had diplomatic cover as assistants or
vice-consuls. Most of the time the Consular Corps did not
know what the C.O.I. was doing.
Doolittle, who had been asked by Shaikh Tha'alibi in
October 1941 about setting up an autonomous state under
American or British protection, was approached again by
Tunisian leaders. With the United States now in the war they
must have considered it a favorable time to discuss the idea
of driving out the French. If their services were of
interest and if they were given arms, they would fight
against the Axis. They would also encourage pro-United
Nations sentiment among the Tunisians. In exchange they
wanted a guarantee of independence and gave Doolittle a copy
of a plan of the kind of government they hoped for. Should
the United States accept their offer, he thought their
organization could provide some twenty-five thousand
men.

{851S.00/199)
Though Doolittle reported that these conversations

with the Tunisians had "reached an interesting stage," they
were already beginning to back away. Their interest in
helping the United Nations depended on how the British
forces were doing in Libya. British losses in January of
1942 and British inability to hold Rommel's army were
causing the Tunisians to lose esteem for the British and to
withdraw from "the basis of understanding" Doolittle was
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reaching with them.

{11)

As for as the French, Doolittle found their policy a
mystery. Although they privately expressed pro-United
Nations sentiments, every public act was positively
pro-Axis. He had concluded that no help could be expected
from the French. While support for the Tunisian cause would
mean breaking with the French, the sympathy it would
generate for the United States in the Islamic world would be
great.

( 12)
In February Doolittle went to Tangier to discuss with

Eddy ways of stopping the Axis shipments to Libya. On his
return he wrote Eddy that the protests and publicity by
British and American radio must have had their effect as he
had learned that Vichy had stopped the shipments destined
for Libya by way of Tunisia. He had also learned that five
ships due to arrive had been cancelled. According to a
friend in the local French government, Vichy had ordered
this traffic stopped.
Doolittle suggested enlisting the cooperation of the
Tunisians to stop shipments to Libya of goods originating in
Tunisia. He proposed a scheme to bribe members of the Bey's
family so they would depose the Bey's pro-French Prime
Minister and replace him with a pro-American and pro-British
one.

( 13)
To understand how this would work, Doolittle described

to Eddy the political set up. The Bey had a French Resident
General as his counselor and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
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Laws and decrees were prepared by the Resident General and
presented to the Bey for his signature before they were put
into effect. Usually these laws were given to the Bey on
Thursday and promulgated the next day. This allowed no time
for the Bey to consider. Technically the Bey's Prime
Minister should have the time to counsel him about which
bills to sign.
Doolittle proposed bribing members of the Bey's family
to influence him to change Prime Ministers. Doolittle
believed that the new Prime Minister could advise the Bey to
wait a week before signing the laws and decress. During that
week Doolittle then expected the Bey's family to convince
him to withhold his signature from decrees harmful to the
United Nations. In particular, this method could be used to
stop a great deal of the supplies going to Libya "as it
would be impossible to gouge them out of the local Tunisian
producers without the Bey's assent."

(14)

While Eddy received approval from Donovan and wrote
Doolittle that $25,000 had been made available for the
"palace revolution," Murphy and the State Department lost no
time in squelching it. Murphy wrote Doolittle that he didn't
believe he had authorization from the American government
for pursuing these talks with the Tunisians. Furthermore, he
thought the French knew about them and, if he continued
them, might ask for his recall.

(15)

In writing to Wallace Murray, Chief of the Division of
Near Eastern Affairs, about this scheme as well as about
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Doolittle's earlier letter recounting his talk with Tunisian
leaders, Murphy noted that Doolittle had "become sold on the
notion that it is possible to build up in North Africa an
Arab movement, antagonistic to the French, which could be
useful to the Allied cause."

(16)

As Murphy understood it, United States policy was to
be mainly concerned with winning over the French military
and civilians so that they might possibly resume hostilities
against the Axis in North Africa. He was convinced that
working with the Tunisians with the idea of eliminating the
French from the area would incur French hostility. Murphy
believed that if French elements could be persuaded to
resume hostilities with American support "the Arabs would
then be faced with a powerful fait accompli"

(17) with the

possiblity that the Americans could then take advantage of
whatever help they would be willing to give provided the
United States took care of their economic needs. Murphy
said: "However, I do not pose in any degree as being well
informed on the Arab question."

(18)

Paul Alling of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
agreed with Murphy and wrote Doolittle "that the Department
would consider any attempt to turn the Arab population
against the French as dangerous in the highest degree."

(19)

United States policy in North Africa was based upon building
up the confidence of the French, particularly the military.
Though the sentiments of the Tunisians were of some concern,
the position of the French was what mattered to the State
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Department. While an Arab organization would be useful
to the United States if its main purpose were to oppose the
Axis, the Department was strongly opposed to any support of
any movement that would sponsor a revolution against the
French Protectorate. Alling wrote a memorandum on April 7 to
Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle and Under-Secretary
of State Sumner Welles explaining that the same problem had
I

come up in Tangier and the charge d'affaires there, J. Rives
Childs, had concluded that the very existence of the United
States consular service in North Africa would be in jeopardy
if the French thought American officers were encouraging the
North Africans to seek redress of their grievances.

(20)

Childs, of course, was worried about the kind of activity
Coon and Browne were involved in with the natives.
A confusing situation was already emerging. On the
one hand Eddy's C.O.I. was actively working with the
natives, while Murphy and the State Department were opposing
it. To add to the confusion, Childs did not know what the
real nature of Coon's work was.

(21)

In fact, according to

Coon, whose brother was married to Doolittle's daughter,
Katya, Doolittle was not in on what the C.O.I. was doing
either.

(22)

Doolittle replied to Alling that he agreed that the
French were more important "to us than the disorganized Arab
mass."

( 23) As far as the "palace revolution", it was only

that and not an attempt to turn the Tunisian population
against the French. Besides the Tunisians had already turned
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against the French. Doolittle had "yet to meet more than one
or two who have the slightest kind word for the French
colonial administration."

(24) Nevertheless, he had

counselled the Tunisians not to attempt any violent measures
as these would gain them no sympathy from the Americans or
the British. The "palace revolution" was proposed at a time
when French supplies were going to Libya and the idea was to
replace the present Prime Minister by one more sympathetic
to the United Nations cause so he could influence the Bey to
oppose "stripping his subjects for the benefit of the
Italians."

(25)

In the meantime shipments had practically

stopped, and, as Doolittle wrote Murphy, the "palace
revolution" was beginning to happen of its own accord.

(26)

The Bey had been upset when thirty-five Destourians,
who had been in prison locally since 1938 (the same time
Bourguiba was sent to France to prison), were given harsh
sentences. He asked his Prime Minister to intercede and,
when the latter failed to do so, the Bey fell into such a
rage that he passed out and was unconscious for three hours.
Doolittle thought changes were beginning to happen so that
the Prime Minister would be replaced.

(27)

Murphy had good reason not to want to upset the
French for he and the vice-consuls had made many contacts
with anti-Axis French groups. A member of one of these

groups, called the Group of Five, was Jacques
Lemaigre-Dubreuil, an industrialist married to a peanut oil
heiress. He was a right winger and a partner of the Banque
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Worms. Because of his right wing connections, he was above
suspicion and allowed to travel freely between North Africa
and the mainland. Lemaigre-Dubreuil and his group, who were
anti-German, wanted to establish a French African
provisional government that would be independent of
metropolitan France. Their plan was to cut all
communications with mainland France. They were looking for a
leader as well as for arms from the United States. Both Eddy
and Murphy wanted to supply arms to this group, but Donovan
refused because he considered their demands for arms
excessive. For the most part, the men with whom Murphy was
working were part of the military with conservative or even
royalist sympathies.

( 28)

In April when Murphy and Eddy were beseeching
Washington for these supplies, they stressed the possibility
of a German landing in North Africa. While this never
materialized, another ominous development occurred when
PJtain, under German pressure, brought Laval back as vicepremier of the Council of Ministers in April 1942. There
were various suppositions about the reason for this. In
North Africa Murphy heard it was because the Germans wished
to protect their rear as they fought the Russians.

(29)

Another possible explanation was that the Germans did not
trust Darlan, who remained as commander-in-chief of all
land, sea, and air forces.
As early as February a member of the French foreign
off ice had told Leahy that the anti-Americanism of Darlan
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had been changing because of recent demands by the Germans.
Leahy, himself, attributed the change in attitude to the
German trouble with Russia, believing Darlan would "shift
from side to side with the changing fortunes of war."

(30)

As a matter of fact on April 14, just as Laval was being
brought back in Vichy, Murphy had dinner in Algiers with
Darlan's son, Alain, and Admiral Raymond Finard, who had
taken over some of Weygand's functions upon the latter's
recall. From them Murphy learned that Darlan and P/tain were
convinced of an American victory and wanted to be on the
United Nations side as they thought, Murphy reported, the
United States stood for the restoration of the French
Empire.

(31) This belief on the part of the French

authorities may have come from the communications from
Roosevelt when he was urging them to withhold their fleet
from the Germans if they wanted United States help in
regaining their overseas possessions. It could also have
come from State Department representatives in France. In his
memo to Berle and Welles of April 7, Alling had referred to
"our announced desire to have the French preserve the status
quo of their existing colonies."

(32)

The return of Laval caused an outburst of indignation
from the United States. Aid was stopped and Leahy was
recalled, though diplomatic relations weren't broken. As
Hull told the French Ambassador in Washington, since Laval
had openly and publicly announced as his
policy intimate cooperation between France and
Germany obviously the United States could not
maintain the same kind of relations with the
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government of Laval as with the preceeding
governments. ( 3 3)
Even before his recall Leahy in a letter to Welles
had questioned whether the United States was following the
right course in supporting the Marshal and whether it might
not be better to support the dissidents.

(34) Welles replied

that the United State was supporting the Free French in
areas they controlled while at the same time trying to keep
Vichy from giving away the French fleet or making its
territory available for Axis military operations.

(35)

While Leahy believed that Laval was willing to go as
far as practicable in collaborating with Germany and aiding
in the defeat of Bolshevism, at the same time he wanted to
maintain good relations with the United States. Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden observed to Freeman Matthews, the
American chargJ d'affaires in London, that he believed Laval
still hoped to play the role of "mediator" between Germany
and the United States and to play an important part in the
establishment of the German New Order to obtain a fairly
favorable position in it for himself and France. Eden
continued
I have good reason to know Laval very well
indeed and regard him as a typical French
deputy. He views the whole international
political scene from the point of view of
getting two polticians of opposite views
into the same lobby. (36)
In France Laval's return meant harsh measures against
the Jews and conscription of French labor for work in
Germany.

In North Africa a visit in February by Interior
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Minister Pucheu was viewed by some of Murphy's contacts as a
step toward incorporation of French North Africa in a scheme
of active collaboration with the Axis.

(37)

Though Pucheu's visit to Tunisia was greeted with
indifference by the populace and even some incidents such as
cries of "vive Weygand", closer collaboration was evident
even before Laval's return. There was a new Prefect of
Police, a Monsieur Philip, accountable only to Vichy, and
four or five hundred new special police from France, who had
introduced "veritable Gestapo methods . . . including
tortures of various kinds." The condemnation of the thirtyfive Destourians had been based on evidence secured by these
means.

(38) The new police had even gone so far as to

approach Doolittle's chauffeur to report on his movements
and visitors. Being a Tunisian, the chauffeur was worried
what the police would do to him for not complying.

(39)

Since December 1941 the French press in Tunisia had
been stringently controlled. The press was magnifying
British inefficiency and leaving the impression that France
had no help except from Germany, "on condition, of course,
of furnishing workmen for German war factories and becoming
a source of raw material for those same factories." By
jamming radio stations the Germans were keeping any news
from American and British radio from the French people. With
so little unbiased news, many people were concluding that
Laval was the only person able to save France.

(40)

There was nothing that the Americans could do to
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counteract this propaganda except by word of mouth and by
passing out copies of American and British speeches. Of
course, this could endanger those found to possess them.
Increasing the power of the short wave radio, Doolittle
thought, would be useful.
While the French government in Tunisia was becoming
more collaborationist, the Beylical government was becoming
more nationalistic. With the old Bey's death and the
investiture of Monce£ Bey in June 1942, changes occurred in
Tunisia that were to have repercussions far beyond what
might have been anticipated. Monce£, who was over seventy,
upset the old comfortable relation between the Residency and
Beylical Court, or as Doolittle described it:
After having been for many years like the
interlocking parts of a well oiled universal
joint the French and Tunisian Administrations
are now tending to separate and run, if not on
opposite, at least on parallel lines. (41)
At the time the French were not in a position to counter
this trend, but before a year passed they were able to make
a dJmarche that would affect not only the Bey and the
Tunisians, but cause differences among the American
diplomats.
According to Doolittle, the new Bey planned to be the
"champion of his people" unlike the former Bey, who was
primarily concerned with "squeezing what he could from the
French Administration in return for his conformity with
their ideas."

(42) Moncef was very popular and wherever his

carriage appeared, he was surrounded by what Doolittle

76

called "cheering crowds of Arabs"

(43) and what Esteva

called "a cortege of half-starved urchins."

(44) The

Tunisians would even knock off the hats of Frenchmen passing
by who failed to show the proper reverence. Moncef was
determined to regain his sovereignty as set forth in the
early treaty of the Protectorate. According to Doolittle, it
had become almost a "mania" with him.

(45)

While Doolittle understood the Bey was prepared to be
friendly with the Americans, this was difficult because of
the jealousy of the French Administration which tried to
keep all foreigners away from the Bey and his counselors. It
was not too long, however, before Doolittle managed to
establish friendly relations with the Bey by selling the
Bey's son an Oldsmobile car that he had acquired from the
previous consul and by attending some marriages in the
Beylical family. Because the car was sold at a very low
price, the Bey felt Doolittle had almost made a gift of
it.

(46)

While relations between Doolittle and the Bey were
good, those between the Bey and the Resident General became
increasingly strained. The first difficulties arose over
the application of the anti-Jewish laws. The Bey succeeded
in persuading the Residency to postpone publication of the
decree prohibiting Jewish doctors from practicing, but then
in revenge the Residency soon published a list which stopped
from practicing all Jewish doctors who had anything to do
with the Beylical family.

(47)
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Shortly thereafter the Bey gave an interview to a
Tunisian newspaper in which he said "he wished to see all
his subjects treated equally without any distinction."

(48)

When the censors eliminated the words "without any
distinction", the Bey made such a commotion that the article
was reprinted in full with the phrase inserted. According to
Doolittle, this did away with the French claims that the
anti-Semitic laws had been applied in Tunisia "as a sop to
the Arabs."

(49) Consulate members had not met any Tunisians

who approved of these laws.
The Bey proceeded to upbraid Admiral Esteva for
having eliminated all his personal Jewish doctors from the
list of Jews allowed to practice in Tunis. Three out of four
of the Bey's personal physicians were Jewish. He told the
Resident that if something were not done about it, he was
ready to fly to France and see Marshal Pjtain. As Doolittle
expressed the Bey's sentiments:
If the French at German instigation insisted
on anti-semitism, let them do it in France not
here in Tunisia where for him all Tunisians were
alike whether Jews or Moslems. (50)
When a Tunisian general who acted as a liaison officer
between the Resident and the Bey tried to get the Bey "to
lower his tone,"

(51) the Bey was so furious that he called

him a traitor, had him taken from the palace, saying he
never wished to see him again.
Esteva was caught between carrying out Vichy orders
on the Jewish question and pacifying the Bey. He wired Laval
that the Jewish doctors were indispensable to the Europeans
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as well as the Tunisians. Not a single Jewish doctor would
be excluded if he agreed to the wishes of the people. He had
limited to twenty-three those who could practice without
restrictions, but he was going to be obliged to allow others
to "exercise their art."

(52) The Bey and his entourage had

demanded a half dozen of these doctors and Esteva had
allowed it, not just to be agreeable, but because it would
be useful to most of the population.

(53) A three month

postponement of the decree prohibiting Jewish doctors from
practicing finally settled that problem.
Moncef Bey, however, continued "to add gray hairs to
the overburdened head of Admiral Esteva", as Doolittle put
it.

(54) Moncef who was sympathetic to the nationalist cause

became its exponent. Moncef 's principal counselor was his
brother, Hussein, who was closely linked to the Destourians.
According to Esteva, though Moncef was on the throne,
Hussein had the brains. Whether or not this was true, both
brothers wanted to resume the policy of their father, Naceur
Bey, of twenty years before which meant asking France for a
program of reforms. Hussein believed that the time had come
to give the educated youth a place in the administration as
well as in all political, economic and social activity.

(55)

The Bey gave Esteva a letter for Marshal P/tain along
with a sealed packet of demands on the French Government.
Among these were the creation of a system of Franco-Tunisian
primary schools, imposition of quotas on Tunisian raw
materials to be exported, reduction of the number of French
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functionaries, and equality in number, grade, and salary
between French and Tunisians, and reestablishment of the

civil and administrative powers of the caids by the
suppression of the Franco-Musulman Agreement of 1892. At
the beginning of the protectorate until 1892, the
caids had been the real administrators.

(56)

In writing Laval, Esteva remarked that because of the
fall of France, the French no longer had the same freedom of
action as with Naceur Bey. Esteva thought the French had
little choice but to agree to take progressive steps toward
granting Tunisians access to jobs in the
administration.

(57)

P£tain, however, gave Moncef Bey little satisfaction,
writing him that tradition in the Protectorate had taken on
the force of law. He continued:
Admiral Esteva has a heavy task, especially
now. The former Bey thanked him many times in
terms which showed the friendly esteem in
which he held him. Your Highness should in turn
witness toward him the same sentiments. (58)
Nevertheless, Esteva, who made a "hurried trip to
Vichy"

(59) because of his difficulties with the Bey, was

authorized to accede to some of his demands, though not to
suppression of the 1892 agreement.
While Esteva blamed the Destourians for being the
ones in the Bey's entourage counselling him to change the
status of the Protectorate, he reported that most of the
Destourians were supported by ''our parties of the extreme
left, by the Free Masons and by the Jews''

(60) - the
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traditional enemies of the French right.
As for the Americans, Esteva wrote that "the
protagonists of Tunisian independence"

(61) had been in

contact with them. He reported, however, that when the Bey
and Hussein had sent a Tunisian to the American Embassy to
ask the American consul to come see them to have a secret
conversation with them, Doolittle had replied that he would
reflect. Esteva learned that Doolittle expected to ask the
Resident General to arrange an interview with the Bey.
Esteva concluded by stating that "he begins to be
circumspect."

(62) Obviously both Doolittle and Esteva had

to tread a careful line. For Esteva it was between the
Tunisians and Vichy while for Doolittle the line was between
the French and Tunisians.
Though the demands did not seem unreasonable,
Doolittle felt the Tunisians were not prepared to be
"directors of a budget, allocators of raw materials, or
members of the council of administration of a large
company."

(63)

In Doolittle's opinion the French educated

Tunisians had lost their own traditions, but had not fully
grasped those of the Europeans. As a consequence they felt
like Europeans with the Tunisians, and like Tunisians with
the Europeans. Many turned to alcohol and most of the
younger ones were spoiled. Their fathers, however, hung on
to "too much of the Arab tradition to be able to compete in
a capitalistic and imperialistic world."

(64)
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Difficulties between the Bey and Resident General
became even worse during Ramadan at a ceremony at which the
Bey received European notables and asked many provocative
questions of the French. To Philip, Prefect of Police, he
asked where were the Tunisians in the police administration.
To the Director of Public Instruction he said that he hoped
in the future there would be no more French lye/es, but only
Franco-Tunisian schools.

(65)

After the ceremony the Bey left for his special train
to return to his palace at La Marsa. At the station there
was an honor guard of Tunisian troops under a French officer
who performed so well that the Bey sent his adjudant to give
the officer a thousand francs and the soldiers four
thousand. When the officer said he couldn't accept tips, the
Bey said this wasn't a tip, but a reward for their good
appearance.

( 6 6)

This incident just increased the Bey's dislike of
Esteva to the point that he gave the Residency a telegram
for Marshal Pe"tain asking for the recall of Admiral Esteva
as Resident General. Admiral Esteva had visibly aged from
all of this. He had always had a slight nervous tic, but now
it was causing his head to wave "from side to side in a
manner which aroused pity."

(67) The state of tension

between the French and the Tunisians had reached an
explosion point.
It was obvious to Doolittle that the French were
"losing their grip on the Arabs."

(68) Even the French
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police had been forced to relax their harshness. Doolittle
thought it not surprising when Axis radio propaganda was
pointing out to the Tunisians that, since "the French
themselves were a protected nation, the Arabs should get
their protection direct from the source without any
intermediary."

(69)

The Italians were all too ready to take advantage of
the troubles between the Bey and the French. Through their
broadcasts, they were assuming the attitude of the "great
friend of all Islam."

(70) Doolittle reported that they were

"watching the situation like hawks and would be prompt to
intervene if any disorders should occur."

(71)

In the summer of 1942 Doolittle had received from a
confidential source a copy of Italian plans for Tunisia once
victory had put them in charge there. Doolittle forwarded a
copy of the document to the State Department with
suggestions of how it could be used as counter propaganda by
having copies made for distribution to Tunisian leaders.
Doolittle thought that letting the Tunisians see what the
Italians planned for Tunisia would have the effect of
turning them against the Axis. The State Department
forwarded the idea on to the Off ice of Strategic Services
who were interested in the project and provided $2500 for
it.

(72)
Just as the situation between the Bey and Resident

General was about to explode, another explosion occurred
involving all of North Africa - the American and British
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landing. Problems between the Bey and Protectorate were not
over, only postponed for six months.
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Chapter V

OPERATION TORCH

By July of 1942 the United Nations renewed plans for
the North African invasion. Because the Russians urgently
needed the relief a second front would afford, President
Roosevelt had promised one to Stalin before the end of the
year. While both General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of
the Army, and Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, preferred a
direct cross-channel attack, Churchill, hoping to relieve
pressure on Egypt where Rommel was advancing, opposed this
and proposed invading North Africa instead. Tobruk in Libya
had fallen to the Germans in June, a serious setback to the
British. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, meeting in London,
decided on July 24, 1942, on the North African invasion
given the operation name "Torch". On learning of the
decision, Roosevelt wired that the landing be made no later
than October 30, 1942. The British insisted that the supreme
commander be an American, and General Eisenhower was chosen
for this position. The British had, also, insisted that the
expedition be led by United States troops, even though
British troops would be used, because of their hope that
Americans would meet with less resistance. Churchill even
wrote Roosevelt that the British might wear American
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uniforms.
We have plenty of troops highly trained for
landing. If convenient, they can wear your
uniform. They will be proud to do so. (1)
The invasion ran the risk of bad weather en route and
it ran the risk of submarine interception. The main risks,
however, were the responses of the French and of the
Spanish. Of utmost concern was how the French military in
North Africa would react. Robert Murphy, in a talk with FDR
at Hyde Park on September 4, 1942, found that the President
was keenly aware of the delicate situation which would
result from sending American troops into the colonies of an
avowedly neutral government with which the United States had
friendly relations. In light of stated American principle,
it would be hard to establish a case for landing in French
Africa without the approval of the Vichy government. Without
the consent of Pitain's government, the United States could
expect a military landing to be resisted with force by some
of the French military who had sworn allegiance to Pt:ftain.
Murphy pointed out to FDR that there were only two
possibilities for overcoming French resistance. One was to
send United Nations troops and equipment vastly superior to
that of the French forces already there. The second was to
persuade the French military by diplomatic means that
victory over the Nazis would result from working with the
United States and that loyalty to France was more important
than loyalty to Pitain. The first alternative was out. As
Eisenhower wrote to his aide, Captain Harry C. Butcher:
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However, study had conclusively shown that it
was impossible to build up a force of
sufficient strength to make tactical
considerations the governing ones in
undertaking this operation . . . measured
purely from a military standpoint the risks of
the projected operation were so great as to
condemn it if military factors alone were
considered. ( 2)
Both FDR and Eisenhower were aware that the second
alternative was the only feasible one. Eisenhower continued
to Butcher:
Consequently, the whole campaign had to be
considered as depending entirely upon
political factors - - that is, upon the
accuracy with which our political leaders
could foresee the reactions of the French
and Spanish armies in North Africa to
this landing. (3)
Eisenhower went on to describe to Butcher that the American
Chiefs of Staff, around the middle of August, had proposed
attacking only at Casablanca and Oran in order to secure the
land-line of communication running between these two in
order to decrease the dependence on Gibraltar. However,
should the French resist, so much damage could be done to
this route as to prevent its use for some months. Thus
Eisenhower reemphasized the need for French co-operation:
This fact again brought to the fore the
certainty that success depends upon
non-resistance on the part of the French
Army. ( 4)
The President named Murphy the sole agent in charge
of political maneuvers in North Africa, and he was given the
task of persuading the French Army not to resist the
landing. Once the invasion took place, he would act as
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Operating Executive head of the Civil Affairs Section and
Advisor for Civil Affairs under General Eisenhower. Murphy
was to contact members of the French military whom he
considered reliable, inform them of a contemplated American
landing, and try to obtain their assistance. After
preparations were made by those French aiding the Americans,
at least twenty-four hours notice would be given them.

(5)

He was to give the French the assurance that the
administration of the colonies would remain in French hands.
Another risk and unknown factor was what the Spanish
would do. In fact, General Mark Clark, Eisenhower's Deputy
Commander, wrote that, "There was, perhaps, more worry about
the Spaniards than the French."

(6) Should Franco decide to

intervene because of Spanish interests in Morocco and
sympathy with Hitler, Spanish troops might easily take over
Gibraltar, which Eisenhower had chosen for his temporary
headquarters.
Not the least of the worries was what the Germans
might do. Did they have enough troops to deflect to North
Africa? Throughout the months preceeding the landing, there
were constant rumors that the Germans were about to send
forces to North Africa. This added pressure for speed on the
part of those planning the invasion.
In planning "Torch" Eisenhower needed to find a
French leader around whom the French military would rally.
He considered the possibility of using de Gaulle, but he
feared that de Gaulle's presence in the initial landing
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would cause the opposition of the French garrisons. The
consuls and vice-consuls in North Africa reported that the
regular French army corps considered de Gaulle a disloyal
soldier. His standing with the resistance elements of the
civilian population was quite different, but the first
priority was winning over the armed services.

(7)

In fact,

Roosevelt insisted that de Gaulle and the Free French not be
told in advance of the invasion for fear they would not keep
it secret. As Churchill wrote Roosevelt on September 3,
"Free French have got inkling and are leaky."

(8)

The logical leader would have been General Weygand,
then living in retirement in the south of France. Weygand,
however, refused out of loyalty to Pe{ain when asked by an
American representative to go back to North Africa and
assume command there with full American military support.
Although anti-German, Weygand was opposed to any dissident
action against P/tain. While Weygand had refused, another
military man had come to the attention of the Americans.
Back in May 1942, Murphy had learned about General
Henri Giraud from the Governor of Algiers, Yves Chatel, who
had just returned from Vichy where he had lunched with
Petain and Giraud. Giraud, a man in his late sixties, had
recently escaped from a German prison, the fortress

K~nigstein, "by climbing down an improvised ladder some 150
feet."

(9) Reporting on the luncheon, Murphy wrote Cordell

Hull: "Chatel says Giraud is as ardently anti-German as
ever. He also said that Giraud would be glad to work with
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the Americans."

(10)

Besides Chatel's recommendation of Giraud, the
Americans had other evidence of Giraud's loyalty to the
United Nations side. The Co-ordinator of Information had
received a copy of a letter that Giraud had written his
children from prison encouraging them to remain faithful to
France and to do all in their power to hasten its
deliverance from the Germans. To some extent the decision to
approach Giraud was based on this letter, a copy of which
Donovan had sent to Roosevelt.

(11)

Murphy managed to contact Giraud with the help of
Lemaigre-Dubreuil. The latter, on one of his trips to the
mainland, met with the general in Lyon and found that he was
already making plans for the day when the United States
would invade France. He agreed to lead if the Americans met
several conditions. One of these was that a French officer
be in over all command and by this he meant, of course,
himself. Another condition was that an invasion of mainland
France take place at the same time. Giraud also wanted
Lemaigre-Dubreuil on his return to Algiers to contact his
old friend, General Charles Mast, Chief of Staff of the
French XIX Corps in Algeria, and ask him to serve as his
representative in North Africa. Mast had been instrumental
through the French intelligence service, the

Deuxi~me

Bureau, for arranging Giraud's escape from Germany.
At a meeting at Eisenhower's hide-away, Telegraph
Cottage, outside London on September 16-17, Eisenhower and

94
Murphy decided that on his return to North Africa, Murphy
suggest to Mast that he send a message to Giraud that the
United States was now able to take action on a substantial
scale and ask whether he was willing to act. Should Giraud
decide to come, the question of French command in North
Africa would have to be settled. Giraud's friends "had
always made the point that the command in North Africa must
be French. On this point Eisenhower said that the question
of command must wait."

(12)

Murphy may have mentioned at Telegraph Cottage that
he had also been getting feelers from Admiral Darlan about
joining the United Nations side. Back as far as August 1941
Darlan had told Admiral Leahy, at that time the American
Ambassador to Vichy, to talk to him when the United States
would be able to send five hundred thousand men and several
thousand tanks and planes to Marseille.

(13) Leahy, as has

been mentioned, considered Darlan an opportunist who
"endeavored to walk a tightrope between the warring
parties."

(14) After Darlan's replacement by Laval in April

1942 as vice-premier, William Donovan suspected that
Darlan's ardour for the P/tain government might have cooled
and considered enlisting his help for the United Nations. In
a memo to FDR he asked:
Would you think it fantastic, and if not, is
it feasible to have someone who is close at
Vichy talk with Darlan? His nose must be
greatly out of joint at this moment. (15)
As a matter of fact it was at that time that Darlan made an
overture to the United States through Admiral Raymond Flnard
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and his son, Alain, to Murphy. Then, in the middle of
October, a friend of Darlan's urgently requested a secret
interview with Murphy. Murphy learned that Darlan was
considering joining the United States side. Darlan's
representative asked if 1) the United States would be
willing to co-operate with Darlan and 2)

if so, would it be

able to do so quickly on a large scale here and/or in
Europe. In reporting this message to the War Department,
Murphy urged that the United States encourage Darlan and
stated that he believed this would be "reconcilable with
eventual co-operation with Giraud."

(16)

In reply Leahy, now

Roosevelt's Chief of Staff, wired Murphy that he should make
any arrangement with Darlan that would assist the military
operations.

(17) Leahy told Murphy:

Inform your contact we also have information
that Germany contemplates occupation of
African Colonies and it is our opinion that
Darlan should resist aggression by Axis
with Army and Navy in which event America
will provide at once large scale military
material, and economic aid in the colonies. (18)
In a cable to Marshall on the same day, October 17, about
the Darlan proposition, Eisenhower wired:
Giraud to be recognized as our principle
collaborator on the French side, with the
proposal that he accept the position
immediately of French Governor of all French
North Africa, responsible for all French
civil and military affairs, and whose
position will be supported and protected by
the Allied Forces. Giraud to be requested to
make proper contacts with Darlan and to
accept him as Commander-in-Chief of French
military affairs, and/or naval forces in
North Africa or in some similar position
that will be attractive to Darlan. (19)
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In this same cable Ike told Marshall that he was sending
Mark Clark and four assistants on a secret mission by
submarine to Algiers to meet with Mast no later than
October 21.
Mast had requested the meeting and had specifically
brought up the question of command. In a telegram to the War
Department, Murphy said: "This is a question I have dreaded
because of French susceptibilities."

(20) Mast insisted that

French command would be necessary, since the French forces
knew the terrain. Murphy asked the War Department if they
had "a happy formula for this delicate point."

(21) Mast,

also, brought up Giraud's idea which was "dear to his heart"
that a simultaneous attack on southern France be made.
Finally, Mast had heard that Darlan was seeking to climb on
the bandwagon, but in his opinion Darlan could not be
trusted. Mast asserted that "Giraud's command will give us
entry practically without firing a shot."

(22) This last

assertion would turn out to be quite wrong and would play a
significant part in Darlan being given the leadership.
The meeting that Mast had requested took place on
October 22 with a good deal of drama. The place chosen was a
private house at Cherchell on the Algerian coast 150
kilometers west of Algiers. The servants of the owner had
tipped off the police that something was happening. When the
police arrived, looking for smugglers, the Americans had to
hide quickly in the wine cellar. When they left the
conference for the submarine which had brought them, the
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waves were so high that the "entire group was thrown into
the sea and money, equipment and clothes were practically
all lost."

(23) While Clark obtained much useful information

from Mast, such as details of troop locations, batteries,
and installations, the question of command was troublesome
and left unresolved. In writing Marshall about the
conference, Eisenhower said, "I will have to ride a rather
slippery rail on this matter.

" (24) Furthermore, the

opportunity the Americans "had hoped for of getting Giraud
and Darlan together on the proposition went glimmering."
(25) Mast, Eisenhower wrote, "believes that Darlan is not to
be trusted and that Giraud will have nothing to do wlth
Darlan."

(26)

Because of the need for secrecy it was decided not to
tell the French when the invasion would take place, only
that they would be given four days advance notice. Murphy
wired the War Department:
At the conference no indication of our
intentions regarding date of operation was
supplied and French officers were left with the
impression that at least several weeks would
intervene. (27)
Since the date of the landing was now scheduled for
November 8, Murphy found that Giraud could not leave France
in time to be in Algiers for it and requested a delay. The
request was refused because convoys had already left the
United States, and could not be turned back.
Besides being in touch with the French military
leaders, Murphy was hoping to obtain the cooperation of the
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French and North Africans by stepping up shipments of
economic aid. While aid had stopped when Laval returned, it

had been resumed in June. With the invasion imminent, Murphy
believed it was crucial for the success of the landing. He
wrote to the State Department:
I believe the Department will appreciate
without much comment from me the
propaganda value of the arrival of
these ships in Algiers from New York
loaded with American goods for the
benefit of this area. (28)
When Murphy was in Washington in late September after his
meeting with Eisenhower at Telegraph Cottage, he pleaded for
supplies for North Africa to arrive before the landing.
While Roosevelt did everything he could to see that they
arrived and Leahy said aid was to be sent with out any quid
pro quo, simply to gain French friendship, the Board of
Economic Warfare did not get them there in time. Since they
could not be let in on the plans of the invasion, it was
hard to convince them of the urgency of the need.
Furthermore, they feared the supplies would fall into Nazi
hands and were reluctant to ship them at all even with "an
order from FDR in his own handwriting."

(29)

Besides economic aid, diplomatic preparations for the
invasion were concerned with an effort to see that Spain and
Portugal were kept reassured as to the United States'
intentions and that Spain would maintain her neutrality and
prevent a German march through the Iberian peninsula to
Gibraltar to attack the United States troops in the rear.
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Spain was told that increased economic aid "would be
possible only so long as Spain stayed out of the war and did
not allow the Axis to infringe upon her territory."

(30)

Furthermore, the French commanders were to be instructed not
to take any retaliatory action on D-day against the Spanish
should there be incidents, until after the consolidation of
the American forces.

(31)

In the meantime, messages were beomg drafted from the
President to General Franco, President Carmona of Portugal,
Marshal Pitain, Governor General Yves Charles Chatel of
Algeria, General Auguste Nogu\s, the Resident General of
Morocco, the Sultan of Morocco, Admiral Jean Pierre Esteva,
the Resident General of Tunisia, and the Bey of Tunisia,
Sidi Moncef Pacha. These messages said that German and
Italian troops were planning to invade and occupy North
Africa and that a powerful American force was being landed
in North Africa to co-operate with the Governments of
Algeria, Tunisia, and French Morocco in forestalling this
threat. Harry L. Hopkins wrote that:
The final stages
involved a great
choosing for the
President . . .

of preparation for TORCH
deal of very careful word
various messages from the
(32)

On reading FDR's proposed letter to Pjtain, Churchill wrote
the President:
Will you allo~ me to say that your proposed
message to Petain seems to me to be too
kind? . . . Will you consider toning it down
a bit? (33)
A leaf let containing a message from President
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Roosevelt to the people of North Africa was also prepared.
It contained a color imprint of the American flag as well as
the President's photograph and was to be dropped from planes
from Gibraltar at the time of the first attack.

(34)

Messages were prepared to be broadcast by radio both in
unoccupied France and North Africa as well as from the ships
that were to provide the protective cover for the landing
forces. The President's statement which was printed on the
leaf let and which was to be broadcast stressed the
friendship of the United States for the French people. This
kind of psychological warfare was a new tactic being tried
out in North Africa. Roosevelt, himself, worked on these
messages. Afterwards, Eve Curie wrote FDR complementing him
to which he replied:
May I tell you that I am glad you liked my
straightforward French . . . no beautiful
phrases, nor oratory . . . I thought,
however, that I ought to be myself and the
French people would understand my normal
simplicity better than if I did something
which was not a part of me. (35)
In spite of the careful preparations for the
invasion, things did not go as planned. Giraud, who had been
picked up by submarine, instead of going directly to North
Africa, stopped in Gibraltar where Eisenhower and his staff
had set up their headquarters just thirty-six hours before
D-day. While the landings were taking place, Giraud was
arguing with Eisenhower and Clark about the command. He
refused to participate except as supreme commander.
Eisenhower thought that Giraud was playing for time, that he
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knew the Americans could not grant his request, but was
waiting to see if the United Nations landing was successful.
Eisenhower wrote Marshall that he and Clark were bitterly
disappointed about his attitude.

(36) Giraud finally left

for Algiers on November 9, thirty-six hours after the
landings began. He was to do his utmost to stop resistance
to the United States troops and to begin to organize the
French forces for employment against the Axis. Eisenhower
had made concessions to Giraud, but he would, of course, not
turn over the position of supreme commander to him, nor
would he promise a simultaneous landing in southern France.
The military operation did not go as planned either.
The Joint Chiefs had decided on attacking Casablanca, Oran,
and Algiers. In explaining this decision, Eisenhower said a
direct landing in the Bizerte-Tunis area would have been
desirable, but that area was beyond the range of fighter
aircraft support. Besides the British had had disastrous
results running convoys to Malta. Though the Joint Chiefs
had decided the Tunis-Bizerte area was too risky for a
landing, Eisenhower, believing that Tunis was so important
that the United States should land as far east as Bone,
wanted to attack Oran, Algiers, and Bone. This, however, was
overruled because the Chiefs of Staff thought the railroad
between Casablanca and Tunis was an important supply route
and to ensure its operation the Casablanca landing was
necessary. This decision meant that the early capture of
Tunis was less likely. Once the Moroccan and Algerian

102
landings had occurred, the American forces were to protect
the rear in Morocco while the British First Army under Sir
Kenneth Anderson, which was to land at Bougie, Djidjelli,
and Bone in Algeria, would rush eastwards to Tunis.

(37)

In meeting with Eisenhower, Murphy had warned him that
the greatest resistance would come from General August
Nogu\s in Morocco. Stopping to see Nogties on his return to
North Africa from the United States, Murphy had tried to win
him over, but without success. Nogu\s, fearing an invasion
would cause chaos, wanted to preserve the status quo. He did
not want to see French authority disintegrate because that
would cause North African nationalism to rise.

(38)

When the landings began on November 8, Nogu\s ordered
the French troops in Morocco to resist the invasion. In Oran
the lieutenant colonel in charge of the resistance had had
cold feet and divulged to his chief what he knew about the
American operation. The chief immediately prepared to resist
the landing and as a consequence the United Nations faced
serious fighting at Oran. Only in Algiers, where Mast and
the Group of Five had successfully organized the resistance,
was the fighting minimal.
In the meantime, another unexpected development was
the arrival in Algiers of Darlan to see his son, who had
entered the hospital with infantile paralysis. Thus while
the landings were occurring and Giraud had not arrived,
Murphy asked Darlan for his co-operation. Though reluctant
at first, Darlan agreed to seek the authorization of Petain,
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to whom he drafted a message. General Alphonse Juin, who had
been commander of the French armies in North Africa until
Darlan's arrival, urged the latter to cease the hostilities.
According to Mast, it was Juin who sanely judged the
situation, refused to continue the fighting in spite of
Darlan's stubbornness and whose intervention finally made
Darlan order a preliminary cease fire.

(39)

In signing the

cease fire, which was only for Algiers and its suburbs,
Darlan claimed to have received a message in secret code
from Pdtain of his approval of Darlan assuming authority in
North Africa. It was Murphy who negotiated with Darlan until
Mark Clark flew in on November 9.
When Clark arrived, he was upset about the Darlan
agreement because he and Eisenhower had just negotiated an
agreement that morning with Giraud. However, when Murphy and
Clark met Giraud in an automobile so as not to be heard,
Giraud had already met with the high ranking French
officials and had learned that most of them considered him a
dissident. As Churchill put it: "The reception of Giraud by
the leading French commanders was icy."

(40)

Giraud told Murphy and Clark that he wanted to be
free to devote himself to combat. He also said he would be
content to work under Darlan. Giraud wanted "an arrangement
by which the Admiral would be a sort of High Commissioner,
while he, Giraud, would become commander-in-chief of the
French forces."

(41) Giraud, thus, without any persuasion

from Clark or Murphy, provided what proved to be an
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effective formula for the early weeks of "Torch".
The surprise for the Americans in regard to Darlan
was the fact that the French officials looked to him as the
man with the greatest authority in North Africa. Mast and
others who had co-operated were looked upon as traitors by
other French officers whose help was needed. Giraud told
Clark that only Darlan could issue a general cease fire
order that would be obeyed.
When Nazi troops started moving into unoccupied
France on November 12 in violation of the 1940 armistice,
the last obstacle to an agreement was overcome. As a result
Darlan decided that P/tain was no longer a free agent and
agreed to cooperate with the United Nations. Clark persuaded
Darlan, using a bit of bullying, to give an order to the
French troops and the navy to stop fighting. He issued the
order in the name of Marshal Pltain and it was obeyed. As
Eisenhower wrote, "The fighting at Casablanca had ceased
because of Darlan's order: at other places the fighting was
over before the order was received."

(42)

The name of Marshal Pltain carried far more weight
with the French military in North Africa than the Americans
or British anticipated. The authority of the state was
vested in him, and it was to him they owed their allegiance.
Darlan wore his mantle. As Kenneth Pendar, one of the viceconsuls described it, most of the French in North Africa had
an almost mystic faith in P/tain and most of the military
there were ready to follow the "head of the State."

(43)
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Once France was occupied by the Germans, Petain was no
longer a free agent and the military could transfer their
allegiance to Darlan. Since the Germans had broken the
armistice agreement, Darlan felt free to co-operate with the
Americans.
On November 12, the French agreed among themselves on
a formula for the French command. It was basically the same
one Eisenhower had proposed in the middle of October. On
November 13 Eisenhower flew in from Gibraltar and received
word that the French had agreed. Darlan would head the civil
government, the present governors would remain at their
posts, Nogu\s in French Morocco and Chatel in Algeria, while
Giraud would head the French armed forces. Eisenhower came
to the meeting and shook hands. The "Darlan deal" was thus
consummated. While Mark Clark and Murphy had been part of
the early discussion, it was Eisenhower who took the final
responsibility for the "deal". According to this
arrangement, the United Nations stated they would not
disturb the French administrative control of North Africa,
provided the French forces and the civilian population would
obey Darlan's orders to co-operate militarily with the
United States.

(44)

This "deal" brought a storm of protest in both the
British and American press because of Darlan's connection
with Vichy and his pro-Axis politics. To explain more fully
the situation, Eisenhower sent a long telegram to the
Combined Chiefs of Staff in which he explained:
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Foremost is the fact that the name of Marshal
P~tain is something to conjure with here.
Everyone from highest to lowest attempts to
create the impression that he lives and acts
under the shadow of the Marshal's figure. The
civil governors, military leaders and naval
commanders agree on only one man as having an
obvious right to assume the Marshal's mantle
in North Africa. That man is Darlan. (45)
Eisenhower also stated in the wire that it was important
to have a strong French government in North Africa.
Otherwise the United States would need a large occupation
force.
FDR was convinced that Eisenhower had acted correctly
in view of the unanticipated situation in North Africa and
cabled him that he would back him to the hilt. On November
17 the President issued a public statement saying that he
"accepted General Eisenhower's political arrangements made
for the time being in North Africa and Western Africa."

(46)

But he went on to say: "The present temporary arrangement in
North and West Africa is only a temporary expedient,
justified solely by the stress of battle."

(47) Roosevelt

said it was made "to save American and British lives and to
avoid a mopping up period in Algiers and Morocco."

(48)

Needless to say Roosevelt's statement caused problems
for Eisenhower. Darlan, on hearing about it said:
Information coming from various parts tends
to give credit to the opinion that 'I am but
a lemon which the Americans will drop after
it is crushed. ' ( 4 9)
Darlan proved to be very co-operative. He did order
the cease fire and stopped the fighting on the western coast
though he was unsuccessful in stopping it in Tunisia. While
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he had never guaranteed that he would be able to bring the
fleet over to the United Nations side, he tried and did say
that the French admiral in Toulon would never allow his
ships to fall into enemy hands. As it turned out, the French
scuttled the fleet in order to keep it from the Nazis. In
Tunisia Darlan's order was received too late.
At two o'clock in the morning on November 8 Doolittle
called at the Residency. He gave Admiral Esteva two personal
messages from President Roosevelt, one for him and the other
for the Bey asking for free passage for United Nations
troops "which had no other object than the rapid destruction
of our common enemies."

(50) Esteva, who received Doolittle

in full dress uniform and Turkish slippers, was terribly
surprised by Roosevelt's letter even though, as French
historian Albert Kammerer said, he approved of it "from the
bottom of his heart."

(51) However, because he was ruled by

the "mystique" of obedience to P/tain, he replied to
Doolittle that he intended to be loyal to the Marshal.

(52)

On the next day the first Axis radio broadcasts
announced that important landings by the United States had
taken place the preceeding night at several points in
Morocco and Algeria. That evening at seven o'clock Admiral
Esteva handed the Bey the President's message giving him at
the same time PJtain's order "calling upon Tunisia to resist
by all its means the Anglo-Saxon invasion."

(53) The Bey

quite naturally was confused by these two contradictory
messages and called a council of his ministers, his close
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entourage, prominent members of the Destour and his two
brothers.
The Bey's Prime Minister, the ''timorous soul"
Doolittle had hoped to depose in the palace revolution,
advised that no reply should be given. But another "bolder
soul", who was later chosen as Prime Minister by the Bey,
pointed out that the French would be abandoning "the basic
principle of the Protectorate"

(54)

if they allowed the

Germans to land and asserted that a reply should be made.
This view prevailed and the Bey finally drafted a reply for
the President that Tunisia desired to be neutral. As
Doolittle pointed out, since Tunisia had no armed force of
its own, "the Bey and his opera bouffe army could obviously
do nothing against either one of the belligerent
forces."

(53)

While this was the official message given to Esteva
for transmission to the President on November 13, an
emissary from the Bey, who had climbed over the garden wall
of Doolittle's house while the guards were distracted by the
bombing of the airfield, brought him an unofficial message
on the night of November 12. The emissary talked to
Doolittle in the garden so as not to attract attention to
his presence by going into the house and turning on the
lights. In this oral message to the President, the Bey said
that since PJtain had taken a position against the
United Nations and had put the airfield at the disposition
of the Axis so they could occupy it at any moment, there was
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nothing at the moment that the Bey could do in favor of the
United Nations other than to declare his benevolent
neutrality.
In case, however, of a future invasion in response to
an Axis landing, he would want to put at the disposal of the
United Nations all the resources of the country as well as
the goods and lives of his people. His Highness did not
doubt that the United Nations which was waging war for
justice and for the rights of the little people would treat
Tunisia according to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.
The Bey was sure that the American government would do
nothing to favor the expropriation of Tunisian territory by
French imperialist elements.

(56)

If the Bey was confused at the time of the invasion,
Admiral Esteva also had reason to be bewildered. Esteva
learned from Doolittle the breadth of the operation. Because
of Vichy's policy of defending the Empire against all, the
first measures in Tunisia were taken against the United
Nations. Admiral Derrien, who was in command of the naval
base at Bizerte, on hearing of the invasion ordered two
cargo ships sunk in the harbor of Bizerte to block its use
by the United Nations while General Barri, in charge of
ground troops, ordered his troops to cover Tunisia from the
direction of Algeria and Bone. On November 9 Axis planes
were allowed to use El Aouina airport at Tunis, and were
refueled as they arrived. Over one hundred Axis planes
towing gliders overwhelmed the El Aouina airport by landing
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over one thousand men. Although a French colonel had wished
to attack the arriving Germans, Barr/ had opposed i t and
ordered his troops to abandon the airport.

(57)

Adding to Esteva's confusion was the fact that he was
receiving orders from both P/tain in Vichy and Darlan in
Algiers. On November 11 Darlan ordered the French troops to
oppose the Germans. Derrien informed his troops that the
Germans were the enemy and they were to def end Bizerte
against them. Derrien's troops received the order with
enthusiasm. Esteva, however, immediately announced that the
order had been given too hastily and that Darlan had revoked
it. Strict neutrality was to be maintained and the orders of
the Marshal were to be followed. The next day the order was
again reversed and Barr/ and Derrien were told to resist the
Axis, but by this time it was too late. In case Esteva had
ever considered independent action, he waited too long.
Beginning on November twelfth Axis troops began debarking at
Bizerte and by the fourteenth the Germans occupied Tunis.
While Derrien's troops may have wanted to fight the
Germans, Derrien, himself, seemed to have decided not to
resist. According to Mast, he gave up the naval base at
Bizerte and all the ships without fighting. Besides refusing
to fight the Axis, Derrien refused to let the ground troops
at Bizerte withdraw to the west. Three thousand men thus
were taken prisoner. The naval forces as well as the arsenal
of Ferryville were delivered to the Axis who took them to
Italy where they were used against the United Nations.

(58)

111
I

While Barre had not opposed the Axis landing, he
withdrew his troops westward into the hills playing for
time. On the fourteenth the British army under General
I
Anderson crossed the Tunisian frontiers to support Barre's

troops who had taken a position at Medjez-el-Bab. By now the
I

Germans had their doubts about Barr~ and asked Esteva to
relieve him of his command. Esteva refused saying he was not
authorized to do so. When the Germans ordered Barr/ to fight
on their side, he followed instead the orders of Darlan and
Giraud saying: "The war has begun. I am the enemy of the
Germans."

(59) On November 19 the Germans opened fire on

Barre's troops at Medjez-el-Bab and with that the Tunisian
campaign had started.
According to Kammerer, Esteva, Derrien and Barri were
unanimously against Germany and against all collaboration.
They wanted the United Natiions to arrive, but they didn't
do anything useful.
they limited themselves to sending telegrams
to the point that the period immediately
preceeding the Tunisian campaign . . . would
appear in history as a flight from
responsibility of all the high agents and all
the civil and military chiefs. (60)
Kammerer went on to say that the French soldiers could have
prevented the landing of the planes or have decimated the
parachute troops, but the French troops were prohibited from
firing and the first German planes to land were refueled by
French attendants at the airport.

(61)

There were a few measures, however, that Esteva took
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that favored the United Nations. When the Germans arrived he
ordered the prison doors to be opened allowing enemies of
the Axis to escape. He also put Radio-Tunis out of
commission. When German General Nehring arrived on November
17 proclaiming: "We come here to liberate Tunisia, in
particular from Jewish oppression," Esteva protested and had
him suppress the part about the Jews.

(62)

In fact on that

same day Nehring, who had opened his command post in the
United States consulate in Tunis which the Americans had
deserted, and Dr. Rudolph Rahn, the Nazi diplomatic agent in
Tunis, recommended that Esteva be relieved of the post of
Resident General. Finally, Esteva arranged for false papers
for the American consul and vice-consuls and their families.
Germans had been landing at El Aouina airport for
four days, but when Doolittle saw the German ground troops
arrive on November 13, he asked for an interview with
Philip, the Prefect of Police, since he and his household
and staff had been completely cut off from contact with
friends and unable to leave the residence. When Philip came
to the house at 9:15 p.m., Doolittle asked whether they were
to remain prisoners and turned over to the German forces or
whether the Tunisian administration would arrange for their
departure.

(63)

Philip promised to discuss it with Admiral Esteva and
left immediately for his office. When he returned at 11:15
p.m., he informed Doolittle that they were to be evacuated
to Algeria. At 12:45 a.m. November 14, Doolittle, his wife,
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their two Spanish servants, John Utter, two clerks, and a
couple with their baby hastily left the house. All
furnishings including silver and rugs were left behind.
Since the Germans already occupied the nearby crossroads,
the American party and their French guides took a
round-about route. Once their cars were stopped by German
soldiers with a medium tank but, because of the forceful
intervention of Philip and the Residency officials, they
were allowed to proceed. Doolittle believed that the German
soldiers were unaware of who was in this caravan. Later they
were once again stopped by Germans and again successfully
passed the barrier. After a few miles all of the French
officials except for a Monsieur Polifet left them with the
parting words to hurry back and free the French from the
prison which seemed inevitable.

(64)

The rest of the trip to Algiers went without
incident. At the border Polifet left the group, informing
them that General Barr/ intended to follow the orders he had
been given to resist any westward advance of the German
troops. Polifet asked Doolittle to impress upon the United
Nations command that speed was crucial. He said that the
Germans had landed some twenty tanks and four thousand men
at Bizerte, while in Tunis there were about fifteen hundred
Germans of which at least one thousand were ground staff for
the aviation forces at El Aouina airfield.
At 8 a.m. on November 14th Doolittle's party arrived
at Bone and made contact with the British forces of
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commandos and parachutists and two Royal Airforce Spitfire
squadrons. As soon as they had told the British their story,
Utter and Doolittle took the ladies of the party to Guelma,
a town south of Bone, where they believed they would be
safe. When they returned to Bone, they were taken to Algiers
on a R.A.F. plane, "leaving in the middle of another air
raid during which their plane was machine gunned and bombs
were dropped on the field."

(66)

In Algiers Doolittle reported to Murphy and Consul
General Felix Cole and found that he was not needed. He then
returned to Guelma passing through convoys of war material
and troops streaming steadily eastward. At Guelma he learned
from his wife that he was needed in Constantine to help the
British Army with the political situation. Returning to
Constantine, Doolittle became semi-officially attached to
the Army there for several months.
Doolittle found in Constantine a strong anti-United
Nations sentiment among those in control. In contacting
resistance groups, Doolittle learned that the same
administration which had been appointed by the Vichy
authorities for the purpose of suppressing any "pro-British,
pro-American or pro-de Gaulle sympathies were still in
charge."

(67) They were the same groups that had worked

against the United Nations since the landings. The
anti-German groups upon whom the United Nations had relied
for their information were forced to remain undercover.
These groups were becoming discouraged while the attitude of
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the local French authorities was anything but
reassuring.

(68)

When the local Constantine newspaper received the
news on November 19 that Barr~ would resist the Germans, the
French censor forbade its publication. Only after a protest
was made by the United Nations general to the French
headquarters, did the article appear. Still the French
censor told the editor that, when the Germans arrived, he
would be the first to be hanged.

(69)

The Prefect of Police of Constantine cautioned the
Director of a Bank, who had expressed United Nations
sympathy to his employees, against undertaking propaganda
among his employees. The same Prefect had ordered the police
to put down any demonstrations for the United Nations
soldiers passing through Constantine on the part of the
local citizens and had arrested some people who had welcomed
United Natiions soldiers. While these demonstrators were
later released, none of the political prisoners in jail for
their ideas had been freed, and the local police continued
to report unfavorably on United Nations sympathizers. A
French general had stated that the French attitude should be
one of neutrality to the United Nations soldiers passing
through since they did not appear of sufficient strength to
cope with the Germans.
Anti-United Nations sentiment was also evident when
rumors were spread through the food lines that there was no
meat and rations would be reduced because United Nations
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soldiers had seized everything in the market. Again the
United Nations general protested to the French staff and a
communiqu/ was put out stating that United Nations soldiers
were bringing their own supplies taking nothing from local
reserves.

( 70)

This local sabotage came from the civil administration
and from the higher French military officials who were

I .

surrounded by members of the Service d'Ordre de 1 a Legion,
described by Doolittle as the French equivalent of the
Gestapo. The S.O.L. was the active volunteer law enforcement
part of the larger veterans organization, "La

L~ion des

Combattants," started by the P~tain government. Mast
described it as a sort of police force supplementing the
regular "more peaceful" police force. According to him, the
S.O.L.'s function before the landing had been to watch and
control opinions, denouncing those not conforming to the
Vichy policy of collaboration. They were also to prevent all
manifestations of ideas or reunions not conforming to this
Vichy policy.

(71) Obviously many members of the S.O.L. had

not switched their allegiance to the United Nations after
the invasion.
Doolittle strongly recommended that these anti-United
Nations elements be replaced. He thought that at least
seventy-five percent of the local French population would
welcome this action and "that the Arabs, passive and
politically inert, would only look upon such action as a
manifestation of the show of force which they
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admire."

( 7 2)

The political situation in Constantine which
Doolittle did not find favorable to the United Nations cause
was a reflection of the political situation as it was
evolving under Darlan for all of French North Africa. While
Darlan had made an important military contribution to the
United Nations cause, in internal affairs he continued the
Vichy form of government. As Darlan described it in an
interview:
I am simply managing French interests in
French Africa in the name of the prisoner
Chief of State. I am acting as a trustee
of authority, the trustee of a national
treasure.
( 7 3)
Thus an unexpected consequence of the American arrival in
North Africa was the reinforcement of Pdtain's "national
revolution". Not only did Darlan continue Vichy policies
there, he expelled from the army those that had helped the
United Nations in the November 8 invasion and even went so
far as to recommend to Vichy that they lose their
citizenship. It was only Eisenhower's intervention that
prevented this step.
Roosevelt, who was being severely criticized for the
"Darlan deal" and the continuation of the Vichy regime in
North Africa, was anxious to change the Vichy laws and told
General Marshall that restrictions imposed by Vichy should
be withdrawn including the ban against labor unions and the
anti-semitic laws. Political prisoners were to be freed.
First, however, Roosevelt thought it important to have
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Eisenhower's views on what effect he thought such a
statement would have on the North Africans.

(74) Eisenhower

sent Roosevelt a detailed report that had been prepared
under Darlan's orders outlining the steps his regime was
taking to liberalize and reform the administration of North
Africa (75), but decided against making a public
statement.

(76)

Another step Roosevelt proposed to Churchill to deal
with the situation in North Africa was that they consider
appointing an American and a Britisher with a veto power
over French civil administrators. As a result Murphy was
appointed as a personal representative of the President on
Eisenhower's staff with the rank of minister and Harold
Macmillan was named by Churchill to a corresponding
position.

(77) Murphy's position was in addition to his

duties as chief of Civil Administration on General
Eisenhower's staff.
In spite of Secretary Henry Stimson's strong
objections, Roosevelt issued a directive turning over the
administration of civilian affairs in North Africa to the
State Department.

(78) Murphy, as Civil Affairs Officer, was

to coordinate with General Eisenhower's staff "since all
civilian requirements are subject in the first instance to
the military situation."

(78) The primary objective of all

civilian officials was to contribute to the successful
military operations. Relations with the French authorities
were to be conducted exclusively through or with the
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approval of the Civil Affairs Officer.

(80)

Though the State Department had been put in charge of
civilian administration, Roosevelt told Secretary Cordell
Hull on the telephone a couple of months after the invasion
that Murphy "was not there to report to Hull but as a
special appointee of his own to handle special matters on
which he reported to Roosevelt direct."

(81) While Stimson

thought this was bad administration, he said: "This was a
truly Rooseveltian position."

(82)

De Gaulle, though not informed in advance about the
invasion, had taken the matter gracefully and showed
satisfaction that Giraud had helped, but when Giraud and
Darlan agreed that Giraud would have command of the military
and Darlan head the civil administration, de Gaulle was
furious and blamed the United States for bringing it about.
De Gaulle had indicated a willingness to work with Giraud,
but refused to have anything to do with Darlan.
Darlan's presence at the head of French North Africa
had aroused opposition from all quarters. The strict
Vichyites reproached him for having betrayed the Marshal by
signing the cease fire. The Group of Five were frustrated
that they had not been rewarded for having aided the United
Nations, and the Gaullists considered Darlan an obstacle to
the arrival of their leader in Algeria. Darlan was aware
that there were several plots against him, even asking
Murphy after lunch at the summer palace on December 23 what
the Americans would do if one of these plots was successful.
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On the day after he asked this question, Darlan was
assassinated by a twenty year old French student who was
immediately condemned to death.

(83)

Only recently has it been learned that it was the
British Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.)
assassin.

that armed the

(84) Because the assassin had been a student of

Carleton Coon, who during the month of December had been an
instructor of the de Gaullist Free Corps of Africa near
Algiers, Eddy thought it was a good idea for Coon to
disappear for a while. One of the places Coon went was
"through the cold and night to Constantine where [he] found
Hooker in a cold room with his wife Vecka, two Basque maids
and two Pekingese dogs in attendance."

(85)

The assassination of Darlan "ended one problem" as
Eisenhower commented to his Aide, Butcher, "but no doubt
created many more."

(86) One of the problems created by

Darlan's murder was that Giraud, now head of both civil and
military affairs, placed a reactionary Vichy general in
charge of investigating the death of Darlan and this general
used his post to persecute the leaders of the Algiers
Gaullist underground. Coon reported that though the assassin
was a Royalist, the authorities rounded up Free French and
others whom they wished to harass. Several of the
instructors where he taught were arrested.

(87) Giraud

brought members of the Group of Five into the
administration. Lemaigre-Dubreuil, though not taking a
cabinet post, became his political adviser. Giraud, whose
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primary concern was military victory, would soon prove to be
a weak leader. A political conservative, he would wait until
the spring of 1943 to change the Vichy laws and then only
under pressure.
According to Vice-Consul Kenneth Pendar, the men
Giraud chose to administer,

"were hardly outstanding leaders

or in any way representative ones."

(88) Pendar said: "We

used them because they were available. Later we continued to
use them because we were committed to them." Pendar thought
Giraud was honest but inept and was too slow in restoring
Vichy destroyed civil liberties, in giving the Jewish people
civil rights and in getting rid of the Vichy group in North
Africa. While Giraud was not in favor of Vichy's ideas, he
thought everything could wait until the war was won.

(90)

Harold Macmillan, the British political adviser to
Eisenhower, wrote in hindsight that it would have been
better if Murphy had been withdrawn at the beginning of
January 1943 when the invasion had occurred and Darlan's
assassination had allowed Giraud's natural succession to
power. He believed a new phase was about to begin between
France and the different French groups and the United
Nations. Murphy had been employed in a Fifth Column
operation. His job had been to make contacts and to organize
plots to prepare for a military landing. He had had to deal
with reputable as well as some questionable people such as
Darlan and many disreputable agents. Macmillan thought he
was handicapped by this in the new phase of his work because
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he was under obligations to a lot of people. According to
Macmillan Murphy should have been replaced by somebody
uncommitted.

( 91)

It is possible to view Macmillan's statement as an
example of British bias. The British were, after all,
committed to de Gaulle for whom Giraud, backed by Murphy,
was simply an obstacle. The United States, on the other hand
was committed to that obstacle, Giraud. Biased as Macmillan
may have been, Giraud would not prove to be a good choice.
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CHAPTER VI

DE GAULLE-GIRAUD CONFLICT

By November 1942 the United Nations had seized the
initiative in North Africa. In the west they had
successfully invaded Morocco and Algeria while in the east
the British had taken El Alamein pushing the Germans back
into Libya. Although fighting continued in Tunisia,
Roosevelt thought the Germans would soon be driven out and
proposed to Churchill that the miliary chiefs, including the
Russians, meet to discuss the follow up to the Tunisian
campaign. Churchill wanted instead a Big Three meeting. He
feared that at such a meeting the Russians would argue for a
cross channel invasion in 1943. In order to dissuade the
Russians from this idea, he thought that he and Roosevelt
needed to handle the matter with Stalin rather than leaving
it to the military chiefs.
Instead of a cross channel attack in 1943 Churchill
was promoting the idea of an attack across the Mediterranean
once the Tunisian campaign had eliminated the Axis from
North Africa. He suggested striking at Sardinia or Sicily,
"at the soft underbelly of the Axis.''

(1)

In spite of

General Marshall's warning against too many diversionary
operations, Roosevelt and the American chiefs were also
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inclined toward the Mediterranean plan knowing that not
enough American troops would be available for a 1943 assault
on Northern Europe.
Churchill believed that at a Big Three meeting he and
Roosevelt could explain in person to Stalin their reasons
for postponing the cross channel invasion in favor of the
Mediterranean plan. Churchill suggested that they meet in
Iceland, but Roosevelt preferred a warmer place and
proposed Africa. Roosevelt sent a cable to Stalin suggesting
the three leaders meet in January to make strategic plans,
but Stalin declined the invitation claiming he was needed in
the Soviet Union where a major offensive was being waged at
Stalingrad. Roosevelt and Churchill suspected the real
reason was that he feared that the two Anglo-Saxon leaders
would try to persuade him that a second front was not
feasible in 1943.
In spite of Stalin's decision not to attend the
meeting, Roosevelt wanted to proceed with it anyway. Not
only would it be an opportunity to plan the follow up to the
North African campaign, but it would give a chance to
discuss postwar plans, now that a turning point seemed to
have been reached in the war. During the fall of 1942 FDR
had been considering postwar objectives. He believed the
Axis powers would need to be disarmed and forced to renounce
their ideology. To make sure of this Roosevelt wanted their
unconditional surrender. He had still another reason just
now for wanting to announce this doctrine. The Darlan deal
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had raised fears with Stalin and others that the
western powers would negotiate an early peace with
collaborators or with Axis leaders. The announcement of the
doctrine of unconditional surrender would lay those concerns
to rest. In particular, it should reassure Stalin.
While Roosevelt did announce the doctrine of
unconditional surrender at the conference, which took place
at Casablanca from January 14-24, discussion of the doctrine
showed differences of opinion between the President and his
Secretary of State. Hull was afraid that it might prolong
the war if the people of the Axis countries thought
they had nothing to which to look forward. He also thought
the doctrine would require that the Americans and British be
prepared to take over the governments of the conquered
countries.

(2) The fact that Hull was opposed to the idea

was probably one reason that Roosevelt did not have him come
to the conference. But Hull had really been left out of
French matters ever since St. Pierre and Miquelon. Because
of Hull's intense anger at de Gaulle for ordering the Free
French take over of those islands, Roosevelt had taken
French matters into his own hands. Instead the President,
who liked being his own Secretary of State, delegated to
Hull and the State Department the job of planning for the
postwar peace keeping organization.
Another reason Roosevelt did not want Hull at the
conference may have been his fear of Hull's antagonism
toward de Gaulle, whom he expected to meet. Roosevelt hoped
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to find a solution to the problem that followed Darlan's
death of both the Giraud and de Gaulle factions wanting to

be recognized as the provisional government of France - "the
French quagmire", as he called it.

(3) At the conference the

Combined Chiefs of Staff decided in only four days that,
once the Germans had been cleared out of North Africa,
Sicily would be the next target, but the French problem
proved to be more difficult.
Upon the assassination of Darlan, de Gaulle had drawn
up a program to meet the new situation whereby his
committee would move to Algiers and become the provisional
government of the liberated French with himself as
president. Giraud would be designated as commander-in-chief
of all the French armed forces fighting with the United
Nations.

(4)

The Giraud group had a similar plan: Giraud with his
advisors would be the civil head and de Gaulle would be a
member of the Vichy created Council of the Empire, and a
military adviser. From the beginning of their association
with the Americans, the Lemaigre-Dubreuil group had hoped to
set up an autonomous French government in North Africa.
While they said their first goal was a military one, they
had a political plan as well. They considered that these
political aims had been endorsed by the United States in the
Giraud-Murphy Accord of November 2, 1942. This accord, based
on several letters between Giraud and Murphy, guaranteed
that the restoration of France to full

132
independence in all the greatness and vastness
which it possessed before the war in Europe as
well as overseas is one of the war aims of the
United Nations.

( 5)

Furthermore, the United States promised to treat the French
as allies and declared that they would not involve
themselves in interior administrative questions of the
temporarily occupied territories.
This accord had been annulled to a certain extent by
the Clark-Darlan Treaty, by which the administration of
North Africa was left to the French under Darlan in exchange
for their help with the war. Now that Darlan was out of the
picture, Lemaigre-Dubreuil tried to reestablish the terms of
the Giraud-Murphy Accord. When Lemaigre-Dubreuil visited
Washington at the end of Decernber 1942 to make arrangements
for the rearming of the French, Hull agreed to see him.
Lemaigre-Dubreuil was astonished to find that Hull knew
nothing of the Giraud-Murphy Accord. Once Hull knew of the
accord, Lemaigre-Dubreuil tried to get him to agree to its
consequences: namely the formation of a provisional
government in Algeria allowing France, independent of the
Axis, to be represented abroad. Hull replied that, if the
Giraud group tried to form such a government, the Foreign
Office would insist on making de Gaulle its head. Hull did
not think it was the right time to raise the political
problem.

( 6)

Informed by Hull about his talk with Lemaigre-Dubreuil
and the Giraud-Murphy Accord, Roosevelt,

just before his

departure for Casablanca, tolo the Joint Chiefs of Staff at
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a meeting on January 7, 1943 that Murphy, in giving certain
pledges to restore France and the colonial possessions, "had
exceeded his authority,"

(7) and that he, as President, was

not prepared to make any promises. There were some colonial
possessions that would not be returned to France, and he
wanted the Chiefs of Staff to make this clear to Murphy and
Eisenhower at Casablanca.

(8)

Like Hull, Roosevelt wanted to make no promises to
recognise either faction as a provisional government.
Instead he wanted to make temporary arrangements with local
authorities as territories were liberated. He felt strongly
that the French people should choose their own government
after the war.
Murphy and Macmillan had suggested that de Gaulle be
offered joint political control with Giraud. The latter
agreed, but de Gaulle resisted. In fact, de Gaulle refused
to come to the conference at all. His committee did not wish
to have any part of a government including Vichy personnel
such as General Auguste Nog~es. Roosevelt wired Anthony Eden
in London, "I have got the bridegroom, where is the bride?"
(9) Only when Churchill threatened to cut off financial
support, did de Gaulle agree to appear.
It didn't help matters when Giraud met de Gaulle as
though he were still the lower ranking officer who commanded
a regiment of tanks. He had not taken account of the fact
that he was now a powerful political force respected by
members of the Resistance.

( 10) De Gaul le refused to
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support the Murphy-Macmillan plan claiming it was dictated
by the Americans and British, but did agree to have his

photograph taken shaking hands with Giraud.
It may have been because of his annoyance at de
Gaulle that Roosevelt signed two memos presented to him by
Giraud just before he left the conference and after
Churchill had already gone. These memos, which came to be
known as the Anfa agreement after the suburb of Casablanca
where the conference was held, were drawn up by
Lemaigre-Dubreuil.
Lemaigre-Dubreuil, who questioned Giraud's ability to
look out for his group's political interests, had managed to
be at Casablanca by saying that he had to visit family in
Morocco. Later Murphy would accuse Lemaigre-Dubreuil of
lying to get to Casablanca. By signing these two memos, the
President agreed to provide weapons and supplies to Giraud's
forces in North Africa and to recognize Giraud as the
military-civil commander in Africa.

(11) Roosevelt also

agreed that the letters exchanged between Murphy and Giraud
before the meeting remained in force. By these letters, the
United States had guaranteed the restoration of the French
Empire and to treat France as an ally. Probably Roosevelt
did not realize what he had signed because, in agreeing to
the latter, he was doing what he had told the Joint Chiefs
he opposed.
In the political field Roosevelt had only recognized
Giraud as the trustee of French interests, not as the head
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of a provisional government. Nevertheless, Churchill, on
learning of the agreement which had committed Great Britain

to Giraud as well, insisted on amending it to include de
Gaulle and to changing the word trustee to manager of French
interests. Because of Giraud's indifference to politics, he
agreed to Churchill's changes, thereby losing the political
benefits of Anfa.

(12)

Basic differences about the nature of the post-war
world between the British and Americans underlay the de
Gaulle-Giraud problem. Churchill wanted a strong France
that would counterbalance Russian hegemony in central
Europe. Roosevelt and Hull wanted a collective security
agreement that would enable the major powers to deal
individually with the trouble spots. Nor did Roosevelt see
France as one of these great powers. In a talk with Molotov
eight months before, Roosevelt had included France as one of
those countries that should be disarmed after the war. When
Molotov asked about France becoming a great power, Roosevelt
said it might happen in ten or twenty years.

(13)

It was at the Casablanca Conference that these
different strands of Roosevelt's thinking on collective
security began to fit together. While there Roosevelt
discussed with his son, Elliot, his idea of trusteeship
which would replace the old mandate system of the League of
Nations. The trustees would report to the "organization of
the United Nations."

(14) This was the first time Elliot had

heard of this plan. Indochina was one of the countries that
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Roosevelt had in mind for a trusteeship and he was to
propose this to Anthony Eden later in the spring of 1943.

When Eden objected, an impasse developed with the British
over colonialism in Southeast Asia.
Differences with the British over colonialism were
quite apparent at Casablanca. The trip to North Africa had
reinforced Roosevelt's anti-imperialism. On his way he had
visited Gambia where he was shocked by conditions.
Dirt. Disease. Very high mortality rate. I
asked, life expectancy - You'd never guess what
it is. Twenty-six years. Those people are
treated worse than the livestock. Their cattle
live longer. (15)
On returning to the United States he "talked much about the
horrible conditions of the natives in the places he had
stopped . "

( 16)

At a dinner party for the Sultan of Morocco,
Roosevelt, in front of Nogu'es and Churchill, expressed his
sympathy for colonial aspirations for independence and
suggested some form of economic cooperation between Morocco
and the United States after the war. While this raised the
hopes of North African nationalists, it only accentuated the
differences with Churchill.
Roosevelt's attitude could only cause problems with

all the French. The Giraud group were no less imperialminded than the Free French of de Gaulle. Roosevelt probably
perceived Giraud as being primarily concerned about military
matters and somebody that he could control in the political
realm. At all costs he wanted to avoid reinforcing
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Churchill's imperial ideas by recognizing his prot~g,, de
Gaulle.
While the United States was committing itself to the
support of Giraud at Casablanca, disillusionment with him
was already evident among his supporters. Discouraged by
Giraud's weakness, Lemaigre-Dubreuil had not accepted any
position in his administration, becoming instead his
political adviser. Lemaigre-Dubreuil complained that instead
of a total rupture with Vichy, the new situation left P'tain
in a certain sentimental place as "prisoner" of the Germans
and the Vichy collaborators still in place.

(17)

General Mast had good reason to be disillusioned.
Mast, who had been Giraud's representative in North Africa
before the invasion, expressed real bitterness about the way
Giraud refused to intervene when Darlan expelled Mast and
the other officers, who had helped with the United Nations
invasion, from the army "even though" as Mast wrote, "the
most elementary moral sense would have dictated to him to
oppose it with energy."

(18)

Nor did Giraud intervene when Darlan had Vichy strip
Mast and the others of their French citizenship. Only
because Mast went to Eisenhower, who intervened with Darlan,
was their citizenship restored. According to Mast, Giraud on
the civilian front was obviously not a chief - "one who
takes responsibility and covers his subordinates for the
consequences of the mission he had given them."

(19) Since

Mast and the others had lost their army positions, Giraud
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decided to group them in a liaison mission to the United
Nations forces under Mast's command. They were installed in

a few rooms in the St. George's Hotel in Algiers where the
United Nations forces had their headquarters.

(20)

Other officers, who had helped the United States
before the invasion, were not as lucky as Mast and his
group. There was a program of removing those officers and
sending them to remote posts where chance of contact with
Americans was slim. One of the best French regiments which
had tried to prevent Nogu~s from resisting the American
landing had been practically disbanded.

(21)

In his position as head of the liaison mission to the
United Nations forces, Mast was able to observe Eisenhower's
conduct of the war. This campaign was not proceeding as
swiftly as had been anticipated. The strategic plan
formulated before the disembarkment was for the First
British Army under General Kenneth Anderson to clean out the
Axis troops from Tunisia. Once this was accomplished, he was
to go to southern Tunisia and fight Rommel whose army was
being pursued by the British Eighth Army coming from Libya.
Difficulties with supplies, heavy rains, and deep mud in the
northern part of Tunisia had stopped Anderson's advance in
December. The Germans, who had poured troops into the
Bizerte-Tunis area, began a counterattack which put the
United Nations forces on the defensive. Observing the troops
mired down in the mud in early December, Eisenhower decided
to halt operations on a line in Tunisia running from Medjez-
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el-Bab in the north to Gafsa in the south. This line was
held by British troops in the north, French (African Army)
in the center, and American in the south.
While the offensive from the west temporarily halted,
that from the east by the British Eighth Army was advancing
westward in Libya and on February 2 crossed the Tunisian
border. Concerned about his position, Rommel began a series
of attacks on his western front in February causing bitter
fighting, but by March United Nations counterattacks forced
the Germans to begin falling back. Soon the attack from two
fronts was successful, and on May 7 American and French
troops took Bizerte while the British at approximately the
same time entered Tunis. Though several more days were
required for mopping up and for collecting the prisoners,
this was the real end of the Tunisian battle.
Mast believed that victory could have come by the end
of December if the Americans had reinforced Anderson's two
British brigades. Unfortunately a powerful German army
supported by airplanes from Sicily could not be beaten by
only two British brigades.

(22)

Instead of committing more

of their troops to battle, according to Mast, the American
command was preoccupied with training their troops behind
the combat zone while others were protecting the rear in
Morocco in case of a German invasion through Spain. Mast
found that there was no United Nations strategic plan to
combat a classic German strategy which had been well thought
out. Mast blamed this on Eisenhower's lack of
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experience.

(23) He was struck by the fact that, even though

the United Nations had numerical superiority, the troops
committed to battle were always less than what the Germans
had and for this reason could not impose their will.

(24)

Mast was also critical of the Americans for not
rearming the French as they had promised at the meeting that
he had had with Mark Clark at Cherchel. While the French
African Army had fought well, they could have done better
with proper arms. From Constantine in January Doolittle
confirmed what Mast said about the French forces in southern
Tunisia being badly armed. They were armed with old
material, and what modern weapons they possessed were short
of ammunition. Their losses had already been heavy.
Doolittle thought
if the elite French troops now there should
receive a beating for lack of equipment,
food, and services the morale of the French
army, none too good except in the isolated
units and individuals, may also receive a
blow which will permanently render French
assistance useless. It is to be hoped that
the Allied command will make use of their
knowledge of the ground and local tactics
instead of letting this happen. (25)
Doolittle was also concerned because the Germans were giving
the Tunisians in the Axis occupied area of Tunisia goods
that had been pillaged locally and were reported to be
arming Tunisian snipers in northern Tunisia. However, he had
learned that plans were under way to counteract this by
buying those Tunisians back with foodstuffs and
clothing.

(26)

141
Not only was there the French African Army of 150,000
men under Giraud fighting in North Africa, but there were
the de Gaulle Free French forces of 15,000 fighting. One
Free French division under Le Clerc had come north to
Tunisia from Chad while another under Larminat was fighting
with the British Eighth in Libya. Rivalry existed between
the French African Army and the Free French forces each of
which tried to recruit from the other. This was one of the
reasons Churchill and Roosevelt were trying to bring the
factions together. Mast had the opportunity to compare the
morale of these two forces when in February he was offered a
new mission.
When General Georges Catroux came to North Africa as
liaison between the de Gaulle and Giraud groups, Mast
explained to Catroux how Giraud, frightened by his illegal
position, sought always to get back into what he believed to
be legality. This obsession, Mast observed, had eliminated
all those officers responsible for the rebellion and without
whom Giraud would not have become the leader.

(27) Now that

Giraud had been named civil and military commander-in-chief
by the Council of the Empire, he signed all his decisions in
the name of the "Marechal empech/.

11

Mast explained to

Catroux the heartbreaking situation of all the officers
abandoned by their chief and for this reason put in
quarantine by the rest of the army. While Catroux could not
intervene, he proposed to Mast to come as a liaison to the
Free French forces in Egypt and Lebanon. Giraud agreed to
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let Mast go on this new assignment.

(28)

Mast had no sooner assumed his new job than an
incident occurred that made him aware of its importance. A
young French soldier appeared in Algiers in a torn shirt.
This soldier, who was fighting with the de Gaulle forces in
southern Tunisia, had been allowed to leave his unit to
visit his family in Algiers only to find himself badly
treated in an encounter with soldiers belonging to Giraud's
French African Army.

(29)

When Mast visited the First Free French Division of
General Larminat, he discoverd a far better morale among the
soldiers than that of the soldiers of the French African
Army who were jealous of each other, disputed among
themselves, and among whom defeatism was prevalent. The
defeatism among the latter was so strong that, at the time
of Rommel's attack in southern Tunisia, a French colonel had
been impatient for the Germans to arrive at Constantine.
Mast believed that the defeatism of Vichy had left its mark
on these men and they were afraid to show their patriotism.
Because of Catroux's intervention, Mast would later
be appointed as Resident General of Tunisia. Giraud had
wanted somebody else, but Catroux had said it was important
to choose somebody who had never accepted the principles of
Vichy's National Revolution.

(30) A broken hip, resulting

from an airplane accident in Lebanon, would keep Mast from
assuming his post at the time of the Tunisian victory.
General Alphonse Juin served as acting Resident General
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until he had recuperated.
In Washington Secretary of War Stimson considered
winning in Tunisia a significant step in the war. In his
diary on May 12, 1943, he wrote, "Today is a great day of
victory for the allied arms in Tunisia."

(31) His press

conference was a "jubilant occasion because of the
victory,"

(32) over 150,000 prisoners had been taken. He

told the press that
the defeat of the Axis in Tunisia was more
than the loss of an army - it was the loss of
a campaign, the loss of a continent. The
battle of Tunisia ranks with the battle of
Stalingrad as one of the two great military
disasters suffered by the Germans within a few
months. (33)
At the same time as Stimson was celebrating the
military victory in Tunisia, Cordell Hull was proclaiming it
a victory for the Vichy policy. Talking with Churchill, who
was in Washington, Hull said, "'Your' and our Vichy policy
has been justified and vindicated 100 per cent."

(34) Hull

had been sensitive to the criticism of this policy as well
as the constant press attacks. It would be only two months
later in July 1943 that Hull requested from Stimson access
to material for a book that he was having written on the
Vichy policy by William Langer (Our Vichy Gamble).
While Churchill was in Washington, he discussed the
Giraud-de Gaulle problem. Progress had been made since the
Casablanca conference in bringing the two factions together.
This was partly due to the efforts of Jean Monnet, a French
businessman who had originally gone to Washington to work
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with the British Purchasing Commission. He was highly
regarded by Harry Hopkins who persuaded Roosevelt to send
him to North Africa to work with Giraud on handling the Lend
Lease supplies for equipping the French Army.

(35) According

to Robert Sherwood, this was one time when Hopkins
successfully circumvented the State Department. Hull had not
wanted Monnet to be sent, believing him too closely
connected with the Lazard Fr~res banking firm which had ties
to the de Gaulle organization in London.

(36)

As soon as Monnet arrived in Algiers, he realized
that changes were needed. He persuaded Giraud to do away
with the Vichy laws and to institute more democratic ones.
On March 5 in a radio address Giraud announced that "France
had no racial prejudices."

(37) Then on March 14 Giraud made

a speech advocating that all Frenchmen fighting the Axis
should unite meaning, of course, the French African Army and
the Free French forces. He also advocated the return to a
more democratic regime. On the eighteenth he had ordinances
published restoring the laws of the French Republic and
abrogating those imposed on North Africa by the Vichy
government, while letting it be known that he was ready to
receive General de Gaulle in order to form a union.

(38)

Commenting on Giraud's speech of the fourteenth,
Doolittle, who had been temporarily assigned to Rabat,
Morocco in February, said the French there were unanimously
in favor, and the bulk of the population approved of the
ordinances. They had traditionally been left-wing
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republicans and had favored de Gaulle. Almost all Frenchmen
wanted to see the independence of France restored.
There was, however, a minority opposed to the
ordinances. Among those opposed were high ranking government
officials, army and navy officers, and former leaders of the
Legion. These officials and officers were worried that they
might be called to account under a more democratic regime
for their actions since 1940. Some were simply reactionary.
This minority considered "the maintenance or installation of
a 'strong' government as important as the defeat of
Germany."

(39) Doolittle thought this group might have been

used by pro-Germans such as Laval, but any pro-German
activity they engaged in was only incidental to their main
purpose of building a "strong" government. They adapted
easily to the situation created by the United Nations
landing up to the point where it was important to revise
internal policy. According to Doolittle:
Here they were incapable of flexibility. On
the contrary they resorted to every device to
prevent public opinion from expressing itself
and to retard the inevitable. (40)

Nogu~s was still one of the primary obstacles to the
union Giraud was now proposing to de Gaulle. Doolittle had
had an opportunity to talk to Nogu~s in person. He described
him as having a "flexible" character which had made him more
susceptible to orders from Vichy than Esteva, whom he
described as the "inflexible 'Bearded Virgin' of Tunis, who
when pushed too far, flew to Vichy, pounded on tables and
flatly refused the more outrageous requirements."

(41)
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Removing Nogu'es would do a great deal to elevate the moral
tone of all of Morocco.

(42) Doolittle, who had had the

opportunity to know Nogues and Esteva, both of whom had
followed Vichy at the time of the invasion, seemed to have
retained more respect for Esteva than Nogu~s.
While de Gaulle let Giraud know he had received his
message with pleasure and that he hoped to go to North
Africa soon, it required two more months of negotiations
before de Gaulle actually left London for Algiers. Finally
he arrived in late May and on June 3 Giraud and de Gaulle
announced formation of the French Committee of National
Liberation on which the two would share the presidency. A
contributing factor to the union may have been the evident
popularity of the de Gaullists both in North Africa and in
mainland France. The Germans' total occupation of France
and the drafting of French workers starting in February 1943
for work in Germany had caused many French to look toward de
Gaulle as the main hope of deliverance from the Axis. The
various Resistance movements had pulled together into a
National Council of the Resistance under Jean Moulin and
announced that they considered de Gaulle their leader on May
15.

(43)

Hull and Roosevelt decided to accept the French
Committee of National Liberation because it had promised it
would turn over its power to the Provisional French
Government to be established after liberation.

(44)

Roosevelt had insisted that Giraud keep command of
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the army and since Churchill agreed with this, Giraud
remained as commander-in-chief.
The fusion of the de Gaulle-Giraud factions did not
stop the problems nor did it ease the annoyance of Roosevelt
and Hull with de Gaulle. Hull expressed his bias against de
Gaulle in the lack of recognition given to the military
achievements of the de Gaullists in North Africa. Though
these were considerable with much loss of life among the
Free French, Hull in a memo to the President which he quoted
in his "Memoirs" said:
It cannot but be realized from your message of
congratulations for the Allied victory in North
Africa that the real French contribution was
given by the French forces under General Giraud,
while throughout the period of the battle
de Gaulle, through his political agitation
directed from London, caused nothing but
disturbance and concern to our military
commanders. (45)
In his determination to justify the Vichy policy, Hull
discredited the Free French divisions even though they
deserved praise.

( 4 6)

In spite of the union, problems continued in North
Africa. One problem was that each army continued to recruit
soldiers from the other. In Tunisia the Free French troops
who had come from Chad under LeClerc and those who had been
fighting with the English Eighth under Larminat had been
welcomed with enthusiasm.

(47) After the victory parade in

Tunis a fight for recruitment began between the two forces.
Recruiting bureaus were set up. Since the Free French troops
had new and modern uniforms, they were at an advantage.
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Entire units of Giraud's African French troops rallied to
the Free French. Another reason for the success of the
recruiting offices opened by the de Gaulle forces in
Tunisian towns under Generals Leclerc and de Larminat was
explained at some length by Doolittle after he returned to
Tunisia. Before the November 8 landing, Tunisia had been the
most favorably inclined toward the United Nations cause of
any of the North African countries. This was because of the
menace of an Italian takeover. Tunisia's rather small French
population was equalled by Italians, and there was an active
Italian Armistice Commission resident in Tunisia. In some
respects Tunisia was like an occupied territory. These
conditions as well as the closeness to the fighting in
Tripolitania caused the spirits of the French to go up as
the British armies moved westward and those of the Italians
to go up as the fighting moved eastward. With the last big
advance by Rommel, the French realized the danger in which
they stood.

(48)

Before November 8, with the exception of a few
officials who worked for Vichy, according to Doolittle,
the feelings were almost entirely for de Gaulle as Giraud
had not appeared on the scene. Doolittle may have been
expressing a selective perception here since he had mainly
talked to Resistance French. Other French who lived in
Tunisia at the time recall that P'tain enjoyed substantial
support among the colonists until the invasion. After that
de Gaulle being better known through the radio was favored
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over Giraud. During the Axis occupation the spirit of
resistance was so pronounced that the Vichy regime was
required to send over from France "special strong arm
squads" to replace the heads of the Legion and other
pro-Vichy organizations. Only a few French Tunisians were
found ready to persecute their fellow Frenchmen.

(49)

After the invasion most of the French residents of
Tunisia, knowing that Giraud was leading the North African
French forces, assumed that this was simply a part of the
whole and that the union between Giraud and de Gaulle would
be arrived at quickly. Reports of dissension between the two
men, which appeared in the German controlled press and over
the radio, were considered as so much propaganda. When
the United Nations forces arrived and Tunis was retaken, the
inhabitants were surprised to learn that the dissension was
true. The surprise turned to wonder and finally to
annoyance. It was in this context that the de Gaulle
recruiting was successful.

( 5 0)

When de Gaulle visited Tunis in late June, he
expressed some of his feelings about the American attitude
toward him. On his arrival he had received an enthusiastic
reception. At a dinner in his honor Doolittle asked him how
he had liked the reception given him by the Tunis crowd.
The General drew himself up to his full
height, which is a great deal, and stated
that it was to be expected because there was
no doubt of the sentiment of the majority of
Frenchmen in regard to the Free French
Movement, sentiment which was unfortunately
ignored by representatives of certain
governments for political reasons. (51)
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When Doolittle asked him about this remark, de Gaulle
explained he was referring to the representatives of the
American government who, while declaring for the unity of
the French people, were rendering that unity impossible by
not permitting the necessary changes which would produce
such unity. "For instance, he said, the creation of this
half-and-half committee at Algiers .
American intervention."

. was directly due to

(52)

After dinner, while coffee was being served, de Gaulle
came up to Doolittle and asked him to sit and talk with him.
The General praised the United States action in North
Africa, but said that the Americans had overlooked one
thing,
the sentiment of the French people underlying
the group of big colonists, industrialists,
and military figures with whom the Americans
had dealt and who had introduced the figure of
General Giraud. (53)
Giraud, he considered "a fine soldier, a courageous patriot,
and altogether a splendid person,"

(54) but at that time

there were only two possible "mysticisms or loyalties, that
of Vichy and Marshal Pe'tain, who stood for defeat, and that
of the Free French, who had always stood for resistance and
resurrection of France."

(55) He explained to Doolittle that

the Americans should not have been surprised at the coolness
of Giraud's reception in North Africa since he stood for
neither or both at the same time and could not possibly have
any political influence. Too many people with the Vichy
spirit surrounded General Giraud and the small people who
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represented the other side had not been given the voice they
deserved.

( 5 6)

De Gaulle complained to Doolittle about American
newspaper attacks which
accused him of being 1. a fascist and
reactionary 2. a communist 3. desirous of
bringing back the old French parliamentary
machine with all its faults and 4. personally
ambitious to emulate Hitler himself. (57)

All of these were false, he said, and he wondered why the
American press was so poorly informed on the objectives of
his movement.

(58)

In this, his first meeting with de Gaulle, Doolittle
was
greatly impressed . . . with his evident
sincerity and directness. De Gaulle is
obviously fanatic, a man with a single
idea, but there is no doubt of his hold
on the rank and file of the French people,
or even in the lower ranks of the French
North African Army which has rapidly
gravitated in the direction of the Free
French Forces wherever there has been
contact between the two groups. (59)
Doolittle thought de Gaulle's visit had "infused new life
into the de Gaulle movement in Tunisia,"

(60) but, because

of the withdrawal of almost all the Free French forces to
Tripoli with the British Eighth Army, recruiting had fallen
off.
While the rivalry between the two factions over
recruitment may have lessened, that between the two leaders
on the Committee continued. Differences between them were so
bad that in September Murphy told the State Department that
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it threatened the prosecution of the war. Just as Giraud
was losing his troops to the de Gaulle forces, so was he
losing ground to de Gaulle in the political field. Harold
Macmillan made an interesting observation about Giraud in
his War Diaries. After calling on him in late June he wrote:
The old boy was as charming and as vague as
ever. I like him more and more, but of course
he is really out of his depth. (61)
No doubt it was because Giraud was "out of his depth" that
de Gaulle would be able by November to force him out of the
FCNL though he still retained the title of commander-inchief of the French armies. Macmillan talked to de Gaulle
the night Giraud left the Committee in November and had this
to say about de Gaulle.
Once again I ended the day feeling that
de Gaulle stood head and shoulders above all
his colleagues in the breadth of his
conception for the long term. Meanwhile, he
was clearly the victor in the short-term
struggle for power. Giraud, while remaining
for the time being Commander-in-Chief, left
the Commit tee. ( 6 2)
While the power struggle between de Gaulle and Giraud
that Roosevelt and Churchill had tried to resolve at
Casablanca had finally been settled, the Committee still
struggled to get Roosevelt to recognize them as the
provisional government. Churchill had brought up recognition
when he had been in Washington in May, and then in July he
had sent Roosevelt a wire urging him to recognize the
Committee. According to Macmillan,
he did seven drafts of it before sending it.
It is witty, convincing, pleading - loyal all
at once. I feel it must have an effect. (63)

153

It had no effect on Roosevelt nor did a wire from Eisenhower
who also wanted immediate recognition of the Committee.
Roosevelt was determined that the French people
should choose their own government after the war. De
Gaulle's ousting Giraud from the Committee simply increased
Roosevelt's antagonism toward de Gaulle and his
determination not to recognise the Committee. He feared
that, by doing so, he would be endorsing him as the postwar
head of the French government. Now more concerned than ever
about what he perceived as de Gaulle's dictatorial
tendencies, he was afraid de Gaulle would not give the
French people a chance to choose their own goverment after
the Germans were expelled and his leadership would cause
civil war in France. It would not be until October 1944 that
Roosevelt finally agreed to granting recogniton. Macmillan
contended that by snubbing de Gaulle, the Americans elevated
him in French eyes.
Furthermore, the Americans in backing Giraud had
backed a general with very old fashioned, right-wing ideas,
one of whose main concerns had been reestablishing his own
"legitimacy" with Vichy. He was obviously out of step with
the mainstream of French political opinion.
One can only wonder at Robert Murphy's inability to
perceive Giraud's political limitations. In the spring
Murphy had actually tried to impede the Giraud-de Gaulle
union. According to Macmillan:
The situation vis-a-vis the Giraud de Gaulle
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negotiations is becoming very difficult. My
colleague Murphy is back at his old tricks and
trying to impede the union, without quite
consciously admitting (even to himself) that
he is doing so. He has an incurable habit of
seeing every kind of person and agreeing with
them all in turn. (64)
Instead of recognizing that Giraud represented a political
viewpoint that was too far to the right to be acceptable to
the majority of the French and which was not in keeping with
American ideals, Murphy was trying to maintain exclusive
control for Giraud. At the same time the Giraud-de Gaulle
conflict was working itself out, another one was taking
place in North Africa involving Murphy and Doolittle.
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CHAPTER VII

RECALL OF DOOLITTLE

Unlike the Giraud-de Gaulle conflict, that between
Murphy and Doolittle was not a power struggle. Instead it
was a clash over whether the United States should stand by
its principles, enunciated in the Atlantic Charter, and
acknowledge Tunisian aspirations for self-determination
or whether it should ignore these in order to keep peace
with the French. The latter course was expedient militarily,
and Murphy stood by it steadfastly. Doolittle, on the other
hand, did his best to open Murphy's eyes to the plight of
the Tunisians under the repressive policy of the French
after the Germans were expelled.
When Esteva permitted the Germans to occupy Tunisia,
he not only made it necessary for the United Nations to
fight an extended campaign to liberate that country, but he
also brought about serious economic and political
disruptions. One was the severe inflation caused when the
Germans imported French bank notes and threw upon the
market, at their arrival, the reserve stocks of wheat and
foodstuffs built up by Admiral Esteva. Although ample
supplies were available at first, shortages soon followed,
and the black market became the only source of food. While
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the rich could survive, the poor nearly starved. With
Italian guidance the Germans also looted the textile and
clothing stores and distributed their goods to the Tunisians
thus to show their friendliness.

(1)

Politically French authority had been severely shaken
by the occupation. The administration had almost collapsed.
The French civil control officers who had resisted the Axis
had been arrested by the Gestapo, usually after being
denounced by the Tunisians, local Italians or Frenchmen
belonging to the Service d'Ordre de la L'gion (S.O.L.).
Those who collaborated had come under the control of the
local caids, the chiefs of the S.O.L or the occupation
authorities. When the Germans left many of the French
collaborators left with them.

(2)

In general, the Germans were hard on the French
population. They requisitioned and occupied French homes
while the terrified owners remained cowering in the
basement. While some of the Germans, usually the higher
ranking ones, were correct in relation with the French,
others carried away household property when they left before
the United Nations advance. The Italians, dominant after the
Axis occupation had taken place, also treated the French and
Tunisians badly. Encouraged by the Fascists, who distributed
black shirts, they looted and humiliated the French. The
Germans and Tunisians also engaged in looting. For the most
part, any farm whether Tunisian or French was pillaged if it
were abandoned.
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While the French suffered under the Germans, it was
nothing compared to the Jews. Albert Memmi, a Tunisian

Jewish author, described vividly in La Statue de Sel what it
was like to be Jewish during the German occupation. Measures
against the Jews started the day after the Germans landed at
the airport. During the nisht the Germans had installed
their command posts. The following morning the German
commander took the first anti-Jewish measure.
Armed with well made lists, the German police,
accompanied by French colleagues went to
collect several hundred hostages. It was
announced that at the first refusal they would
be shot. Then the requisitions, the exactions
and the assassinations began. (3)
On the eighth day the Germans required all Jewish men
eighteen to forty to assemble so they might be sent to
concentration camps. The first response of the Jewish
community was to send a delegation to Admiral Esteva to ask
for advice and protection. He simply sent it away declaring
he was under the orders of the Germans. Memmi himself was in
one of the camps.

(4)

In Tunisia Jewish property was requisitioned while in
rural areas Jews were forced to sell their holdings of olive
oil and turn the proceeds over to the Germans. There were
compulsory Jewish labor gangs, the expenses for which were
borne by the Jewish community. There was a levy to defray
Anglo-American aerial bomb damage. In a report prepared by
the United States Treasury, it was estimated that the
monetary cost to the Jews was 100,000,000 francs
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($2,000,000).
military requisition of property

30,000,000

maintenance of compulsory Jewish
labor gangs

60,000,000

levy to defray Anglo-American
aerial bomb damage

20,000,000

fine for Jewish labor desertions

3,000,000

To underwrite the expenses imposed upon them, the Jewish
community in Tunis made a capital levy of ten to fifteen
percent upon the property of its members and borrowed funds
from French banks at high rates. Individuals were forced to
sell property and personal effects to meet their levies.
Much of their property was mortgaged to French banks. After
the liberation, the banks threatened mortgage foreclosures
on those who had not met their payments because of lack of
funds.

(5)
After the United Nations retook Tunisia, Henry

Morgenthau took a personal interest in this matter. He asked
the American Consul General in Algiers to urge the French to
adopt a program to undo the economic hurt inflicted upon the
Jews in Tunisia. The matter dragged on for several months
during which time the President was kept informed. In
November 1943 Consul General Wiley advised Morgenthau that
"in view of local political considerations" presentation of
the program seemed inadvisable. Not meddling in French
politics was consistent with American policy in North
Africa. Apparently there was a "bitter dispute"

(6)

in the

State Department over the program. The Political Division of
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the State Department claiQed that the problem was an
internal one for the French and that it should make no
recommendation even though Dean Acheson supported
Morgenthau's position. Finally the American position was
presented in late November and December to the French who
said they would give it further study.

(7) This same problem

of whether or not to interfere in French affairs was
involved in the Doolittle-Murphy conflict which came to the
attention of the President in November 1943.
While the middle class Tunisians stayed neutral, many
of the poorer Tunisians collaborated at the beginning of the
German occupation. The fact that the Germans were the
conquerors gave them prestige. The Tunisians may have been
even more impressed by the way the German soldiers treated
them as equals and made no distinction between them and the
Europeans. The Tunisians preferred the German soldiers, who
ate in their houses and played with their babies, to the
French who treated them poorly. According to Memmi, it was a
miracle that the Tunisians were not completely won over by
the Nazis, for nothing was overlooked - promises of
independence, Arab radio broadcasts by Radio Berlin, and
reminders of the Islamic friendship of William II.

(9)

The Bey, of course, was the object of special
attention by the Axis. During the occupation both the German
and Italian consuls tried to establish direct relations with
him only to be referred back to Admiral Esteva. The Bey told
them that all transactions should be carried on through
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normal channels.

(10) Attempts were made to get the Bey to

declare war against the United Nations and, after an
especially bad bombing of Tunis, to have him condemn
publicly the barbaric methods of the Anglo-Saxons. He
refused both of these. He also refused the Italian consul's
suggestion that he denounce the French treaty of the
Protectorate and replace it with one with Italy. Instead,
the Bey told the Italian consul that he would be grateful if
the Italian government, which was holding members of the
Destour in Rome, including Bourguiba, would hasten their
return to Tunisia. The consul left the palace "white with
rage."

(11)
From the beginning of the occupation the Italian and

German consuls pressured the Bey to bestow decorations on a
list of twenty-six of their countrymen. The Bey interposed
objections and inquired of Admiral Esteva if it would be in
keeping with his November 8, 1942 position of neutrality.
Esteva replied that conferring the decoration was not
incompatible with his position. Finally on April 30 the Bey
presented the decorations in the presence of Esteva. These
actions of the Bey were of importance later when Hooker
Doolittle would urge his superiors to resist the French
desire to depose the Bey because of his alleged
collaboration.

(12)

The Bey, who had begun to regain some of his powers
from the French before the invasion, became increasingly
independent during the occupation. The Germans treated him
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as an autonomous sovereign. One example of his independence
was seen in an interview the Bey had with a representative
of Pe"tain from Vichy as reported in a Tunisian newspaper.
According to Doolittle, it was noteworthy that the interview
had been published at all as it never would have been under
the French. In the beginning of the interview, the Bey
asked about the "health of the Marshal for whom he held a
particular affection."

(13) He said also that he hoped

that in the future Tunisia and France would have a common
destiny. In spite of the many errors committed by the
French, the Bey declared "we desire to pass the sponge over
the past."

(14) The Bey continued by stating that he had

named new ministers and that he was certain France would
"demonstrate her comprehension and justice.

11

(15) The Bey

brought up the list of Tunisian claims that had been
presented to Esteva the previous year. The representative
requested a copy and said he was sure the Marshal would
support a new policy in Tunisia. Doolittle remarked that the
outspokenness of the Bey demonstrated that French control
was ''illusory if not actually non-existent."

(16)

One of the ministers the Bey appointed was Habib
Bourguiba who had been imprisoned in Marseille without trial
since 1938. When the Germans occupied all of France in
November 1942, they sent him to Rome, where they hoped he
could be used for propaganda purposes. Apparently they
were unaware that in October 1942 Bourguiba had sent his
wife and son back to Tunis with a personal message to the
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American consulate that ample time for reflection had made
him realize that the Tunisians could expect nothing from the
Germans and that he was telling his followers to support the
United Nations.

(17)

As an example of this support by the Destourians,
Doolittle in a letter to Murphy, pointed out that in
February 1943, when Rommel made his push against Kasserine
and drove the Americans and French out of Tozeur and Nafta,
areas where the Tunisians had always been considered very
anti-European, the retreating French asked the Destourians
of Tozeur to handle the policing of Tozeur. They did such a
good job that no looting took place there "and not even the
Jews were molested."

(18)

Even though Bourguiba was treated handsomely by the
Italians in Rome, he resisted their attempts to have him
ally himself with the Axis. While he made a speech from Rome
to the Tunisians, he made it sufficiently ambiguous to
give no aid to the Italians. In fact, he was probably
referring to Italian designs on Tunisia when he said "while
our country is the theater of operations it is at the same
time a booty of colonization." He ended by saying that
"he hoped to join them as soon as circumstances
permit,"

(19) and by asking the Tunisians to obey Moncef

Bey.
The Axis sent Bourguiba back to Tunisia in March of
1943. While he found that some of the Destourian cells had
cooperated with the Germans, won over by the promise of
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freedom and independence, he quickly took the matter in hand
and turned the Neo-Destour back in favor of the United
Nations. Bourguiba wrote,
My first care was to put the brakes on the
purely sentimental movement which carried
certain militants toward the Axis powers
because they had liberated all the imprisoned
Destourians. (20)
While it would still be several months before
Doolittle would be involved directly with the economic and
political problems caused by the German occupation, he was
already anticipating them in Constantine. The economic
situation, he said, would be catastrophic with "ruined
ports, railroads, electric plants, water supplies,"

(21) all

of which would have to be reestablished immediately.
Politically the situation would be more complicated. The
French would undoubtedly throw out the Vichy partisans in
the administration but the status of the Tunisians, who
constituted five-sixths of the population, would still
present a "very delicate" problem.

(22)

Before the United Nations invasion of November 8 the
Bey of Tunis had begun to regain from the French Resident
General some of his powers. Doolittle said the latest
information from Tunisia indicated the Germans were treating
him as an independent sovereign. Because of the political
sophistication of the urban Tunisians and because the
Germans were playing up to him, Doolittle believed the
French could no longer treat the Bey solely as a puppet.
Since the Americans would have the primary responsibility of
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feeding, clothing, and reequipping Tunisia, he thought they
should serve as a buffer between the French and the
Tunisians. Because of its role in supplying the "stricken
Tunisian population,"

(23) the United States should be in a

position to impose its decision on these opposing groups.
To do this, there should be an American representative with
definite instructions as to policy and with authority to
carry it out. Although in this despatch to his superiors in
the State Department Doolittle was arguing for an American
policy to be established which would allow the American
consul in Tunisia to serve as an intermediary between the
French and the Tunisians, this was later to be denied him,
and he was not to be consulted on Tunisian policy.
For their part the French, well aware of the prestige
they had lost during the German occupation, were making
their own plans to reestablish their authority as soon as
Tunisia would be recaptured. One obvious step needed was to
unify the two factions so there would be one definite
authority. In a report to the Free French in London in April
1943, the Secretary General of their Algerian mission
reported that Tunisia was in a chaotic state with two enemy
armies and five United Nations armies operating there. Each
army was recruiting their political agents among the French
or the Tunisians. According to the Secretary General, the
French administration had disappeared or had no more
prestige. The leading Tunisians were absent while those who
had collaborated had fled with the Germans. The faithful had
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been taken to the rear. Every troop was acting as its own
police, administering on the spot, and pillaging at random.
To reestablish order the Secretary General thought it
crucial that the political and military unity of the Empire
be achieved. He meant, of course, a solution to the
Giraud-de Gaulle problem.
To delay this risked compromising French
authority in the region which had always
been the most difficult to govern in North
Africa and the most receptive to anti-French
forces. (24)
Other measures were also being considered, the most
important of which was the deposition of the Bey. In a
report from one of the French civil controllers in Tunisia
during the occupation on what steps would be necessary after
the war, he thought it was "important to exploit the
occasion to diminish the importance taken by the Beylical
family."

(25) This controller in his report pointed out the

"need to be tolerant with the Destourians whose only error
was to nourish premature ideas of national liberation."

(26)

Perhaps because he saw the Destourians as weak, this
Frenchman did not see them as the threat other Frenchman
would. He also thought it would be important to ameliorate
the conditions of life for the Tunisians.
In February 1943 Doolittle was assigned to Rabat,
Morocco. While there he learned that the French were
considering deposing the Bey. Pointing out the Bey's
pro-United Nations sympathies, he wrote Murphy that he
thought this was a serious mistake and that the Americans
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should intercede to prevent the French from doing it. In
bringing up the question of the deposition of the Bey,
Doolittle was broaching a subject on which he and Murphy
were to differ profoundly.
Doolittle asked to be excused for putting in his "six
cents", but said that if he was to go back to Tunisia, he
felt strongly that the Bey should not be deposed. It would
be an opportunity for the French to rid themselves of a Bey
"with a mind of his own"

(27)

and to wipe out the vestiges

of Tunisian nationalism, but he did not see any reason for
the United States to be a party to such action.
Doolittle asked what acts of the Bey were reproached.
The only ones he could think of were that the Bey had
received the Germans and had decorated a German general or
two. He asked though "what would any of us have done in the
position of the Bey?"

(28) He then asked about the pressure

brought by the American Army on the Sultan of Morocco for
private audiences and decorations. He concluded by saying
it was his opinion that "we have everything to lose and
nothing to gain by deposing the most popular sovereign of
Tunisia since Naceur Bey,"

(29)

the present Bey's father.

Murphy, however, took the position that it was a
strictly French problem. In replying to Doolittle, Murphy
told him that his letter carried the thought that the United
States was going to deal directly with the Tunisian
question;

"I have the feeling that that is a contract which

we do not want to assume."

(30) Murphy believed that the
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United States probably did not want to deal directly with
the Tunisians. He didn't think that the United States or the
British wanted to take over the responsibility of
administering Tunisia from the French nor did the United
States want to interfere in French internal policy as long
as that policy did not interfere in the war effort.
Cooperation of the French was more important than the
position of the Bey, as long as the protectorate was
maintained.

(31)

Doolittle responded by saying that he feared Murphy
had missed the point. Doolittle had never meant for the
United States to deal directly with the Tunisians,
but, since the French and the Americans were fighting
together against the Axis, whatever policy the French
adopted would surely be attributed to the Americans as well.
Whether the Americans wished to assume ''the contract" or
not, Doolittle thought the United States would be held
responsible. Everyone would believe the Americans had been
consulted in the matter and told the French to go ahead.
Because of this, Doolittle believed that the United States
should "restrain the action apparently envisaged."

(32)

Should it turn out badly, the French would be the first to
say that the Americans approved or even ordered the action
to be taken. Later events proved that Doolittle was
essentially right because the French would ask if the
Americans approved of deposing the Bey before they did it.
Doolittle referred to a memo prepared by Lieutenant
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Archie Roosevelt, a cousin of the President and an OSS agent
in Morocco. In this memo Roosevelt had come independently to
the conclusion that it would be a bad policy to allow a
spirit of revenge to prevail in handling the Tunisian
question after the arrival of the United Nations forces in
Tunisia.
Doolittle told Murphy that if he, Doolittle, were
going to go back to Tunisia, he would be the person
responsible for carrying out any policy or lack of policy.
Even though Doolittle had not been consulted on Tunisian
affairs since leaving Constantine, he thought he should have
had a chance "to put a word in here and there."

(33) Though

Murphy did not want to upset the status quo, Doolittle asked
if deposing the Bey was not in fact upsetting it. Doolittle
did not think all French proposals should be swallowed
without examination. Should the Americans follow the one
about deposing the Bey, they would be turning their backs on
their own public declarations such as the Atlantic Charter,
and would "lay ourselves open to the accusation of talking
through our honorable hats, brass-bound or silk."

(34)

The return of the United Nations to Tunis on May 7
began inauspiciously for the Bey. No sooner had British
soldiers moved into Tunis then they attacked the summer
palace of the Bey at Hammamlif and forcibly took him at
bayonet point to Tunis to the off ice of the British Consul
General. The recently arrived acting Resident General Juin
had him returned to Hammamlif. The British excused
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themselves for this unfortunate incident by saying their
soldiers were carried away by the heat of the moment and
were badly informed.

(35)

Juin, who was to serve until Mast was well enough to
assume his post, had arrived in Tunis right after the
British. Describing his entry, he said that he was greeted
with a "a delirious enthusiasm"

(36) as he passed through

the Jewish quarter. He mentioned how these poor people had
suffered terribly during the German occupation. As for the
Tunisians he saw few of them while "the Italian colony
naturally didn't put its nose outside."

(37) When he reached

the Residence, he found a few French and Tunisian officials
and some prominent persons who had escaped being forcibly
removed by the Germans, as well as some French resisters who
had come out of hiding. At the Residence Juin proceeded to
give his first commands restoring order.

(38)

Doolittle, Murphy, and Colonel Julius Holmes, Allied
Force Headquarters, visited Tunis on May 11 for three days.
Doolittle found that his home, which had been used by the
German military commander, had been "thoroughly and
completely sacked."

(39) Doolittle reported:

"My wife and I

now have not even a single napkin to our names."

(40)

Clothing, silver, china, kitchen utensils, furniture, rugs,
everything were lost. According to his daughter, Katya, it
was the rugs collected in Persia and the Caucausus that he
most minded losing.

(41) The consulate, which had been used

as offices by the Germans, had also been ransacked and the
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safes blown.
Murphy wired the President and Secretary of State
that the Tunisian population was enthusiastic, but affected
by the destruction which had occurred. In many towns it had
been quite severe while Tunis on the other hand had suffered
little except for the dock area. Eight hundred civilians had
been killed, but, had the bombing not been confined to the
dock area, the toll might have been much greater. Other than
a shortage of food and the lack of electric lighting caused
by the destruction of the power plant by the Germans as they
left, the situation in Tunis was almost normal. As soon as
transportation was reorganized, Murphy thought there would
be no serious food problems. The enemy trucks that had been
seized would help solve distribution needs. While the
Germans had either consumed or taken two-thirds of the
livestock in northern Tunisia and one-third in the southern
part, Murphy thought enough remained, along with a good
cereal crop about to be harvested, to alleviate the food
situation.

(42)

On this trip Murphy had also visited Bizerte which
was "a complete shambles, not a building in the town
remained undamaged."

(43) He saw many thousands of enemy

prisoners on the roads and in the prison camps. In one camp
there were a group of 36,000 German prisoners, principally
young shock troops; in another, there were 20,000 Germans
and Italians.
Included in Murphy's telegram was a report on the
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political situation. Giraud had arrived in Tunis on the
twelfth and discussed with Murphy and Juin the question of
the Bey. Giraud believed the Bey should not be allowed to
remain in office on the grounds that he had collaborated
with the Axis and permitted acts of disloyalty on the part
of his subjects which militated against the United Nations
effort. Giraud told Murphy that he proposed to detail Juin
to suggest to the Bey "that the happiest solution would be
for the Bey to abdicate."

(44) When asked by Giraud whether

the United States government would approve the French action
in deposing the Bey, Murphy said:
There apparently is no law under which the
action could be taken without invoking
necessity arising out of the military
situation. (45)
Murphy informed Giraud that he had no instructions from his
government, but he was sure that American opinion would
favor any French action that proposed to punish those who
had actively aided the Axis during the course of the
Tunisian campaign. He said the internal affairs of the
Protectorate lay between the competent French and Tunisian
authorities.

(46)

While it fell upon Juin to execute the decision to
depose the Bey, he claimed in his M~moires that the order
bothered him since he did not wish to commit an injustice.
After making an inquiry, Juin could discover nothing serious
against the Bey. All one could reproach him for was having
conferred some decorations on some enemy personalities at
the insistence of the Resident General. He had formally
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refused to recognize them himself. The only other complaint
invoked against him was his pro-Neo-Destourian sympathies.
Nevertheless, the Committee at Algiers was insistent on
profiting by the disarray and shock produced by the defeat
of the Axis. According to Juin, since "the instructions had
once again an imperative command, he had no choice but to
obey."

( 4 7)
Juin called on the Bey on May 13 and asked for his

abdication explaining that the decision had been made in
Algeria. The Bey insisted that he would not abdicate. After
three hours, Juin left saying he would wait until four p.m.
for his decision. At four with the Bey's decision unchanged,
Juin had him flown with a reduced entourage to Laghouat,
Algeria near the Sahara. Juin had hoped that, since he had
never flown, he would change his mind and abdicate. Instead
he showed a joy, which Juin patronizingly called childish,
in mounting the plane. With the approach of summer being at
Laghout, according to Juin, was not "a beautiful gift."

(48)

In his Mi'moires Juin said, in recalling these events, that
he regretted that the "pseudo-government of Algeria", in
haste and in ignorance of the exact facts of the political
situation, had required of him "an unwise act to the
detriment of a sovereign to whom there was nothing grave to
reproach and who had always been loyal."

(49)

The Tunisians were devastated by the deposition of
the Bey. They went into mourning for three days, shutting
their shops and praying in their homes.

(50) Whereas there
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had been some Tunisians favorably disposed toward the
French, the deposition had the effect of turning them

unanimously against them. As French historian
Julien wrote,

Charles-Andr~

"in eliminating Monce£ one had created

Moncefism which was to give to nationalism a virulence
without precedent."

(51) He continued,

Moncef ism took on a passionate character that
did not let up until the death of the Bey. It
was around him that nationalism crystalized.
The inconsiderate decision of General Giraud
executed hastily but without conviction by
Juin rendered all French Tunisian rapprochement
impossible and furnished a solid basis for
Destourian opposition . . . (52) The French
Committee should have shown itself more
prudent. With the exception of General Catroux
who said the era of colonial domination had
ended, the technicians surrounding de Gaulle
and Giraud had forgotten nothing and learned
nothing. ( 53)
Juin had one last "thorny case'', as he called it, to
handle before leaving Tunisia and that was the presence in
Tunisia of Habib Bourguiba. The latter had gone into hiding
when the United Nations entered Tunis since he was not sure
what his legal status would be with the return of the
French. Bourguiba, according to his own account, had refused
to follow the Germans, who had proposed to take him to save
the head of the nationalist movement.

"I refused in order

not to compromise the party and the unity of the Tunisian
movement."

(54)

Persuaded that the Axis forces were going to

an inevitable defeat, he thought the Neo-Destourians had no
interest in finding themselves at the end of hostilities on
the side of the defeated.
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He knew, however, that the Allies at Tunis
would mean the presence of the French
partisans of de Gaulle or of Giraud and in
short the French whatever their tendency would
be in agreement that Bourguiba and the Destour
constituted the enemy. (55)
Bourguiba was quite right that the French looked upon him as
the enemy. Juin referred to him as "the Destourian
agitator."

(56) Juin, however, did say that, in truth,

Bourguiba had not compromised himself and since his arrival
in Tunis Juin had verified this.
Bourguiba sent an emissary to seek an interview with
Doolittle. He wanted him to intervene with the French to
have them lift the order for his arrest. While Doolittle
rejected this demand, since it was not part of his job, he
did take the opportunity to tell Juin that Bourguiba had
been detained illegally during five years

~nd

that appeared

to him unjustifiable. He suggested that the order of arrest
be rescinded, that he talk to the Destour leaders and use
them as instruments of French policy rather than "make of
them outcasts and martyrs and thereby lose all touch with
the very considerable body of Arab opinion which they
represent."

(57) Juin told Doolittle that his orders were to

arrest Bourguiba, that he could not disobey, and "that to
assuage British and American opinion these present measures
against the Arabs were necessary."

(58) Juin, at that point,

seemed to be blaming the Americans for the hard line he was
taking against the Tunisians. This was precisely what
Doolittle had told Murphy the French would do. Doolittle
replied that he was unaware of any great British or American
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opinion which demanded such repression and that if it did,
it was obviously misinformed.

"Now that France was again

becoming strong, she could afford to be generous."

(59)

Bourguiba, as he would recount later, recognized that
while the war lasted against the Axis powers, the United
States did not want to displease the French or hurt their
feelings. Bourguiba believed that such a policy was
justified at a time when Vichy propaganda was attempting to
raise up the French against the United Nations by accusing
the English and Americans of having designs on North Africa
and wishing to defraud the French of their colonial
possessions.

(60)

In fact, Bourguiba wrote a manifesto when the French
returned to Tunisia asking his followers to put aside until
after the war their nationalistic ambitions and join the
Fighting French in the war against the Axis. The French
authorities, however, refused to allow the diffusion of this
appeal. According to Bourguiba,
They were aware of the fact that from the moment
it would be published it would be difficult to
justify the repression of a movement which
declared itself ready to cooperate with them. (61)
Doolittle thought the manifesto had irritated the
French because it implied that they would also make a
gesture of reconciliation. Doolittle found it ironical that
Bourguiba had said that he could speak freely now because he
was confident that the United Nations would not let the
French proceed in a spirit of revenge and that "the way is
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open for a fruitful collaboration."

(62) Doolittle commented

"nothing of the sort. No Tunisian can speak freely. An
answer of any kind to the most unjust accusation is taken as
insolence."

(63) The French had shut the door unfortunately

to any collaboration and had alienated the Tunisian
bourgeoisie "who had always been sincerely Francophile and
remained so during the occupation."

(64)

The United States was pretending, according to
Doolittle in a despatch to the State Department,
that this was a matter for the French alone and
would not see that the French were not able to overlook
their own pettiness.
Led by a stiff-necked and stupid military clan,
overloaded with generals of 1906 vintage and
admirals without ships, they suddenly find, at
the behest of selfish colonists and inefficient
administrators, that now that France as embodied
by the handful of colonial rejects and selfpromoting armchair warriors in North Africa, is
great and powerful and therefore must take the
strong hand with a helpless native population.
They forget that sixty years of the strong hand
had done nothing to endear them nor to create a
group of native collaborators animated by no
other motives than that of splitting the
proceeds of exploitation of the fellah with the
French officials set over them ostensibly to
guide and control. ( 65)
Doolittle had heard that Allied Force Headquarters had
issued orders saying no members of the Destour should be
arrested simply because they were Destourians, but by a
peculiar coincidence most of those arrested were known as
Destourians.
Besides leaving the order of arrest for Bourguiba in
place the French had instituted harsh and repressive
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measures against the Tunisians. Doolittle wrote:
As I had foreseen, the French, not the Tunisian
French but the French military administration in
which few changes in mentality or efficiency are
to be observed came into Tunisia in a spirit of
revenge for their three years of humiliation. It
was obviously necessary to find a scapegoat for
the acts of the French administration and what
more natural and easy than to choose as the
scapegoat the Arabs of Tunisia with their Bey
and childish attempts at nationalism. (66)
It should be realized, Doolittle continued, that it was
not the Tunisians who allowed the Germans to enter, but
Admiral Esteva and General BarrJ, the two responsible heads.
Nor was it the Bey and his court who had requisitioned
animals and provided foodstuffs for the Germans during the
occupation, but again it was the French administration. The
Bey had refused to sign decrees given to him on this score.
Admiral Esteva himself had done this by Residential orders.
Nor was it Moncef Bey who had organized the North African
Phalange which sent young Frenchmen to fight against their
brothers under General Giraud. Inspite of all this, when the
Army of Liberation entered Tunis, they immediately deposed
Moncef Bey and began a series of arrests, the number of
which was reported at about five thousand. While Doolittle
agreed that "pillagers, spies, and denouncers should be
apprehended and punished,"

(67) very few Tunisian notables

were known to have collaborated with the Germans. None of
the French officials who underwent the occupation were
consulted as the steps to be taken and several protested
vehemently against the actions and considered resigning in
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protest. Doolittle pointed out that neither he nor
Vice-Consul John Utter had been consulted in Tunisian
matters since leaving Constantine.

(68)

The new Bey, Sidi Lamine, accepted the post only to
preserve the Hussenite Dynasty. New ministers were chosen by
the French to replace the ones that Moncef Bey "had had the
effrontery to choose for himself."

(69) Two of these new

ministers had talked to Doolittle about the unfairness of
deposing Moncef Bey. The Tunisian bourgeoisie, whose conduct
during the German occupation was dignified according to
Frenchmen who stayed there, "was disgusted and
worried."

(70) Numbers of Tunisian merchants had not

reopened their shops in the souks, and the peasants in the
outlying districts were afraid to bring in their products.
There was an atmosphere of repression and terror.

(71)

American prestige was high in North Africa at that
time. Doolittle asked if the United States was to let it be
dimmed because it turned its back on the series of
injustices of the French. "By their acts since 'liberating
Tunis' the French have made the Tunisians more unan±mous
than formerly in detesting them."

(72)

It was also true that the Tunisians had a first hand
knowledge of what German occupation meant. With the
exception of a few who profited, most of the Tunisians found
it worse than expected. "Here then was a malleable material
ready for use through a policy of generosity and
understanding."

(73) The French told the Americans to tell
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the Tunisians to settle their differences with the French.
Yet this implied two sides to the bargain. Doolittle asked,
if the French themselves refused to settle, how could the
Tunisians arrive at a settlement? (74)
Doolittle thought the Americans, "the torchbearers of
freedom", should accept the responsibility they had assumed
by landing in North Africa by making their voice heard in
the policies that affected not only North Africa, but the
whole Islamic world. He wrote:
Any observer here in North Africa is soon forced
to the conclusion that the French are
psychologically sick. Their division, their
petty quarrels, their lack, with a few notable
exceptions, of any will to help themselves out
of the muddle, their tendency to call upon the
British and Americans to help them, and not
only to help them but to do everything for them,
and then object to measures taken indicates that
they need a rejuvenation of spirit and a
direction which they themselves are incapable of
furnishing. ( 7 5)
Doolittle thought that the Americans had the men and
material to give the French a new direction. If so, the men
must be given the authority and those with specialized
knowledge should be consulted.

(76)

Doolittle supplemented his despatches of this time
with a telegram.
Present policy toward Tunisian Arabs is
disastrous. The army of liberation in three
weeks has succeeded in what 60 years of
occupation has failed to do, unite the
Tunisians solidly against the French. (77)
He continued that the United Nations were blamed for the
deposition of the Bey. The situation had degenerated into
"a reign of terror, arbitrary arrests, beatings, and
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torture."

(78) Forced labor was being obtained by police

roundups. Instead of returning to Tunisia "to heal the
wounds of German occupation," the French had returned "as to
a conquered country." He reminded the State Department that
the army that was to be raised in Tunisia would be largely
composed of Tunisians. A copy of this as well as all of his
despatches went to Murphy who apparently ignored them.
For his part, Bourguiba wrote a long letter to
President Roosevelt asking him to help the Tunisian people,
who were being treated poorly by the returning French.
Bourguiba described how repression of Tunisian patriots had
started with the events of April 9, 1938 when the militants
and the party chiefs had been put in prisons and
concentration camps in France and Tunisia.
This repression, which ironically had only known
a moment of respite during the German-Italian
occupation, has started again with an
accelerated rhythm. Inspired by a desire to
humiliate and terrorize the people and taking
advantage of the terror weighing on the country,
the heads of Free France have by an
unparalleled blow deposed the legitimate
sovereign of the country, Sidi Moncef Pacha Bey,
who in spite of advances and pressures of the
Germans and Italians had obstinately remained
neutral and faithful to the French Protectorate.
Thus by an irony of a sort which is particularly
cruel to Tunisian democratic hearts the victory
of the Democracies in Tunisia had established
methods which were most authentically
fascist. (80)
Bourguiba said the Tunisians were putting all their hopes in
the President to intervene with the Free French "who were
fighting against Nazi enslavement to see that they did not
treat the Tunisians as an enslaved people."

(81) Bourguiba
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believed that the United Nations could not be indifferent
to the crisis in Tunisia for the errors being committed by
the French "out of a spirit of revenge could not but nullify
the Allied war effort by alienating precious
sympathies."

(82)

Suddenly on June 6 a member of Juin's staff informed
Doolittle that, if Bourguiba presented himself to the
Director of Security, Juin would give him and his immediate
colleagues, their provisional liberty whereas, if he did
not, he would be shown no mercy. Doolittle relayed this
proposition to Bourguiba's Destourian friends. They replied
that Bourguiba wished to meet Doolittle. Doolittle accepted,
and the two met clandestinely at night. Bourguiba wanted to
inform Doolittle of Tunisian nationalist goals, while
Doolittle wished to know the truth about the accusations
that Bourguiba had collaborated with the Axis. Doolittle was
quoted on the occasion of a celebration of this meeting:
I did not know him before. From the first
contact, he enchanted me. He was really
bubbling, a real force in action like an
overcharged battery. He pleaded the Tunisian
cause, naturally. I was already won over to the
cause he was defending. By the time we
separated, we had become two good friends. (83)
Bourguiba presented himself to the Director of
Security and at first was met coldly by the Director who
asked what his demands were. When Bourguiba replied that he
had come, as requested, to regularize his juridical
situation which was not clear, since he had been imprisoned
by the French and liberated by the Germans, the Director

185
became more cordial. Bourguiba told him that he had no plan
of creating public demonstrations, but, if treated with
understanding, would be happy to try to "disintoxicate the
Tunisian people from the poison left by the German
occupation."

(84)

In reporting this to the State Department, Doolittle
remarked that "in spite of injunctions not to meddle in Arab
affairs as being exclusively a function of the French
administration" he thought
a constructive act has been taken. The fact that
the French themselves came to the Consulate for
a matter of this kind indicates that they
recognize that we have a certain right to be
consulted on their policy inasmuch as we are all
engaged in the same struggle. (85)
Doolittle was far too optimistic about the French.
Juin's version of this, as given in his ~es, was quite
different. He said there was "not a day that passed that I
was not pestered"

(86) on the subject of Bourguiba's

freedom by his American friends. Juin thought it "of public
notoriety that the Americn diplomatic agents in North Africa
always made themselves the advocates of the most active
nationalists."

(87) According to Juin's account, Doolittle

insisted that Bourguiba be authorised to come see him, but
since Juin did not wish it at any price he replied that he
could see his Director of Security who would give him his
instructions.

( 8 8)

Having given Bourguiba his freedom, Juin left Tunisia
in June 1943 and was replaced by Mast. Little or no change
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in French policy toward the Tunisians was apparent.
Bourguiba found Mast's policy as repressive as Juin's had
been. Mast no sooner arrived in Tunis than he sent a
despatch back to Algiers saying that it was desirable to
obtain the abdication of Monce£ Bey. Mast reported that the
Destourians were telling the Tunisian population that the
new Bey was not legitimate. The new Beylical court was upset
by rumours that the return of Moncef Bey was imminent and
that his return would be because of American pressure. Mast
wanted to suppress this agitation by obtaining the Bey's
abdication in exchange for his being moved to a more
tolerable climate on the seashore.

(89)

Nor was the arrival of de Gaulle in North Africa to
cause any noticeable difference as far as French policy
toward the Tunisians went. Though he had not arrived in
North Africa at the time the Bey was deposed, he expressed
his approval of the measure in his MJmoires, saying that it
was necessary because the Bey's "attitude had been
troublesome with regard to the obligations that had linked
him to France."

(90) He went on to say that the Committee

had no more serious problems in Tunisia after that and that
he supported Mast who, he said, was doing his job with
intelligence. Furthermore, he blamed Esteva, whom he
referred to as "that unfortunate man'', for causing serious
political consequences when he allowed the Germans to occupy
the country.

(91) The presence of the Germans and Italians

in Tunisia had given "agitators many occasions to turn the
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citizens against France."

(92) For imperially minded

Frenchmen any nationalist could by labelled "agitator". By
his actions in Lebanon in November 1943 de Gaulle
demonstrated his general attitude toward nationalists; he
dissolved the newly elected parliament, suspended the
constitution, and arrested the ministers.

(93)

Doolittle's concern for the Tunisians bothered the
French. Before Juin left Tunisia, he wrote Giraud that the
Americans were critical of the deposition of the Bey and
thought it harmful to the United Nations cause. Juin
believed the Americans lent too attentive an ear to the
complaints of the Beylical milieux, and he feared that their
solicitude extended to the nationalists as well.

(94) When

Mast arrived, he also complained about Doolittle and
actively pursued obtaining his removal.
Under pressure from the French, Murphy now began
seeking Doolittle's recall. In first bringing up the matter
with the State Department, Murphy said that he personally
liked Doolittle and "admired his idealism" and did not like
to suggest his transfer, but thought it might be
necessary.

(95) Murphy was disturbed about "the independent

policy pursued by Doolittle in respect of the Arabs in
Tunisia."

(96) Since his return to Tunisia Doolittle had

not disguised his disapproval of the deposition of the Bey
and had encouraged the Tunisians to come to him with their
grievances. Murphy admitted that ''the French may have been
too aggressive in punishing those who had aided the Axis,"
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but Doolittle was the only person he knew who called it a
"reign of terror."

(97)

While despatch after despatch had flowed from
Doolittle to the State Department with copies to Murphy
about the Tunisian situation, now telegram after telegram,
all secret, started flowing to the State Department from
Murphy with no copies to Doolittle about the Doolittle
situation. Although Murphy at first had only suggested that
Doolittle's recall might be necessary, he soon was actively
building up a case against Doolittle in order to obtain his
recall.
He reported that an observer who had just come back
from Tunis was worried "that Doolittle had gone so far out
for the Arabs that a serious French reaction had set in
against him."

( 9 8) The same observer said the French

resented Doolittle's intervention on behalf of Bourguiba.
This was in accord with Juin's opinion as quoted above.
After Doolittle had intervened for different Tunisians
several times, the French Second Bureau decided to ignore
his interventions "because of his advanced partisan
attitude."

(99)

Murphy then sent letters from two different American
Army officers, who were stationed in Tunisia, saying that
Doolittle was overstating his case. However, both admitted
that there had been instances of mistreatment and that
French methods were "somewhat more drastic" than
American.

(100)

189
Murphy also sent a complaint from the French Director
of military security about Doolittle. On June 27 Doolittle
had visited a camp of internees in Sousse accompanied by
Lieutenant Archie Roosevelt and by a Tunisian, Abdelaziz
Hadj Hussein, also known as "Slim Driga", to inquire about
the latter's brother, Abdallah. Slim Driga was the one who
had climbed the garden wall with the message from the Bey
after the German occupation when Doolittle was confined and
just before his escape. In an interview with Abdallah,
Doolittle learned that he was poorly fed and ill-treated.
Doolittle told the warden that he was going to try to have
Abdallah released, as he had done intelligence work for him
against Italy, and he did not consider that having belonged
to the Destour Party a serious offence. The French Director
thought Doolittle's attention should be called "to the
irregularity of any direct action on his part, which might
well be interpreted as an attempted interference with the
rights of sovereignty of France over its own
subjects."

(101)

Murphy had discussed with General Mast, just before
the latter assumed his duties as Resident General, what his
policy would be in dealing with the Tunisians. Mast assured
Murphy that he would "avoid anything savoring of repressive
brutality in dealing with the Arabs."

(102) For those

Tunisians responsible for treasonable conduct or criminal
acts, they should be punished, but he planned to follow
judicial procedures and make every effort to avoid
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injustice.

{103)

Doolittle's despatches and Murphy's telegrams did not
go unnoticed at the State Department. Paul Alling, Assistant
Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, now wrote
Murphy asking for his comments on the French policy of
deposing the Bey. Murphy replied that he did not agree with
the statement of Doolittle that "we had nothing to gain and
everything to lose by the deposition of this Bey."

(104)

Murphy thought United States policy had been that the French
authorities were "responsible for the native policy in North
Africa"

(105) and, if the Americans had reversed this

attitude in the case of Moncef Bey, it would have had an
adverse effect on American relations with the French. Murphy
admitted that the Bey had never been proven to be actively
pro-Axis, but that his feud with the French administration
of the Protectorate before the Germans came played a
decisive part in his removal.

(106)

In late July Doolittle was recalled to the Department
"in order to clarify the issues."

(107) While Doolilttle was

on his way, Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations,
on July 27 sent a long memorandum to Adolf Berle, Assistant
Secretary of State, summarizing the differences between
Murphy and Doolittle. Murray pointed out to Berle that the
two ''took diametrically opposed positions."

(108) Murray

thought the proper policy lay somewhere in between.
The attitude of Murphy, according to Murray, was quite
understandable and was based on the status quo in French
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North Africa that he found when he was sent there to work
with General Weygand. Obviously the objective then was "to
leave no stone unturned to gain the goodwill of the French
masters of that area"

(109) and enlist their active

collaboration in the military landing. Murphy pursued this
loyally and with great success. Murphy could not be worried
about whether French rule was just or unjust. His assignment
was to win over the French and he could not have done this
if he had tried "to carry water on both shoulders''

(110) by

worrying about complaints of the North Africans against the
French, no matter how justified.
Murray went on to say that Doolittle, whose North
African tour of duty went back to 1933, knew more about
"native problems'' and was more inclined to see the point of
view of the Tunisians than to adhere to "Mr Murphy's rigid
objective of dealing solely with the French and steering
absolutely clear of native problems."

(111)

While Murray believed that Murphy's policy was sound
before the landing and through the close of military
operations, it should not be followed indefinitely. In view
of the policy the United States had adopted for subject
peoples and their aspirations as stated in the Atlantic
Charter, the United States could not ignore Tunisian
aspirations. Should the United States do this, it would
reinforce the British belief that the Americans were
peculiarly interested in maintaining the French Empire while
undermining the British Empire by their sympathy for
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India.

(112)
Murray pointed out that of the three French areas in

North Africa, two, Morocco and Tunisia, were protectorates
and not parts of the French Empire. Both had been
independent countries with which the United States had
diplomatic relations. Neither country had forgotten its
lost independence, and there was every chance that sooner or
later the United States would be reminded of the articles in
the Atlantic Charter stating that peoples shall have
governments they choose. While Tunisia and Morocco might not
be ready to assume independence, Murray wondered whether
their ability to rule themselves was any less that that of
the Ethiopians or Afghans whose independence the United
States didn't question. In his opinion, the problem might
"come home to haunt us in due time and that the unduly
prolonged policy now being pursued by Mr. Murphy will not be
good enough in the long run."

(113)

Berle wrote Murray that his memorandum about the
deposition of the Bey was "extremely interesting."

(114) He

had heard the same differences of points of view that the
cables from Doolittle and Murphy expressed from other people
returning from North Africa. The dilemma was that, while the
French colonial system was far from perfect, American
soldiers were not there to revise it but to restore France
and fight the Germans. Berle said it did appear that the Bey
did not deserve the treatment he received. The way the
Tunisians were treated appeared wrong too. Still, he
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questioned whether the United States was entitled to use the
war to improve European colonialism. While the Americans
would like to do much, he did not think they should be "too
expansive about it."

(115)

He suggested proposing a commission, made up of
French, to study the administration of Tunisia. While the
United States would have to be careful, he thought forces
could be set in motion to improve the situation. The only
right to say anything, beyond that, would be if American
forces were endangered by ill-considered measures of the
French that might provoke a Tunisian uprising. Berle asked
Murray to think about what the United States could do.
Referring to the remark of Doolittle about the colonial
policy of the "1906 vintage'', he said that "besides being
inherently immoral, French policy may offer very solid and
political dangers."

(116)

Mast made a trip on July 29 to Algiers to protest
informally to Murphy about the policy of Doolittle.
Unfortunately, Doolittle, who had stopped in Algiers en
route to the United States, had just left that morning.
Otherwise, Murphy wrote, he would have insisted on a joint
conversation. Mast asserted that Doolittle had associated
"with Arab enemies of the French administration acting as
their counselor and adviser and encouraging them to be
anti-French."

(117) According to Mast, Doolittle had

connected Lieutenant Archie Roosevelt with these activities
causing the Tunisian leaders to believe that President
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Roosevelt favored the policy of Doolittle. Mast continued
that the French administration was increasingly embarrassed
by the activity of Doolittle "in cultivating and supporting
anti-French leaders"

(118), which was being interpreted as

an indication that United States' policy was unfriendly
toward France. Mast was aware that the attempt of Doolittle
to defend Tunisian rights was primarily a personal matter,
but he thought it best if Doolittle did not return to Tunis.
Murphy assured Mast the United States had no intention of
supporting anti-French activity. While in Algiers, Mast took
advantage of his "friendly relations with Eisenhower,"

(120)

whom he had known from the time he had served as head of the
liaison mission to the Allied Force Headquarters, to discuss
the Doolittle matter with him and Bedell Smith. Requesting
that Doolittle not return to Tunisia, Mast put it on a
purely military plane referring to his need to maintain the
order and the security of Tunisia which served as a base for
United Nations operations. Eisenhower told Mast that he
agreed that Doolittle had gone beyond his job as consul, and
he assured him that the Consul General would not regain his
post. Mast also obtained the assurance from Eisenhower that
Lieutenant Archie Roosevelt would be sent to another theater
of operations. Mast thought Doolittle used Roosevelt because
of his name.

(121)

In Algiers Mast, of course, talked to the French
administration about
the activities of the Consul General of the
United States toward the Moslems, the
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relations he maintained with influential
members of the Destour, the violent criticisms
he directed against the Protecting Nation and
how the Doolittle administration had unsettled
circles favorable to France. (122)
On his return he wrote that he believed that the
assurances he had received from Eisenhower would contribute
to maintaining the political situation in
Tunisia and will permit me to obtain a
progressive amelioration of the state of the
indigenous mass. (123)
Murphy thought it had been superfluous for Mast to
speak to Eisenhower as though nothing had been done about
the Doolittle matter. Nevertheless, when Eisenhower
questioned Murphy about the Doolittle problem, Murphy
explained it to him as he had already done to Bedell
Smith.

(124) Both Eisenhower and Bedell Smith insisted that

Doolittle not be allowed to return to Tunis. They thought
that he was acting against United States policy and that
American military concerns in Tunisia were so important that
the United States could not risk the trouble with the French
that would result if Doolittle continued his activities.
Eisenhower requested that a "well balanced and intelligent"
(125) replacement be found. In reporting this to the State
Department, Murphy concluded by saying that some
French who were already unfriendly to the United States were
using the Tunisian policy of Doolittle as another example of
the "meddling" of the State Department in French affairs and
saying that United States policy was designed to diminish
the French position in North Africa.

( 12 6)

Murphy may have been influenced by Macmillan, who
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in his War Diaries indicated he had had a hand in
Doolittle's recall. Macmillan described himself as an old
friend of Mast, whom he had known and liked from Algiers,
and who was "very pro-British and reliable.''

{127) Macmillan

had dinner with Mast at the mess in Tunis on July 23. On
July 24 when Bedell Smith came for a talk with Macmillan,
the latter expressed his desire to see Doolittle removed "as
a source of trouble to the French and of disunity to the
Allies."

{128) Macmillan had met with Doolittle and formed a

bad opinion of him.

{129) In view of the fact that he was a

friend of Mast and represented a prime minister who had
sworn to defend the British Empire this was not surprising.
Felix Cole, who came at the end of July to Tunisia
from Rabat, Morocco to serve as temporary Consul General
when Doolittle was recalled, sent a long letter to Murphy
about the situation as he found it. After being there only
eleven days, he wrote that a change was necessary in the
United States Consulate especially in connection with
relations with the French. While Doolittle was "an able,
intelligent and attractive personality," he had pursued a
personal policy which was not in accord "with the general
line prescribed . . . The Consulate has become his personal
appanage and the seat of his personal politics."

(130) Those

toward whom his personal policies were aimed were the
leaders of the Tunisian "intelligentsia''.

They have taken

advantage through him, or through his influence on Murphy in
Algiers, or the Department in Washington to promote their
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goals of obtaining from the French more control over their
own affairs and own people. As Cole understood it,

interfering in the question of Tunisian rights and
grievances toward the French was not "the proper
concern"

(131) of the United States Consulate in Tunisia

except to preserve peace and quiet in a military area.
Cole noticed a "swarm of visitors at the
office"

(132) on his first day. A Tunisian, Abdelaziz

Hussein, "Slim Driga'', was using the kitchen of the
Consulate apartment to receive reports of French abuse.
This slackened a day or two after Cole came partly because
Doolittle, before he left, had already told Slim Driga to
stop using it. Recently Doolittle and Utter had suspected
that he was receiving money by posing as the consul's
private secretary and as the only channel by which one could
communicate with the Consul General. According to Cole he
had had police charges in 1937 of "abuse of confidence,
embezzlement and bad checks" which may or may not have been
because of Neo-Destourian activities.

(133)

Mast reported to Algiers that Doolittle's departure
had brought about a marked "detente'' in the relations with
the American Consulate. He had seen Cole twice and the
latter had expressed his desire to stay out of local
intrigues and to have no relations with anti-French Tunisian
personalities. Cole gave Mast the impression, by his
attitude and words, of having received formal instructions
in this regard from Murphy. Some United Nations officers,
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however, persisted in maintaining toward "indigenous
elements" a policy similar to that of Doolittle.

(134)

Mast continued that rumours had circulated in the
Destourian circles that Doolittle was not coming back.
Bourguiba appeared discouraged and, according to reliable
sources, thought of abandoning politics and of going to
Egypt for some time. Mast wrote "I, of course, would not put
any obstacles in his way."

(135)

On September 14, 1943 Murray wrote Murphy that he had
"given much thought to your various communications regarding
Hooker Doolittle's policy with respect to the Arabs in
Tunisia."

(136) Because of Eisenhower's "strong views in

this matter," the Department had decided that it would be
"inadvisable to have Doolittle remain in Tunis and that he
should be transferred to another post."

(137) The

Department, however, thought it best "for reasons of
prestige"

(138) for Doolittle to return to Tunis for a short

time to wind up his affairs and to receive a transfer in the
near future. This would avoid the precedent "of yielding to
French pressure"

(139) which the United States might regret

in the future. Murphy thought Felix Cole and Doolittle might
exchange posts with the latter going to Rabat, Morocco.
In Tunisia both Cole and Mast now confirmed what
Doolittle had been reporting about French treatment of the
Tunisians. To save face Mast probably had to wait until
Doolittle was no longer on the scene to take measures to
correct the situation. Mast now formed a commission to study
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ways of opening up more positions in the administration for
Tunisians. A start had been made by appointing a Tunisian to
be a counselor in city planning. Since many Tunisian homes
were destroyed during the fighting, using a Tunisian to plan
the rebuilding could be beneficial. According to Cole, while
the French realized it was politically desirable to open
more positions to Tunisians, it was difficult to find
Tunisians who would stay in the bureaucracy. Tunisians
usually studied to become either lawyers or physicians.
While the latter found jobs as community physicians in the
administration, the former did not fit easily into a routine
bureaucratic job.

(140)

Beginning in August Mast had begun to try to create
an atmosphere of confidence and understanding between the
French and Tunisians. Utter had obtained a letter from "very
confidential sources"

(141)

that Mast had written to bureau

and office heads of the French administration reprimanding
them for their behavior toward the Tunisans. About this
letter Cole wrote the State Department:
This rebuke to French bureaucratic behavior is
unprecedented as far as anyone in this off ice
can remember. Many of the French Government
employees, uneasy because of their own conduct
during the occupation, have sought to assuage
their consciences by taking it out on the
Arabs whom they accuse of all the misdeeds of
which they themselves were guilty. The
inferiority complex which local French
officials have consistently shown also
explains their attitude of bullying the weaker
party. ( 14 2)
Mast in his letter asked the Frenchmen "to adopt a
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correct attitude toward Tunisian Moslems by avoiding all
contemptuous words or gestures.''

(143) He reminded them that

the French acts were being observed by foreign troops as
well "as an educated and cultured Tunisian bourgeoisie and
that every blundering and stupid act may endanger the very
existence of the Empire."

(144)

In October Murray, Adviser on Political Relations,
sent Berle a report on native affairs in Morocco written by
Gordon Browne, now with the OSS, whom he described as
formerly "one of our ace control officers"

(145)

in that

area. Going into the history of the protectorate in Morocco,
Browne discussed the present Moroccan situation which was
similar to that of the Tunisians. He, also, mentioned that
stories had begun to drift into Morocco about the French
attitude toward the Tunisians when that country was
reoccupied. Murray felt sure that Berle would agree with him
that when the views held by such persons as Gordon Browne
and Hooker Doolittle became current in the United States,
the State Department would be subjected to rather severe
criticism for ignoring the Atlantic Charter. The
inconsistency of this policy would be pointed out in that
the United States was going to great lengths to suppress
those principles in North Africa while being concerned about
them in India.
Browne's report along with one which Berle had
received from the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Army
must have made Berle decide it was time the President

201
learned of the Doolittle situation. The J.I.C.A. report,
drafted by an informant, described how the Tunisians had
turned instinctively to Doolittle because of the "massive
arrests even of the important Arab families,"

(147) how

Doolittle had intervened several times, how the Tunisians
became used to addressing him and deserting the French
Residence, and how this had annoyed Mast. The Tunisians had
reacted emotionally to the news of Doolittle's recall which
had been a real blow to them and especially to
Bourguiba.

(155)

Berle asked Murray to draw up a one page memorandum
for the President. While this was prepared and signed by
Acting Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, a handwritten
note attached to it in the Archives indicates that it was
"not seen by the President."

(149) Probably Stettinius did

not despatch the memorandum to the President because in the
meantime he had arranged a personal meeting between the
President and Hooker Doolittle. Stettinius, who was upset by
Doolittle's recall, had him stopped in Union Station as he
was about to leave Washington. In a note to the President he
wrote:
You have been interested in the problems of
the natives in North Africa. I wonder if you
would perhaps care to see Hooker Doolittle,
Consul General in Tunis up to a couple of
months ago, who, prior to that, spent eleven
years in the area; was an eye witness of the
French colonial policy in Tunis; got to know
too much; was fired out by the French for that
reason. The story is dramatic; and really
raises the question as to whether we ought to
try to mitigate the rigors of the French
imperial policy. It is quite a story. (150)
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Stettinius' promise of a good story must have aroused
Roosevelt's interest because he agreed to see Doolittle. A
meeting was arranged for 11:15 a.m. on November 9.
While the President began the interview by asking
Doolittle about what he called "the Moors" in Tunisia, the
problem was discussed only briefly and superficially.
Doolittle told Roosevelt that there had been some relaxation
of the actively oppressive measures and that the Resident
General had written his subordinates that they were now
under observation by foreign forces. When he reported that
some steps which he had suggested had been taken, the
President said, ''Good work." To Doolittle's suggestion that
he had interpreted the President's sentiments too early, the
President smiled and said, "it seemed so," but he agreed
with the idea of acting as a conscience.
The President then questioned Doolittle on a broad
range of topics including what sort of person the new Bey
was, the reception given de Gaulle in Tunis, how the Arabs
got along with the Jews and Italians, and about the food
situation. Doolittle responded that the new Bey was an
elderly scholar without the influence of the former Bey;
that de Gaulle had received a great welcome and was a superb
showman; that the Arabs resented the Jews and Italians
because of economic competition and because of memories of
Italian acts in Libya; and that wheat and olive oil were not
moving and would soon create a storage problem.

(152)

For his part Doolittle expressed the opinion that
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"Foreign Service officers could help the Arabs by reporting
on their difficulties and asking tactful, but pointed
questions."

(153) The main problem was lack of contact.

Roosevelt was aware of this and mentioned Archie Roosevelt
as having been transferred from North Africa because he was
too "pro-Arab". Doolittle said he had seen Archie in North
Africa and his "pro-Arab" tendencies were similar to his own
in merely wishing to see them have decent treatment. The
French not only tried to prevent the North Africans from
talking with Americans, but from being exposed to American
publications. Doolittle showed Roosevelt a copy of the
Arabic edition of the Reader's Digest which the French did
not permit in North Africa. Roosevelt was surprised and
asked why not. Doolittle presumed they did not want to give
the "Arabs any food for thought.''

(154) Doolittle thought it

should be made available through United States offices
there, "that it would be intellectual manna."

(155)

Doolittle concluded that the President was well
informed on the whole situation and was especially
interested in Morocco. He was also interested in the idea of
an international trusteeship. He talked about "the vast Arab
majority and seemed to feel that something should be done
for them."

(156) He noted the difference between Algeria and

the Protectorates, Morocco and Tunisia, where he thought a
difference in treatment could be brought about. While
obviously interested and sympathetic with the plight of the
North Africans, Roosevelt did not bring about any policy
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changes. He may, however, have intervened to see that
Doolittle was able to return to Tunis eventually to wind up
his affairs and help move his wife and household to Egypt.
(157)
The State Department must have "yielded to French
pressure" after all because Doolittle did not return to
Tunis until after he had assumed his new post in Alexandria,
Egypt. The fact that he went there before returning to
Tunisia and was not given the position in Rabat was probably
due to another intervention by Mast. Four days before
Doolittle's interview with Roosevelt, Mast cabled the French
Committee that Doolittle was about to resume his post and
he thought Ambassador Henri Hoppenot, the accredited
representative of the Committee, should make an energetic
intervention in
Washington based on promises made by Murphy
and Eisenhower. Destourian circles are talking
of Doolittle whom they considered as their
protector and their best agent. Mrs. Doolittle
who is in Tunis is not unfamiliar with these
rumours . ( 15 8)
Apparently Mast thought of the Doolittles as engaged in
something of a conspiracy.
In an undated essay entitled "L'Affaire Doolittle",
written on stationary of the Division of Political Studies,
Doolittle with a certain amount of bitterness, wrote of the
power the American Army exercised in dictating what State
Department personnel should remain or not in North Africa.
Doolittle said the ideas of the State Department, regarding
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its personnel in North Africa, did not appear to be worthy
of consideration since
General Mast continues to dictate the
movements of personnel in that area apparently
on the grounds that he is the only friend
still left to the American Army there. (159)
Doolittle thought it was regrettable that the Army
was isolated. However, he continued, no effort had been made
to determine the reason. Possibly it was due to ignoring the
wishes of the majority so as to keep the "professed esteem
of certain agreeable individuals."

(160) By this Doolittle

probably meant people with whom Murphy had been working,
such as Mast, as well as those who were holdovers from the
Vichy regime.
It was alleged that Doolittle had intervened in the
internal affairs of Tunisia. Doolittle asked if any specific
charge had been filed to this effect. The internal situation
was said to have improved since the intervention stopped.
"Has the fact been mentioned that certain measures suggested
by Doolittle to the French prior to his departure have been
put into effect and may have something to do with better
Arab-French relations."

(161)

If the French treated the

Tunisians in such a way as to cause "resentment against not
only themselves but also against American forces," it would
seem obvious that the United States should try to persuade
the French to adopt a policy that would tend to "conciliate
local majorities."

(162)

The worst aspect of the intervention by the United
States Army in this situation was that, by relinquishing the
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position of the State Department, "we give up any moral
influence we may have and with it the hope of implementing
any of our ideas regarding the betterment of colonial
peoples throughout not only French colonies but throughout
the world."

( 163)

If United States policy was to be determined by
the personal social relations of colonial
administrators with American army officers who
happen to be stationed in certain areas, the
work of the Division of Political Studies
seemed useless and henceforth the United
States should simply approve in advance the
policies of the subordinate officers in the
colonies occupied by American forces. (164)
Doolittle's daughter, Katya Coon, said her father was
very depressed when he returned to the United States,
fearing that his career was finished with the State
Department. It was her belief that it was due to the
intervention of Roosevelt that he was reinstated.

(165)

Still it was Mast and the American Army that had the final
word. Roosevelt may have been preoccupied with other
problems for it was at this time, November 1943, that de
Gaulle forced Giraud out as chairman of the National
Committee, and it was in November that de Gaulle had taken
repressive measures against the nationalists in Lebanon,
which Roosevelt had not liked. In this case, even if he had
wanted to intervene, Roosevelt may have found himself in a
difficult spot since his personal representative, Robert
Murphy, was supporting the French position of asking for
Doolittle's recall. Roosevelt probably did not wish to
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overrule him. Nor would he have wished to overrule the
decision of the Supreme Commander, Eisenhower. The latter
had probably been persuaded by Mast's argument that
Doolittle's presence interfered in the war effort. Even if
he were not persuaded, his policy from the first was that he
needed the French and had to have their cooperation.
Eisenhower revealed the reasons for this policy in a
letter he wrote to his brother Milton on June 29, 1943 just
a month before Doolittle's recall in which he said that
there was
deplorable racial and political discrimination
that not only cried aloud for quick
correction, but were of the type that our
people were determined that war should
eliminate. (166)
Nevertheless it was necessary to have the
active cooperation of French forces. If we had
not we would have had to permit the Axis to
take over and defend Tunisia. If we had done
that we would be fighting the Tunisian
campaign until next Christmas. The size of the
eventual military victory certainly justified
the policy of evolution rather than revolution
in the political field. (167)
While Eisenhower's policy was understandable,
Murphy's was not. Eisenhower, after all, did acknowledge the
"deplorable" conditions of the North Africans. Murphy, on
the other hand, chose to ignore them. Although Doolittle had
aroused the sympathy for the Tunisians of members of the
State Department in Washington such as Murray, Berle and
Stettinius, he had not influenced Murphy who was in a
position to talk to the French. When Giraud asked Murphy
what American opinion would be if the French deposed the
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Bey, Murphy could have pointed out that the American Consul
General considered it a mistake. It might have saved the
French from a move which later many of them acknowledged to
be a mistake.

Instead Murphy told Giraud what he wanted to

hear, that it was a French problem as long as it didn't
interfere with the war effort. It would seem that Macmillan
was right when he said about Murphy:
He is a pleasant enough creature and amenable
to kind and firm treatment but he had neither
principles nor judgment. (168) He is without
fixed purpose or plan and is affected by every
changing mood of local opinion or Washington
rumour. (169)
If Macmillan's assessment is correct, then one can better
understand why Murphy ignored Doolittle's strenous efforts
to have United States policy in Tunisia reflect the
principles of the Atlantic Charter and was swayed by the
French.
The choice of Marcel Malige as Doolittle's
replacement was a clear indication that the policy of
appeasing the French had prevailed. French Ambassador
Hoppenot cabled Mast that he had the best reports about the
new Consul General to Tunisia, Marcel Malige, whose parents
were both French, and who had always shown a sympathetic
understanding of French interests. Malige, who had been
consul in Martinique, had a "favorable prejudice toward
Petain and for certain aspects of the National
Revolution"

(170), according to Hoppenot, while he was only

lukewarm toward de Gaulle. In his wire Hoppenot said, "It's

60c

NOTES

CHAPTER VII

1. Doolittle to Hull, December 30, 1942.
2. OSS Report No. 0136.
3. Albert Memmi, La Statue de Sel {Paris: Gallimard,
1966), 294-295.
4.

Ibid, 296-297.

5. Paul White to Morgenthau, June 23, 1943,
Morgenthau Diary, container 644, deposited at the Roosevelt
Library, Hyde Park, New York, 225.
6. Morgenthau to White, November 3, 1943, Morgenthau
Diary, container 688, part 1, 9.
7. White to Morgenthau, December 14, 1943, Morgenthau
Diary, container 688, part 2, 24.
8. OSS Report No. 38992.
9. Memmi, La Statue de Sel, 296.
10. Doolittle to Hull, June 1, 1943, 851S.00/259.
11. Doolittle to Hull, June 3, 1943, 851S.00/257.
12. Doolittle to Hull, June 2, 1943, 8518.00/256.
13. Doolittle to Hull, February 10, 1943, 851S.00/242.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Doolittle to Hull, April 17, 1943, 851S.00/247.
1 7. Ibid.
18. Ibid.

211
19. Ibid.
20. Doolittle to Hull, June 1, 1943, 851S.00/255.
21. Doolittle to Hull, January 8, 1943, 851S.00/238.
22. Ibid.
2 3. Ibid.
24. Telegram from Marchal to France Libre in London,
April 14, 1943, vol. 861, Quai d'Orsay.
25. "La Question Tunisienne," vol. 861, Quai d'Orsay.
26. Ibid.
27. Doolittle to Hull, April 17, 1943, 851S.00/247.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Murphy to Doolittle, April 22, 1943, 851S.00/259.
31. Ibid.
32. Doolittle to Murphy, May 3, 1943, 851S.00/259.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Alphonse Juin, M'moires: Alger, Tunis, Rome
(Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1959-60), 181.
36. Ibid, 178.
37. Ibid, 179.
38. Ibid.
39. Doolittle to Hull, May 14, 1943.
40. Ibid.
41. Interview with Katya Coon, December 10, 1983,
Marshfield, Massachusetts.
42. Murphy to the President and Hull, May 14, 1943,
851S.00/250.
43. Ibid.

212
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Juin,

I

.

Memo~,

183.

48. Ibid, 188.
49. Ibid.
50. 088 Report No. 001826, June 18, 1943.
51. Charles-Andr~ Julien, L'Afriaue du Nord en Marche
(Paris: Rene Julliard, 1972), 92.
52. Ibid, 156.
53. Ibid, 153.
54. "Le Prlsident Bourguiba Retrace Les £v~nements du
7 Juin 1943," Radio Interview printed in La Depeche
Tunisienne, June 8, 1960, Katya Coon.
55. Ibid.
56. Juin, Mimoires, 192.
57. Doolittle to Hull, June 1, 1943, 8518.00/259.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. "Le President Bourguiba Retrace Les frv~nements du
7 Juin 1943," June 8, 1960.
61. Ibid.
62. Doolittle to Hull, June 1, 1943, 8518.00/255.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Doolittle to Hull, June 1, 1943, 8518.00/259.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.

213
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Doolittle to Hull, June 5, 1943, 8518.00/253.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Bourguiba to Roosevelt, transmitted by Doolittle
to Hull, June 7, 1943, Katya Coon.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. "Bourguiba et Doolittle,"
Katya Coon.

L'Action, June 5, 1966,

84. Doolittle to Hull, June 11, 1943, 8518.00/262.
85. Ibid.
86. Juin, Me'moires, 193.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Mast to Massigli, June 27, 1943, vol. 909, Quai
d'Orsay.
90. De Gaulle, Mdmoires de Guerre: L'Uniti, 123-124.
91. Shortly before the United Nations retook Tunisia,
Esteva was deported by the Germans, apparently forcibly.
When he reached Vichy, he was given special honors for his
actions during the occupation. (Cole to Hull, October 2,
1943, 8518.00/285)
Later when France was retaken and was
under de Gaulle's authority, Esteva was tried by the High
Court and sentenced to solitary confinement. (De Gaulle,

214
M'moires de Guerre: Le Salut, 110)
92. Ibid.
93. Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American
Foreign Policy 1932-1945, 458.
94. Juin to Giraud, May 28, 1943, Quai d'Orsay.
95. Murphy to Hull, June 16, 1943, 851S.00/258.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. Murphy to Hull, June 26, 1943, 851S.00/263; June
28, 1943, 851S.00/264.
101. Murphy to Murray, August 11, 1943, 851S.00/279.
102. Murphy to Hull, June 26, 1943, 851S.00/263.
103. Ibid.
104. Murphy to Alling, July 5, 1943, 851S.001/34.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Murray to Berle, July 26, 19 43' 851S.00/257.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111.

Ibid.

112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Berle to Murray, July 30, 1943, 851S.00/257.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.

215
117. Murphy to Murray, July 29, 1943, 8515.00/267.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Mast to Massigli, August 2, 1943, Guerre
1939-1945, Alger, vol. 868, 4-0-6, Quai d'Orsay.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. Murphy to Felix Cole, August 5, 1943,
851S. 00/281.
125. Ibid.
126. Murphy to Murray, July 3, 1943, 8515.00/268.
127. Macmillan, War Diaries, 149.
128. Ibid, 162.
129. Ibid, 134.
130. Cole to Murphy, August 4, 1943, 8515.00/281.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
134. Mast to Massigli, August 10, 1943, vol. 868.
135. Ibid.
136. Murray to Murphy, September 14, 1945,
8515.00/279.
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
140. Cole to Hull, October 16, 1943, 8515.00/290.
141. Cole to Hull, October 19, 1943, 8515.00/291.
142. Ibid.

216
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
145. Murray to Berle, October 11, 1943, 881.00/2678.
146. Ibid.
147. Berle to Murray, October 12, 1943, 881.00/2680.
148. Ibid.
149. Memorandum to the President, November 1, 1943,
State Department.
150. Memorandum to the President, undated,
unnumbered, State Department.
151. Interview with President Roosevelt, November 9,
1943, 8518.00/282 1/2.
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid.
155. Ibid.
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid.
158. Mast to the French Committee, November 5, 1943,
vol. 868, Quai d'Orsay.
159. "L'Affaire Doolittle," undated, Katya Coon.
160. Ibid.
161. Ibid.
162. Ibid.
163. Ibid.
164. Ibid.
165. Interview with Katya Coon.
166. Eisenhower Papers, II, 1219.
167. Ibid.

217
168. Macmillan, War Diaries, 393.
169.

Ibid,

66.

170. Hoppenot to Mast, Decemoer 20, 1943, vol. 868.,
Quai d'Orsay.
171. Ibid, December 18, 1943.

Chapter VIII

TUNISIA AFTER DOOLITTLE

Marcel Malige came to Tunis as the American Consul
General in January 1944 and stayed approximately one year.
His appointment was obviously meant to appease the French,
and it must have done just that. His sympathies were in
harmony with theirs, and he followed a policy of
non-involvement with the nationalists. The American
Consulate was across the street from the Residency and he
came to know both General and Madame Mast well since he was
often their guest. Because of his friendship and close
contact with Mast, Malige viewed Tunisia very much as the
French would have liked the Americans to view it - a country
where French and Tunisian lived in harmony.
Malige seriously underestimated the force of
nationalism and thought that American observers had
exaggerated the importance of the Destour. Malige thought
the Tunisians, for the most part, were "apathetic to any
change at all because of innate fatalism and
non-combativeness."

(1) Of course, the Destour were quiet

the year Malige was there because they were following
Bourguiba's manifesto of May 1943 of forming a bloc with the
French for the sake of winning the war. Malige did admit
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that there were those who wanted more Tunisians in the
administration.
It is true that a few agitators, such as
Bourguiba, are genuinely imbued with a desire
to see Tunisia governed by more Arabs and less
Frenchmen with a view to eventual elimination
of the latter: but they have recently confirmed
Bourguiba's appeal of as long ago as May 1943
calling upon the Tunisian Arabs to collaborate
with the French. (2)
The fact that Malige referred to Bourguiba as an
"agitator" indicated his identification with the French
point of view. Because of Malige's policy of non-involvement
with the nationalists, he was probably out of touch with
their true strength. Instead he thought that the "initial
enthusiasm among the Destourians over the Atlantic Charter
had disappeared,"

(3) and they had had to accept reality.

They had "resigned themselves to gradual political evolution
within the framework of a more enlightened French
policy.''

(4) By this remark Malige himself seemed to deny

the validity of the Atlantic Charter for the Tunisians,
agreeing instead with Mast's basic belief that Tunisia
belonged to the French Empire and that this situation was
irrevocable.
During this period, Mast continued to restore French
authority, on the one hand, by forcibly eliminating any
threats to it and, on the other, by gaining the goodwill of
the Tunisians, or as de Gaulle wrote in his M'moires de
Guerre, "Resident General Mast maneuvered readily between
plans for reform and authoritative action."(5) While it was
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not until 1945 that Mast announced his plan for long range
reforms, he made many gestures during 1944 to obtain
Tunisian good will. At his request de Gaulle pardoned
thirty-three Tunisians who had been in prison since 1938 for
crimes committed during the Destourian riots of that time.
The Residency announced this action as an indication of its
desire for "Franco-Tunisian appeasement and frank
collaboration."

(6) At the same time he launched the

Paysannat Plan at Kairouan whereby he presented 350 title
deeds to Tunisian peasants who already occupied the land as
squatters. In his speech there, he emphasized that "France
always keeps her promises."

(7) Mast tried to form a

commission composed of French and Tunisians to study
reforms and took many good will trips to outlying areas.
As Mast told Malige, he hoped to do for Tunisia what
Marshal Lyautey had done for Morocco. By his reforms and
goodwill trips Mast also hoped to nullify the Neo-Destourian
demands. As for nationalist demands, he refused to concede
to their wish for liberty of party organization and freedom
of expression. While he aspired to be an enlightened
administrator, as Malige considered him, Mast was very much
imbued with the idea of Empire as he revealed in an
interview with the Paris newspaper Lib~ration in November
1944. In his interview Mast spoke of a wish to create "a
patriotism of empire."

(8)

Each country of the Empire would

have its own individuality and be governed with the
assistance of its elite -

including the elite among the
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Tunisians. The independence movement would fail because the
improvements planned by the French "will give sufficient
liberty."

(8)

by the wari
remain."

He referred to hopes of the Tunisians raised

"certain Tunisian illusions, of which some

(10) Nevertheless, Mast thought there was a

favorable attitude "among the native masses'' toward France.
"The influence of the former Destourian Party is no longer
to be feared. They are divorced from the people."

(12)

Mast continued that to counteract those "perspectives
of independence"

(13) held out to the indigenous people in

the Atlantic Charter, Tunisia would need the help of England
or the United States. England was loyal as well as the
United States to the French position. Right after liberation
Tunisian Arab agitators believed they found
encouragement in the attitude of the American
Consul General, Mr. Doolittle. My personal
position allowed me to breast the current.
Mr. Doolittle departed. The comportment of the
present Consul General cannot lead to confusion
and the Tunisians know there is no divergence
of views to exploit. The most effective
agitator of the past has sought contact, but
he struck a categorical refusal. (14)
Mast told Malige that the author of the Lib,ration story had
obtained the reference to Doolittle elsewhere, but, in
general, the article reflected accurately enough present
French policy toward the Tunisians.

(15)

In the article Mast referred to the "former
Destourian Party." In October 1943 the French Committee of
National Liberation had decided that the "indigenous party"
could not be authorized, it having already been banned since
1938. However, Tunisians could join French parties. The
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"agitator'' undoubtedly referred to Bourguiba.
The French were not all happy with Mast's reform

plans. Some of them thought that instead of giving Tunisians
land to cultivate, they should be taught to increase
production. Mast, however, realized the settlers had to
relinquish some privileges. He thought that giving labor an
honorable status could not hurt the real interests of the
French. In his interview with Lib~ration Mast said that with
the French settlers the war had brought about the fear of
losing everything which was then manifesting itself in a
determination "to regain all former privileges - even the
most unjust perhaps."

(16)

Mast's trips to outlying areas gave him the
opportunity to act the part of the benevolent colonial
administrator. Even Malige realized that they were so
carefully staged that it was hard to judge true native
sentiment. These trips, on which Madame Mast accompanied
Mast and occupied herself with charitable works, were given
much publicity. Mast often asked the American and British
consuls to accompany him. This had the effect of reinforcing
the French position. In fact on one trip the Bey went with
him to quiet rumours that there were differences between the
two.
Very shortly after Malige arrived, he accompanied
General Mast on a goodwill trip to northwest Tunisia.
Writing about this trip and others, Malige portrayed a
Tunisia that was living comfortably with the French
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administration. Malige described how at the towns they
visited the French and the native leaders made speeches, all
claiming loyalty to France, after which Mast would give each
of the native officials an autographed photograph of
himself.

(17}

On the first trip they stayed overnight with a
colonialist who had left a practice as an architect in Paris
to restore a wheat farm to its productivity of Caesar's
time. This meant restoration of underground tunnels which
pumped water to the surface and, as Malige wrote, was an
example of France 1 s "mission civilizatrice".

(18} On this

farm the owner had built new concrete living quarters for
the Tunisians to replace their sod huts, but the latter
still preferred sleeping in their clothes directly on the
floor. A future step for the owner in the civilizing process
would be to raise the sleeping surface a few inches onto a
bed. Malige wrote:
This recalcitrance to first steps in
civilization characterizes two-thirds of the
population of Tunisia and reminds one of the
American Indian's aversion to our own early
efforts to help him. ( 19}
Malige found Mast interested in the material welfare
of the Tunisians. Malige reported that there was a serious
lack of cloth "and natives in the more remote areas.
so clothed in rags as to arouse pity."

.are

(20) General Mast

promised to have a small amount of clothes sent including
discarded American Army clothing. Madame Mast, on one trip,
took clothing to the people in the area, while in Tunis she
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organized a charitable sale of articles of clothing.

(21)

Malige did say that the receptions at the various
towns that Mast visited had been organized well in advance
by the controllers. While Malige had "an opportunity to talk
freely with the native leaders, it was difficult to assess
how faithfully the reception portrayed native sentiment
towards the French."

(22) Malige, however, believed that

French influence had not suffered much due to the war "and
that sentiment in favor of France's recovery through Allied
victory was genuine."

(23) Goodwill toward France had been

built up by French doctors and nurses. Malige wrote that
anti-French sentiment was found mainly in Tunis among a few
thousand educated youth and in a few other towns. Actually
Malige found little interest in politics outside of Tunis
and three or four other cities. In fact he said, what went
on in Tunis was looked upon with distrust. One caid told
Malige that all natives realized the ascendancy of the
Protecting Power, but "only the malevolently disposed
criticized the relationship."

(24) The Tunisians were

indifferent to who occupied the Beylical throne so long as
the French upheld it.

(25)

In the south a caid told Malige they respected the
Bey because of the French and, if the Protectorate were
eliminated, they would go back to independent tribal ways.
In the north around Sfax, Arabized descendants of
Phoenicians were distrustful of Arabized Berbers. Both
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wanted the French to stay as arbiters between them and as
caretakers of order.

( 2 6)

Reporting on a study trip to central and southern
Tunisia, Malige described the controller-caid relationship.
There were twenty-four French civil controllers and
thirty-six Tunisian caids who governed 2,500,000 Tunisians.
Six of the controllers were chiefs of six regions with the
other eighteen under them. Each controller had a district
with usually two or more caids to control. The essence of
the French Protectorate was this co-sovereignty.

(27)

Malige was impressed that "the Controllers were of
uniformly high standard."

(28) He thought their job required

much tact "in teaching the Caids to carry out their
responsibilities to the governed along western
standards."

(29) On the other hand the caids had punitive

powers which led to "venality that characterized the native
officials".

(30) Graft was not considered immoral by the

Tunisians because it was an "ingrained practice consolidated
by many centuries."

(31) According to Malige,

all Controllers and Caids agree that the
universal Moslem trait of deception carried to
the point of perjury is their greatest problem,
one they despair of ever solving. (32)
The checks and balances made the system "function among a
people who are fundamentally undisciplined by
nature."

(33)

One of the cities where anti-French sentiment was
found was Moknine where the first attack against French
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authority was made in 1938. Representatives of both the
British and American Consulates were invited to accompany
Mast on a trip there. John Utter went along. Utter reported
that in his speech there,

"realizing that he was among the

enemy, so to speak, Mast spoke less in generalities and
devoted much of his speech to subjects which touched the
inhabitants of his region."

(34) Mast told Utter he had

purposely come to Moknine to "beard the lion in his
den."

(35) By putting into effect that for which the

Destourians were agitating, the new French policy was,
according to Mast, taking the initiative away from Bourguiba
and his followers.

(36)

When Utter asked Mast why he didn't give Bourguiba a
place in the administration, Mast replied "that Bourguiba
would have too much to lose in abandoning his party - both
in prestige and income."

(37)

Utter also asked Mast how "the

exploratory conversations by Tunisians for reforms were
progressing."

(38) When Mast answered that "nothing was

being accomplished so far and prospects were poor,"

(39)

it

confirmed what Utter had already heard.
Utter was referring to the commission Mast was trying
to form of twelve Tunisians and twelve French to study
reforms. Bourguiba refused to join the commission unless the
ban on the Neo-Destourian Party was lifted. Other Tunisians
had also declined. In October, however, Mast was able to
induce Tahar ben Amar, the head of the Tunisian Section of
the Grand Conseil, the legislature, to bring together
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seventeen leading Tunisians, including Bourguiba, to seek
agreement on political aspirations preparatory to appointing
twelve of them to the Franco-Tunisian Commission. When they
met, they voted against participation in the commission
unless liberty of expression, party organization and meeting
were restored. They also wanted seven of the Tunisians at
the meeting to be designated as an exclusively Tunisian
committee which would reflect the different Tunisian
political views. These seven would decide on a program for
eventual presentation to the French government rather than
the Resident General's commission. Mast refused and
esplained to Malige that bitter experience with sabotage and
bloodshed in 1934 and 1938, when the Tunisians had liberty
of organization, precluded restoration of the liberty asked
for by the Tunisians.

(40)

Mast, in trying to form his commission, had brought
the Tunisians together. They had settled their differences
and were presenting a united front to the French. The
Tunisian Committee of Seven in November voted in favor of
self-government with a prime minister who would be
responsible to a popularly elected assembly. France would
remain the Protecting Power. These views would be submitted
to other leading Tunisians before being adopted as the
Tunisian nationalist platform. Mast, however, considered the
resolution impolitic at a time when solidarity with France
was important. Receiving this decision, the committee voted
to do nothing.

( 41)
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Bourguiba, who had resumed his law practice, had
advised his followers to be patient and to cooperate with
the French in their stated policy of appeasement of the
native population. In March 1944 Mast reported to Algiers
that Bourguiba was in semi-retirement and nationalist
activities were confined to "court intrigues and clan
rivalries."

(42) According to Mast, Bourguiba's policy

appeared to be one of "playing the French card."

(43) Mast

went on to say that Bourguiba was beginning to be criticized
for his policy of "attentisme'' and his desire for a
rapprochement with France. Mast thought that the former Bey,
Moncef, had supplanted Bourguiba in the spirits of the
bourgeois and the more educated. "The star of the chief of
the Neo-Destour had seemed to pale," and he was already
considered "un vieux'' by the young ambitious
Destourians.

(44)

In fact some Tunisians even accused Bourguiba of
having been bought by the French. Some of his lieutenants,
including Salah ben Youssef, considered the most important
Neo-Destourian leader after Bourguiba, had wanted more
political activity and had wanted to distance themselves
from Bourguiba. Bourguiba, however, had brought them back
into line and in August 1944 the party had issued another
manifesto justifying the apparent inactivity.

(45)

In spite of Bourguiba's cooperative position, Mast,
who met with Bourguiba in August 1944 and asked what he
wanted, refused his request to print an unmuzzled party
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organ and to hold a party congress of four hundred delegates
at which the reinstatement of Monce£ and Tunisian
independence would be discussed. Mast told Bourguiba there
was no real political unrest in the regency.

(47)

In fact

from the summer of 1944 Mast restricted Bourguiba's
movements more and more. In the summer of 1944 a bad food
shortage, resulting in heavy French requisitions, had added
to native unhappiness. Mast must have feared that there was
a risk in allowing Bourguiba to circulate freely. Even
though Bourguiba repeatedly tried to reach an understanding
with the Residency and attempted to convince Mast that his
policy would only add more troubles, he was "brushed off"
and put in a situation equivalent to forced residence.

(47)

Discouraged by Mast's intransigence, Bourguiba
decided that the French were not going to make any
concessions and only in obtaining help from the outside
could pressure be put on the French to grant the reforms
they refused to give spontaneously. His hopes as well as
those of the other Neo-Destourians turned toward the Arab
League. In the fall of 1944 he sought help from both the
American and British consuls to intercede with Mast to allow
him to leave for a pan-Arab conference in Cairo.
Pan-Arabism had been a negligible force in Tunisia,
but Tunisians had been made aware of it in 1943 when Feisal
and Khaled, the two sons of King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud of
Saudi Arabia visited Tunis. When they left, the Bey sent a
letter to the King in which he expressed the hope that his
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majesty would find success in the idea of a Union of the
F.rab World which would be the "reward for his noble and
glorious initiative in striving to help Arab states .
out of the sometimes painful straits in which certain ones
among them still find themselves."

(48)

Bourguiba approached Malige to ask him to intercede
with Mast for permission to go to a pan-Arab conference in
Egypt despite, according to Malige, "previous failures to
involve me in Destourian questions."

(49) Malige agreed to

see him, having first made sure that Mast had received him.
Though the meeting had been scheduled at one o'clock for a
half hour, Malige found Bourguiba so interesting that he
kept him all afternoon. The two men found that they were
both graduates of L'Institute

d'~tudes

Politiques in Paris,

having attended together in 1926-1928, though not having
met.

(50)

In spite of his interest in Bourguiba, Malige

refused to help him leave Tunisia by interceding with Mast,
and he refused to see him on another occasion when Bourguiba
wanted to see him "ostensibly to air Nationalist resentment
over continued denial of the right of self-expression."

(51)

Malige thought it was possible he wanted to see him to
"strengthen his own position among the party
leaders."

(52)

The Communists were taking advantage of the
inactivity of the Neo-Destour and at times Mast seemed more
worried about them than the Destourians. After the United
Nations liberation some Neo-Destourians had joined the
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Communist Party with the idea of using membership as a way
of criticizing French policy not allowed them as
nationalists. The Communists trying to enlarge their numbers
had taken on the political goals of the Destourians as well
as keeping the goals for social change of their own party.
In September 1943 Mast put the Secretary General of the
Communist Party in jail for sending him a letter in which he
strongly criticized Mast's Tunisian and economic policies,
charging that the situation had become worse than during the
German occupation. In October 1943 Mast reported to Algiers
that Communist propaganda could have a disastrous effect on
the Tunisians who were unbalanced by the enemy occupation.
The Communists could cause serious social troubles which
could gravely hurt the war and the French position in
Tunisia. Mast wanted the Committee to limit Communist Party
membership to French citizens.

(53~

Mast called on Macmillan in Algiers in October 1943
to express his concerns about the Communists who were
working hard with the Tunisians and "stirring up
disaffection."

(54) Mast complained to Macmillan that he

couldn't get support from the French Committee in Algiers
for firm measures against the Communists because de Gaulle
was "always flirting with Russia and Communists."

(55)

Macmillan, describing this meeting in his War Diaries,
wrote: "But poor Mast is rather a 'fusser', and apt to
exaggerate on this topic."

(56) Macmillan told him he should

get Stalin to intervene and tell the Communists to be quiet
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as they were interfering with the war effort. When Mast
"brightened up" at that idea, Macmillan promised to put him
in touch with the new Russian Ambassador.

( 5 7)

By January 1944, however, Mast found the Destourians
were the most troublesome party. By then the Communists had
separated from the Destour because, they claimed, the
Destourians were taking up anti-French activity. For their
part, the Destourians were upset with the Communists for
their pro-French position and in March 1944, when the
Communists publically stated their platform which included a
pledge of cooperation with the Protectorate, the Destourians
walked out. Ben Youssef, who thought there were several
thousand Tunisian Communists, told the American vice-consul,
Paul O'Neill, that this stance would not change as long as
the Communists went along with the French. He did say that,
if the Communist Party came out wholeheartedly against
France in Tunisia, he would become a Communist immediately
along with all other Destourians. O'Neill commented that
this statement showed how bitterly anti-French and
opportunistic some of the more militant nationalists
were.

(58)
Less militant Destourians looked upon the Communists

as adversaries. They worried about their recruiting of
Tunisians. According to Mast, the Communists tried to win
the Tunisian population over to their side by flattering
them in their sentiments for the former Bey, by showing that
Islam was compatible with Bolshevism, in attacking the
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established order, the bureaucrats, and in particular the
government, and in exploiting economic difficulties, notably
that of provisioning.

( 59)

The concern of the nationalists was expressed in an
editorial in the Arabic

N~hda,

which Malige described as

much a nationalist organ as was possible under the
Destourian ban. It stated, "We are Moslem Arabs7 we have our
own ideals and traditions: we want none other."

(60) Malige

commented that the permission of the Residency to print the
editorial reflected its dislike of both Communists and
Destourians. According to Malige, Mast welcomed the
controversy between the two believing it created for him "a
divide-and-rule atmosphere."

(61)

At the time of the death of Shaikh Taalbi, the head
of the old Destourians, in October 1944 a bad rift occurred
between the Communists and Destourians. The latter were
furious over the obituary of Shaikh Taalbi in the local
Communist Party organ. It was written by its leader, a
Tunisian, who referred to the Old Destourians as
pro-fascists and suggested Taalbi was a Hitler sympathizer
and that he had consented to the collaboration of his
political associates with the Axis occupation. Bourguiba
told Malige that the Destourians "were already lukewarm
to the Communists, because the latter were too pro-French
and this latest attack has split them wide apart."

(62)

Both the American and British consuls agreed not to
attend the funeral.

In Malige's case it was probably because
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of his non-involvement with the nationalists. When Bourguiba
did not attend Shaikh Taalbi's funeral, it was feared that
he had left for the Pan-Arab Conference. Mast had asked both
the British and American consuls to prevent any escape of
Tunisian leaders via United Nations military aircraft.
Actually Bourguiba had not gone.

(63)

While there was little political activity among the
Tunisian nationalists during 1944, significant changes
occurred in the French Committee of National Liberation. In
April 1944 de Gaulle relieved Giraud of his rank as
commander-in-chief thereby essentially eliminating Giraud
from the scene. Roosevelt continued to be opposed to
recognition of de Gaulle in spite of the fact that the
invasion of France was imminent and Eisenhower and Murphy
recommended recognition in order to have a French
administration in place with which to deal after the
invasion. Henry Stimson blamed Roosevelt's opposition on
Leahy, who had warned the President that he might expect a
revolution in France. Although Leahy had had the advantage
of being stationed in Vichy for several years, Stimson did
not think his advice was good. He did not consider Leahy "a
very acute person."

(64)

On May 7 de Gaulle visited Tunis in celebration of
the anniversary of the United Nations victory there. In a
speech he spoke of the need for recognition.
On the eve of battle in France, we ardently
wish that French realities be definitely
recognized, so that the Allied armies can
concentrate on their task, which must remain
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strategical.

(65)

On June 6 the United Nations invasion of Normandy took
place, and though there was no revolution, Roosevelt still
refused recognition.
In June Mast expressed some bitterness to Malige over
the "mistaken" United States policy of non-recognition of de
Gaulle. He spoke of an anti-American sentiment that was
developing because of it. Mast was now pro-de Gaulle, not
from personal attachment, because his sympathies were with
Giraud, but because of the political leadership of de
Gaulle, which he considered the best rallying point for
Frenchmen under the circumstances.

(66)

Mast told Malige that the proclamation of General
Eisenhower (the Darlan deal) had been expedient, dealing
with officials found on the spot. They were, however, "Vichy
tainted." Mast continued that, "Just as Darlan had been
eliminated from the Algiers scene so would any other rival
of de Gaulle"

(67) who might arise under American aegis. No

French prefect could govern his department without a
superior and central French authority.
Mast attributed United States policy to the
unsympathetic reaction Roosevelt had at his one meeting at
Casablanca with de Gaulle. He thought other meetings would
have changed the reaction. Besides, he thought personalities
should be overlooked. Mast felt deeply over what he felt to
be the misguided policy of the United States. Malige had
observed the same belief in the press and in conversations
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with other Frenchmen.

(68)

Actually President Roosevelt had invited de Gaulle to
meet with him in July 1944, the following month, but Mast
had heard that "the President's invitation was 'to have tea'
and nothing was expected from it."

(69) Mast was right

because, when Roosevelt met with de Gaulle in Washington, he
refused to grant any concessions to de Gaulle's Committee
other than "temporary de facto authority" for civil
administration in France, on condition that military
authority rest with Eisenhower and that the French people
would choose their own government.

(70) While Paris was

liberated from the Axis on August 25 and the Committee moved
from Algiers to Paris, it was not until October 1944 that
Roosevelt gave his approval of recognition which was
announced on October 23. Shortly after that Mast held a
reception to commemorate recognition by the United States
and Great Britain at which he reminded Malige of his
"outburst" of June. Malige and Mast agreed that frankness
was the best policy among friends.

(71)

When Malige was transferred to another post in Poland
during the early part of 1945, Vice-Consul Paul O'Neill took
over as acting Consul General. He had arrived in Tunis at
the end of August 1943. At that time he had only just become
a Foreign Service Officer. Having been sent briefly to
Canada, he had requested a post as close to the war zone as
possible. Though from a Quaker family, both his brothers
were in the armed forces, and he, himself, was not opposed
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to fighting. Still, because he was married and had a child,
he was exempt.

( 7 2)

O'Neill had met Doolittle when the latter came to
Tunis for three weeks to pack up his things. O'Neill admired
him though he felt he had gone too far in his
pro-nationalist position. O'Neill found that Malige was
pro-French with a hands-off attitude towards the
nationalists. Though the latter had sought out O'Neill, he
was less involved with the political side while Malige was
there. It was John Utter who saw the nationalists and who
was much more understanding of their aims than Malige.
Utter, however, left Tunis for an assignment in Paris in
February 1945.

(73)

In that month O'Neill wrote of the reaction in French
government circles to a speech made on February 4 by de
Gaulle in Paris. Roosevelt had not wanted de Gaulle at the
Yalta conference and rejected the latter's request to
attend. Regarding France as a defeated and collaborating
power, Roosevelt did not think France deserved to have an
equal role in making postwar decisions. Nor did he want to
add to de Gaulle's power by giving him a voice in these
decisions. De Gaulle, on the other hand, wanted to assert a
position for France as a victor power with equal authority.
His exclusion from the conference had led to hurt feelings
among the French. For those with whom O'Neill had spoken,
the part in de Gaulle's speech which brought forth the most
pride was the one saying that, in the future peace, France
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would not consider herself bound by anything which she had
not discussed and approved in the same way as the other
powers .

( 7 4)

By the time of Yalta Roosevelt had accepted the idea
that France would play a stronger role in Europe than he had
previously wanted. Because he did not think the United
States public would agree to keeping occupation troops in
Germany more than two years, he decided at Yalta to give
France an occupation zone and to let France arm eight more
divisions. By Yalta Roosevelt had also given up the idea of
putting former French possessions under trusteeship except
for Indochina and by March he would agree to make that
country a trust territory of France.

(75)

Roosevelt asked de Gaulle to meet with him in Algiers
after the Yalta conference. De Gaulle refused feeling that,
if Roosevelt had a good reason to see him, he should have
permitted him to go to Yalta. Furthermore, de Gaulle did not
think the American President qualified "to invite the French
President to visit him in France."

(76)

De Gaulle realized

that for Roosevelt, Algiers probably was not France, but de
Gaulle felt it was just as well to remind him. Besides,
Roosevelt was starting his trip by going through Middle
Eastern Arab states inviting kings and heads of states
aboard his cruiser including the presidents of Syria and
Lebanon, French mandates. De Gaulle considered it an affront
that the President was offering to receive de Gaulle "on the
same ship and under the same conditions."

(77)

Thus, at the
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time of Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, relations
between the two men had not improved, and this fact
undoubtedly had an effect on future United States relations
with France.
When O'Neill took over as acting Consul General his
despatches were far more concerned with the Neo-Destourians
than Malige's had been, indicating, no doubt, more contact
with them. Nationalist activity was still relatively
dormant. The nationalists were aware that they could expect
no backing at this time from Great Britain and the United
States and without their help or French concurrence, they
were powerless.
O'Neill had an interview with Salah ben Youssef in
which they discussed different aspects of party policy and
attitudes which, to some extent, were a reaffirmation of
already known ideas. Ben Youssef was at that time more
militant than other top nationalist leaders and was closely
watched by the French, who thought him the likely successor
to Bourguiba should anything happen to the latter. Ben
Youssef told O'Neill that the party had two projects for the
immediate future. One was to work on strengthening itself
internally and on organizing for posible action along
"maquis" lines when the war finished. The other was to send
a top notch representative to Cairo to carry out anti-French
activity. O'Neill mentioned how the Destourians had already
attempted to send a representative and to obtain United
States aid. Ben Youssef confirmed that they were still
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determined to do this and, in fact, a few students had
already left the country via Libya in secret several months
before and were now in Cairo where they were to make contact
with young Algerians and Moroccans who had been there since
before the war.

(78)

For his part, Mast still refused to recognize Tunisian
aspirations. At the final meeting of the Grand Conseil,
which had been considering the 1945 budget, the
Vice-President of the Tunisian Section, Tahar ben Amar,
again, as he had at the opening session, asked for
democratic liberties for the Tunisian people and for more
internal self-government.

(79)

General Mast replied that the Protectorate "from the
beginning had been established on a permanent basis."

(80)

There was a great deal of comment that the Vice-President,
who had been considered a French stooge, had spoken out as
forthrightly for extensive concessions. Some thought he had
been put up to it by General Mast in order that the latter
could silence all speculation by his answer. Others thought
it more likely that he had been prompted by his colleagues
on the Tunisian Committee of Seven.

(81)

While Mast's reply was well received by most of the
French residents, it was bitterly criticized by the
nationalists who were especially upset by Mast's use of the
word "permanent." Mast said,
Although this
is not within
Conseil since
don't want to

question (Tunisian aspirations)
the jurisdiction of the Grand
it has been raised gentlemen, I
leave any doubts in your mind . . .
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other French Government spokesmen have already
drawn your attention to the fact that a
protectorate was not a mandate and that the
French Protectorate was, from the beginning,
established on a permanent basis. (82)
Furthermore, Mast went to great lengths to make it
appear to the outside world that the Tunisians were content
with this permanent arrangement. The British consul told
O'Neill that he had seen no nationalist leaders for a while
but, when he did see Bourguiba, he suggested, after telling
him that no British support could be expected for
nationalist agitation, that the party would better occupy
itself in preparing its case for the peace conference. The
Destourians, since they were outlawed, expected no such
opportunity and complained that France had for some while
been gathering as much evidence as possible to prove, when
the matter arose, the attachment of the colonial subjects to
France. To counteract this was another reason the
Destourians wished to send a spokesman to Cairo.

(83)

To prove this attachment of the Tunisians to France,
all the newspapers had been publicizing telegrams received
from civil controllers in different parts of Tunisia
expressing gratitude and happiness to Mast for his reforms.
All the telegrams had approximately the same date and
O'Neill learned that they were sent in response to
instructions from the Residency. The way this worked was for
the controllers to assemble the leading Tunisians such as
caids and shaikhs and read them a summary of the reforms and
then recommend that they send telegrams on behalf of the
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assembled group. Presumably these messages were for external
use to prove that the Tunisians were fully and loyally
attached to the protecting power.

(84)

Mast outlined his long range political, social, and
economic plans for Tunisia in a broadcast on February 17,
1945. Politically the reforms were to permit the Tunisians
to participate more in the government and administration of
the country. Socially and economically there were plans for
more schools, better medical care, and new building
programs. As envisioned by Mast, the reforms would require
twenty to fifty years and large sums of money. Mast
"emphasized that all reforms would be carried out within the
framework of the French community and under the
Protectorate."

( 8 5)

After Mast's speech sixty-eight Tunisians of
different political parties met and denounced the reforms as
"insufficient and illusory."

(86) This group was an

enlargement of the Committee of Seven which had met during
the past few months to obtain agreement on their political
aspirations. Representatives from all Tunisian political
parties and independent groups attended including the Old
Destour, Neo-Destour, the Tunisian Section of the Grand
Conseil, Chamber of Commerce and Chamber of Agriculture,
professors from the Grande Mosquje, College Sadike and
College Alaoui, businessmen, and landowners.

(87)

At the meeting a motion was read requesting internal
self-government with a popularly elected assembly. The
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Committee of Seven had already approved this motion. Some of
the group thought that the motion did not go far enough and
wanted complete independence with integration of Tunisia in
an independent North African Federation, and then into a
larger pan-Arab federation. Both the Old and New Destour
leaders, however, said this was not a good time to raise the
question of complete independence as it would hinder the war
effort of the United Nations. Furthermore, internal
self-government was a necessary step before external
sovereignty could be thought of.

(88)

It was clear to the participants at the meeting that
outside pressure would be needed if Tunisian aspirations for
self-government were to be met. They also believed that it
was important that the sacrifices of the Tunisians for the
war effort, particularly in troops, be credited to the
Tunisians and not to France; and that the
claims for self-government be presented to the
outside world independent of ideology and
passion for the world must know that these
claims are based not on fanaticism or
xenophobia but on the need for more self
respect, liberty, better food and living
conditions. These needs are not met by France
which not only humiliates and represses us but
prevents us from advancing in education,
agriculture, and technical fields. {89)
The meeting agreed to form four study groups to work
out a detailed plan for self-government with commissions for
political and legislative problems, economic and financial
problems, educational and cultural problems, and social
problems. O'Neill pointed out that nationalist parties had
formerly concentrated on political aims and had been vague
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about details of administrative, social, and economic
matters.

(90)

Mast, several days later informed Tahar ben Amar, the
Vice-President of the Tunisian Section of the Grand Conseil,
who had in the past been agreeable to French directives,
that he, Mast, was "most displeased''

(91) with the

activities of the meeting, and that no more of these illegal
meetings should take place, and that the leaders would be
confined if it continued. A second meeting was cancelled.
O'Neill wrote of an article in Nahda about a
conversation between its director and General Mast on the
reforms planned by Mast. In parentheses O'Neill explained
that Nahda and the other Arabic daily, Zohra, were both
censored and under a certain "amount of control and
suggestion from the Residency,"

(92) but Nahda to the extent

allowed, was more representative of nationalist opinion. It
was believed that the interview was initiated by the
Resident General in order to allow Tunisian critics who
thought the reforms did not go far enough "to let off a
certain amount of steam"

(93) and to allow Mast to say these

reforms were planned steps that, when finished, would be
followed by others.
In talks with some of the leaders of the Neo-Destour,
O'Neill was told that the party policy for the time being
was one of "wait and see."

(94) While a minority wanted to

act now in hopes that demonstrations and their repression
would elicit the sympathy and action of Great Britain and
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the United States, the majority were for waiting in hopes
that the San Francisco Conference scheduled for April 25,
1945 would result in some colonial agreement favorable to
the Tunisians. They were looking for the support of
independent Middle Eastern countries, especially Egypt, at
the conference.
The Destourians continued to insist that they would
get an important leader to Cairo in the near future.
Bourguiba was now limited to the city of Tunis proper by the
security authorities, and his colleagues claimed that this
was because the French were afraid that he would be the one
to attempt to leave the country or, should he be permitted
to come and go freely, he would conduct a campaign in the
interior against the reform plan of General Mast.

(96)

April 9, the anniversary of the Tunisian nationalist
demonstrations of 1938 after which the French legally
dissolved the Destourian parties, was quiet without any
incidents. The French police patrolled the streets and
Sengalese troops, as well as the American military police,
were put on alert. Several inflammatory bulletins were
passed around before April 9 and a few were posted on walls
I

around the Grande Mosquee where the students were a focal
point for nationalist loyalties. Nationalists reported that
some French "agents provocateurs" were trying to promote
demonstrations. The Neo-Destourian party, however, had asked
its members to remain quiet and avoid any open action. The
native quarter appeared normal during the day.

(97)
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This peacefulness was not unexpected. The nationalist
leaders had often assured the Americans and British that
they would refrain from any active disturbances that might
hurt the war effort. They knew that any disturbances would
be quickly put down by the French authorities and would be
disapproved by the United States or Great Britain.

(98)

While the peacefulness of April 9 was expected, the
vast outpouring of grief at the time of Roosevelt's death on
April 12 was not. The extent of Tunisian mourning came as a
real surprise to the French. The nationalists looked up to
him because he had espoused self-determination in the
Atlantic Charter, and they organized a mammoth parade of
mourning. Demonstrations had previously not been allowed,
but this ceremony of mourning was allowed on this day. There
was great fervor and shouting. It was a memorable occasion
that really startled the French and frightened them since it
was the first time that they saw the dimensions of the
nationalist movement. O'Neill described it saying, "you
could hear the shouts. There was peaceful marching in
ordered ranks. There were rows and rows - thousands."

(99)

It gave the nationalists a sense of their own strength and
was a real shot in the arm for them. The French were
alarmed, but O'Neill was not sure what their reaction was or
what they did in retaliation.

(100)

O'Neill reported on a couple of minor incidents that
happened at the memorial ceremony which involved Tunisians.
In one, Tunisian students marched around with a sign in
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Arabic saying "Glory to the Great President Roosevelt,
Creator and Guiding Spirit of the Atlantic Charter."

(101)

French authorities watched them carefully to make sure no
unanticipated demonstration took place as a result of this
group. Another minor incident was over the report of a
French newspaper that "several Tunisian religious
organizations took part"

(102) in the memorial ceremony. The

Tunisian press was indignant because all sections of the
Tunisian population had taken part with great
enthusiasm.

(103)

When it was learned that Habib Bourguiba had
disappeared, there was much discussion. It was rumoured that
he had been whisked away by the French, as a precaution
before April 9, or that he had left secretly for Egypt,
which he had wanted to do in order to promote Tunisian
nationalist aspirations.

(104)

The rumour that Bourguiba had escaped to Egypt was
indeed true. When the French had refused to allow him to go
to his niece's wedding in his native village of Monastir, it
was the "final blow,"

(105) and he decided to go anyway. His

car was sent empty to Monastir while he remained
"ostentatiously in Tunis."

(106) Then, taking a midnight

train to Sfax, he mixed with a group of Tunisian students
and arrived at Monastir where a group of Destourians ready
to fight kept the police from arresting him. The Tunisian
governor of the district advised the local French controller
not to start riots by keeping Bourguiba from going to the
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wedding so he was permitted to attend and to return to Tunis
by car. In Tunis his comrades told him his escape had been
arranged. He was to leave his car conspicuously parked in
front of his house and go to a hiding place.

(107)

From his hiding place he went on March 26 to Sf ax
where, disguised as a fisherman, he took a sailing ship to a
small port in Tripolitania. The trip took almost a week and
at one point the ship was becalmed for three days within
sight of Gabes. Bourguiba spent his time below deck. In
Tripolitania he bought native clothes and was able to join
the party of a shaikh going to Benghazi. From there his trip
was by camel, donkey, and on foot for sixty kilometers until
he passed the Egyptian border where he was arrested on April
26, one month after leaving Tunis. His release was arranged
through the Secretary General of the Arab League and the
British immigration authorities allowed him to remain
indefinitely.

(108)

In Egypt Bourguiba saw advocates of the Arab League
and other groups concerned about their North African
brethren. He also contacted Doolittle and on May 15 he
visited the Alexandria consulate and recounted his story.
Doolittle told Bourguiba to take up with the Legation any
political matters that he could not handle himself. In his
despatch Doolittle wrote,
I hope that he may be accorded a hearing. Habib
Bourghiba is a most interesting man. A fanatic
in defense of his ideals of national autonomy.
I have found him to be straight and direct
beyond the conception of any other Oriental
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politician. Slight of figure with blazing blue
eyes, he is the type that lives on nervous
energy and inner convictions. (109)
Doolittle's youngest daughter, Natasha, who joined her
parents in Egypt in 1945, recalled that Bourguiba had come
twice for lunch. Her father saw that Bourguiba was not the
unscrupulous agitator the French portrayed, but a man
devoted to his country.

(110)

When Mast learned of Bourguiba's arrival in Egypt and
meeting with Doolittle, he lost no time in telling O'Neill
that he was afraid that the friends of Bourguiba might try
to send messages to him through the American Consulate and
that he would view seriously any such help to the
nationalists by the United States. O'Neill assured him that
"it was established policy not to accept such material from
any source."

(111)

In his anxiety about Bourguiba and Doolittle, Mast
must have again asked the French Embassy in Washington to
intervene. The Counselor from the latter spoke to Loy
Henderson in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs of the State
Department about the fact that Doolittle
had been encouraging Tunisian revolutionists
who had taken refuge in Egypt and in particular
had been giving encouragement to Mr. Habib
Bourguiba, one of the most notorious of the
Tunisian revolutionary leaders. (112)
Henderson told the Counselor that "after investigating the
matter the Department was convinced that Doolittle was not
assisting or encouraging Tunisian revolutionists."

(113)

Doolittle "had been in the Foreign Service for many years
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and his record was such that the Department had confidence
in his integrity and judgment."

(114)

Because he feared Henderson was "fed up"

(115) with

his complaints, several weeks later the same Counselor
approached another member of the State Department with
reports of frequent contacts between Doolittle and Bourguiba
along with a report that Bourguiba's journey to Egypt had
been arranged by Mrs. Doolittle. The Counselor was told that
the story about Mrs. Doolittle was absurd and "that all of
these reports bore the stamp of overzealousness on the part
of some agent."

(116)

It was not only Doolittle that Mast worried about,
but any contacts by the Americans or British with the
Tunisians. Mast expressed a concern to O'Neill about the
activities of OSS and JICA representatives in Tunisia,
saying they were interfering with the internal affairs of
the country. O'Neill believed Mast's complaints were
unfounded and represented only a general concern about
foreign aims in North Africa.

( 11 7)

Mast was worried about Doctor Frend, a member of the
British Psychological Warfare Board, who thought that the
administration of Tunisia was too heavy a burden for the
French and that the troubles in Tunisia could only be
remedied by replacing the Bey's ministers with members of
the Destour who enjoyed the confidence of the Tunisians.
Frend thought an interallied commission should be formed to
study and find solutions to the Tunisian problems. Frend had
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been in touch with Ben Youssef and Bourguiba through the
intermediary of Slim Driga "ancien Secretaire de M.
Doolittle."

(118) Mast thought it was important to call

these "agitations" to the attention of the British and have
him recalled from Tunisia.

(119)

On a trip to Paris Mast met with Malige, now
Counselor for Economic Affairs at the American Embassy, to
complain of a certain OSS agent who was consorting with a
notorious Arab prostitute. He ended by saying "with a smile"
that this was "the only problem of importance which existed
in the relations between the United States and the French
Protectorate of Tunisia."

(120)

Mast's overzealousness may have been partly due to
his own personality, formed by a military career, which
could not tolerate any threats to his authority. John Utter,
who was also working in Paris, saw Henri Gantes, a French
controller from Sfax, who explained why he had refused the
job offered to him by Mast as Chef du Cabinet. In giving his
reasons, he was very critical of Mast who, he thought, saw
everything from a military point of view. He considered Mast
to be too rigidly maintaining an outdated colonial system.
He is not in agreement with the General's Arab
policy . . . Gantes was born and brought up in
Egypt, has a thorough knowledge of the English
treatment of this Moslem country and is
definitely inclined to such methods for French
North Africa. He fears strongly that France is
not keeping pace with the world-wide evolution
of colonial policy and is sure to run into
trouble if definite actions and unselfish
gestures are not substituted for fine yet
vague words. The top-heavy structure of
Functionnaires in the Regency appalls him.
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Gantes does not want to work closely with a
man who views everything from a purely
military angle, and he feels that Mast does
not listen to advice.

(121)

While Mast may have had such limitations, his policy
simply reflected that of the de Gaulle administration and
the very nature of colonialism. The watchword of the de
Gaulle administration was maintenance of the colonial status
quo. This stemmed from its own weakness. The Committee,
later the Provisional Government, could not afford to
alienate the large landholding colonialists and
industrialists in the colonies, who, of course, had always
felt threatened by any hint of change or liberalization that
might benefit the Tunisians. The Committee itself included
members formerly connected with big business and the army.
Naturally, the Committee stuck to the traditional colonial
line. Even if members of the Committee had wanted to change
that line, the Committee was too preoccupied with attempting
to strengthen itself internally and establishing itself as
the representative of France to begin new programs.

(122)

De Gaulle's anticipation of France's post-war
situation was a major factor in his colonial policy. He felt
in order for France to regain its position as a first rate
power, it needed the Empire, and he did not wish to give the
colonial peoples the slightest hope of independence. This
rigid policy probably came from the fear that colonies might
break away if given any privileges while France was in such
a weak position. Preserving the greatness of France was the
dominant idea of all the Gaullists. Macmillan described the
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French attitude in the fall of 1943:
They are really as touchy as a divorced woman

about their 'reputation' and their 'position
in European society'. If they could get a
ticket for the Great Powers Enclosure they
would be happy. (123)
The French bureaucracy was composed of officials,
many of whom had held their posts since before the war.
Since their major concern was their pensions, it was not
surprising that they didn't want to give up the traditional
colonial policy for some new liberal ideas. Furthermore, the
bureaucracy contained many pro-Vichyites who were motivated
by hanging-on rather than introducing new ways.

(124)

The very nature of colonialism was at the heart of
the problem.

Memmi in Portrait du Colonise-1, pr~cedd du

Portrait du Colonisateur described how the colonizer became
a reactionary, even a fascist, since he had no choice but to
approve the discrimination and codification of injustice.
The colonizer worried whenever any political change was
suggested and could support only governments that were
oppressive and reactionary or at least conservative.

(125)

According to Memmi, racism symbolized the fundamental
relation between the colonizer and the colonized. The
colonized had lost the habit of active participation in
government. At first the colonized attempted to imitate the
colonizer, but, in this attempt at assimilation, he was
denying himself and his traditions. The next step was to
revolt. Memmi did not think it was a coincidence that many
colonial leaders, such as Bourguiba, had mixed marriages.
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Having pushed the attempt at assimilation to its

limi~

they

had returned to their own base and to the realization that
their own future coincided with that of their people.

(126)

While still imprisoned in Marseille, Bourguiba had
written his intimates that the colonized had a
responsibility for his servitude. The first thing he needed
to do was to become aware of the mediocrity of his condition
and the pride of being liberated from it. "The day when the
colonizer will have been delivered from his complex of
dominator and the colonized from his complex of servitude,
colonialism will have seen its end."

(127)

It was the colonial system that was at the heart of
the problem between Doolittle and Murphy as well as between
de Gaulle and Roosevelt. Even if Roosevelt and de Gaulle had
been able to meet again and perhaps overcome personality
problems, there would have remained their fundamental
difference over colonialism. The reason De Gaulle refused
Roosevelt's invitation to meet in Algiers was a
demonstration of this. De Gaulles' readiness to take as an
insult Roosevelt's inviting him to the same cruiser on which
he had talked with the presidents of Syria and Lebanon shows
something of his touchy attitude of superiority toward these
colonials.
For his part Murphy took the side of the French.
Since he had been the Counselor of the Embassy in Paris
before coming to North Africa, he was, perhaps, in the habit
of identifying with French goals. Because of his role in
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obtaining French help for the North African invasion and
then keeping it during the Tunisian campaign, it was
understandable why he avoided consideration of Tunisian
goals.
Murphy had his critics. Roosevelt received several
letters and telegrams complaining about his appointment of
Murphy as Ambassador to Germany in the fall of 1944. One
telegram suggested that Roosevelt would be hurt in his
campaign for reelection by his appointment of Murphy. A
letter entered a protest against Murphy's appointment
because of his record which was "at such variance with the
Democratic Ideals expressed by you [Roosevelt] and longed
for by most people."

(128) Another letter

su~gested

that

Murphy was being appointed only because of "personal
appearance and handsome social manners."

(129)

It would seem that Doolittle might have resented
Murphy's part in his recall. According to his daughter,
Katya, however, this was not the case. Katya indicated that
he continued to feel friendly towards Murphy. Paul O'Neill,
who later served with Murphy in Brussels, thought this was
not surprising because Murphy was very affable. Possibly
Doolittle was unaware of the case Murphy built up against
him and thought it was primarily the influence of Mast on
Eisenhower that had caused his withdrawal.
Roosevelt and Doolittle shared similar beliefs about
carrying out the goals of the Atlantic Charter. Roosevelt
envisioned a world without colonialism with trusteeships for
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former colonies serving as an intermediary stage. He would
have liked French Indochina to have been one of these. One
of the reasons he had tried to block de Gaulle from power
was because of the latter's wish to restore France and its
Empire to its former glory. Not only did Roosevelt not
succeeed in preventing de Gaulle from taking power, in
retrospect it was obvious that he had far less influence on
the French than he thought he should have.
Like Roosevelt, Doolittle thought the United States
could influence French policy. Military necessity was the
reason for not interfering. While this may have been
sufficient reason during the war, it need not have kept the
United States from lending a sympathetic ear to the problems
of the North Africans and attempting to understand their
nationalist goals.
This was what Doolittle had done. In a letter to
another Foreign Service Officer, Doolittle speculated that
his outspokeness had hindered his advancement in the State
Department. Doolittle wrote that his own career was
marred and often retarded by an unfortunate
propensity for expressing what I believed in
the interests of the country rather than what
the powers that be in the Department wished to
have reported. (130)
Doolittle was Minister to Pakistan when he retired to live
in Tangier. In his letter he told the friend if he came to
Tangier to
Go to Cape Spartel and turn left into the
valley. Look for a vine covered stone hut
surrounded by some straggling weeds and a
bench where a disreputable elderly native is
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trying to catch a prawn for a frugal supper.
Hirn, the native will be me - ex F.S.O. (131)
While Doolittle's career advancement may have been
hindered by his forthrightness, he did receive the Medal of
Freedom for
his active and successful role in the work of
preparation for the landing of Allied forces
in French North Africa. Speaking the French
and Arabic languages, Mr. Doolittle was able
successfully to establish useful contacts with
the resistance movement in French Morocco and
Tunisia and to assist in counteracting the
subversive activities of the German and
Italian Armistice Delegations and their agents
operating in that area. (132)
Bourguiba credited Doolittle's intervention on his
behalf in 1943 for saving the Neo-Destour from oblivion. On
0une 7, 1966, the anniversary of the date that Bourguiba was
given his freedom, Bourguiba honored Doolittle at a
celebration in Tunis. At that time Bourguiba recalled in a
radio address the help Doolittle had given him. Only
recently Doolittle's daughter, Katya, and granddaughter were
welcomed by Bourguiba and his wife on a visit to Tunisia. On
that visit they discovered that there was a Hooker A.
Doolittle Street in Tunis.
The fact that Tunisia obtained independence without
bloodshed may perhaps be attributed to Bourguiba's patient
and sensible guidance. In his radio broadcast of June 7,
1966 he stated
We were able to disengage ourselves from a
difficult situation by using audacity,
suppleness and perseverance.
Bourguiba continued that was the method of fighting which
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had always succeeded for them. By his help and
encouragement Hooker Doolittle had played a role in that
successful fight.
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